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ABSTRACT 
In 1937, the international community preliminarily agreed on a 
definition of international terrorism. A major World War and Cold War 
since that time have made impossible any such modern consensus. In 
particular, the U. N. principles of the equal rights and self- 
determination of "Peoples" have caused political and juridical confusion 
in that liberation fighters who utilize terror methods as one tactic in 
an overall political strategy to achieve self-determination are 
frequently termed "terrorists", and prosecuted as such. 
In order to regulate wars of self-determination under interna- 
tional law, and to control the means and methods of warfare utilized in 
them, international humanitarian law (IHL) was extended in 1977 to 
include armed conflicts for the right to self-determination, "as 
enshrined in 
... 
the Declaration on Principles of International Law 
concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation among States in 
accordance with the Charter of the United Nations". Thus, acts of 
terrorism perpetrated during armed struggles for self-determination are 
separable from random acts of international violence, and when 
perpetrated by states or insurgent forces during wars of self- 
determination, may be prosecuted under IHL as war crimes. 
However, although states are obligated to seek out and prosecute 
the perpetrators of illicit acts of warfare, they rarely do so. 
Nevertheless, should IHL be fully utilized during wars of self- 
determination, if only for purposes of guidance, the separability of 
illicit acts of war would enable the international community to reach 
Iconsensus 
more easily regarding a definition of terrorism in general, 
and a co-ordination of efforts to deter its occurrence. 
When the French Revolution broke out, it certainly 
afforded to Mr. Burke an opportunity of doing some good, 
had he been disposed to it; instead of which, no sooner 
did he see the old prejudices wearing away, than he 
immediately began sowing the seeds of a new inveteracy, 
as if he were afraid that England and France would cease 
to be enemies. That there are men in all countries who 
get their living by war, and by keeping up the quarrels of 
Nations, is as shocking as it is true; but when those who 
are concerned In the government of a country, make it their 
study to sow discord, and cultivate prejudices between 
Nations, it becomes the more unpardonable. 
- 
Thomas Paine, Rights of Man 
il 
C0NTENTS 
Analytic Table of Contents 
Preface and Acknowledgements 
Abbreviations 
Chapter 1 
Chapter 2 
Chapter 3 
Chapter 4 
Chapter 5 
Chapter 6 
Chapter 7 
Chapter 8 
Chapter 9 
Bibliography 
page iv 
xiv 
xv 
1 
27 
85 
123 
172 
243 
297 
345 
389 
401 
iii 
ANALYTICTABLE0FC0NTENTS 
Chapter 1 The Utilization of International Humanitarian Law and, in 
Particular. the Geneva Convention Treaty Regime. to Deter 
Acts of International Terrorism: 
Introduction an ems of Reference 
1.1. Working Definitions 
1.1.1. "Terrorist Offense" 
1.1.2. "Self-Determination" 
1.1.3. "Peoples" 
1.1.4. "International Humanitarian Law" 
1.2. Discussion 
1.2.1. Legality of the Use of Armed Force in Liberation Wars 
1.2.2. IHL as a Neutral Forum 
1.2.3. State Unwillingness to Invoke IHL 
1.3. The Use of Violent Force to Define a Liberation War 
1.4. The Issue of Self-Determination and the Content of IHL 
1.4.1. Recognition of Conditions of Modern Warfare 
1.4.2. Jurisdictional Conflicts 
1.4.3. Terrorism and Freedom Fighters 
1.5. The Proper Legal Placement of Terrorist Offenses 
iv 
1.6. Effects of Assessments of Responsibility for Violence 
1.7. Legal Obstacles in the Prosecution of Terrorists under IHL 
1.8. Conclusion 
Chapter 2 The Evolution of the Right to Self-Determination, through 
the Perspective of Resort to Violence 
2.1. The Self-Determination Issue: the Principle as Opposed 
to the Right 
2.1.1. Evolving Basis: Post-Colonialism, the "Aaland Islands" 
Dispute, and the U. N. Charter System 
2.1.1.1. The League of Nations 
2.1.1.2. The "Aaland Islands" Dispute 
2.1.1.3. The U. N. Charter 
2.1.2. The Right of Self-Determination, National Liberation, and 
Customary International Law 
2.2. Problems in Defining Which "Peoples" are Entitled to Use 
Force to Achieve Self-Determination 
2.2.1. The "Peoples" Entitled to Self-Determine 
2.2.1.1. The Evolving Basis of Self-Determination 
2.2.1.2. Self-Determination and the Law of War 
2.2.1.3. Alternative Analyses of Self-Determination 
2.2.2. The "Right" to Use Force to Achieve Self-Determination 
V 
2.3. The Use of Nonconventional Means and Methods to Achieve 
Self-Determination 
2.3.1. The Right to Wage War 
2.3.2. War to Create New Law or System Transformation 
2.3.3. Nonconventional Means and Methods of Warfare 
Chapter 3 Examples of "Peoples" Achieving the Right to Self- 
Determination through Resort to Violence 
3.1. The Issue of Choice in Self-Determination 
3.1.1. Algeria 
- 
Emergence as Sovereign 
3.1.2. Micronesia, Hong Kong and Free Association 
3.1.3. The Integration of Northern Ireland, Goa and the 
Occupied Territories 
3.2. "External" and "Internal" Self-Determination 
3.2.1. The East-West Split 
3.2.2. U. N. General Assembly Resolution 2625 (XXV) of 1970 
3.2.3. The Right to Use Force and the Laws of War 
Chapter 4 The Effects o4 Wars of_Self-Determination Qn the 
Evolution of International Humanitarian Law 
4.1. The Historical Development of International 
Humanitarian Law 
4.1.1. Hague Law and Control of the Means and Methods of Warfare 
vi 
4.1.2. Geneva Law and Humanitarian Concerns 
4.1.3. Human Rights and IHL 
4.1.4. Protocols 1 and 2 of 1977 - Convergence of Previously 
Separate Regimes 
4.2. The Necessity to Extend IHL to Wars of Self-Determination 
4.2.1. The Failure of Common Article 3, and Foreign State 
Intervention in Struggles for Self-Determination 
4.2.2. Regulation of and Restrictions on Contemporary Scales 
of Violence 
4.3. Protocol 1 and the Use of Violent Force to Achieve the 
Goals of Self-Determination 
4.3.1. The "New" Approach to Self-Determination 
4.3.2. The 1974 
- 
77 Diplomatic Conference, and Political 
Compromise 
4.3.3. Problems in Ratification 
Chapter 5 Terrorists and Freedom Fighters: The Failure oL State- 
Centric Codification Efforts to Deter Acts oL Interna- 
tional Terrorism 
5.1 The League of Nations and International Co-operation 
with Regard to the Prevention of Terrorism 
vii 
5.1.1. The 1937 Definition of Terrorism, as Contained in 
the Terrorism Convention 
5.1.1.1. Pertinent Provisions 
5.1.1.2. Discussion 
5.1.2. The I. C. C. Convention of 1937 and Jurisdictional 
Problems 
5.1.2.1. Pertinent Provisions 
5.1.2.2. Discussion 
5.2. The Current Legal System, with Particular Regard to 
Extradition Arrangements 
5.2.1. The Hostages Convention, and the Geneva Conventions, 
as Applicable to a Particular Act of Hostage-Taking 
5.2.1.1. Pertinent Provisions 
5.2.1.2. Discussion 
5.2.2. The U. S. 
-U. K. Extradition Treaty, European Convention 
and Dublin Agreement - Attempts at Unification 
5.2.2.1. The U. S. 
-U. K. Supplementary Extradition Treaty 
5.2.2.2. Pertinent Provisions 
5.2.2.3. The European Convention 
5.2.2.4. Pertinent Provisions 
5.2.2.5. The Dublin Agreement 
5.2.2.6. Pertinent Provisions 
5.2.2.7. Discussion 
5.2.2.7(1). The Scope for Political Offenses 
viii 
5.2.2.7(2). The Issue of Inquiry 
5.2.2.7(3). State Mutual Interest 
5.2.2.8. Conclusions 
5.3. The Failure of State-Centric Codifications to 
Comprehensively Address the Extradite or Prosecute 
Obligation of States 
5.3.1. The I. L. A. Committee on International Terrorism 
5.3.1.1. Use of the IHL Treaty Regime 
5.3.1.2. Draft Articles on Extradition 
5.3.1.3. Discussion 
5.3.2. The Prohibition of Terrorist Acts in International 
Humanitarian Law 
5.3.2.1. The Law of Armed Conflicts and the Special Status of 
Wars of National Liberation 
5.3.2.2. The Law of Armed Conflicts as Guidance to a Legal 
Approach to Terrorism in Peacetime 
5.4. Conclusions 
Chapter Protocol 1. Methods of Terror-Violence. and to Scope 
QL hie, Potential Applicability p1, JE L 
6.1. Terrorist Violence as a Political and Ideological 
Strategy 
6.1.1. The Use of Violence to Achieve Political Interaction 
ix 
6.1.2. Terrorist Verbal Strategy to Indicate a Legal 
Relationship 
6.1.3. The Use of IHL to Deter Political or Ideological 
Terror-Violence 
6.2. The Use of Terror-Violence to Provoke the Application 
of IHL 
6.2.1. Group Terrorism as Evidence of Commonly-Shared 
Grievances 
6.2.2. The Use of Terrorism to Preserve the Legitimacy of 
Group Identity 
6.3. Threshold Problems in Prosecuting Acts of Terrorism 
under IHL 
6.3.1. Terrorism and Concern for the Victims of Violence 
6.3.1.1. The Application of Common Article 3 
6.3.1.2. Difficulties in Applying Common Article 3 to Terrorism 
6.3.2. Terrorism and Fundamental Humanitarian Concern 
6.4. Terrorism as a Grave Breach of Geneva Law, Where 
Applicable 
6.4.1. Grave Breaches/War Crimes as Greater Statements of 
Principle 
6.4.2. Grave Breaches and International Individual Responsibility 
X 
Chapter 
,7 
Political Aspects of the Applicability of IHL to 
Liberation Struggles 
7.1. The Legitimacy of the Authority Representing a "People" 
7.1.1. Application of the Law of War and the Legal Status of the 
Parties to a Conflict 
7.1.1.1. Belligerency and Insurgency 
7.1.1.2. International War and Internal War 
7.1.2. Terrorism as a "Peacetime" Phenomenon 
7.1.3. Terrorism as a "Wartime" Phenomenon 
7.2. Implementation of IHL Strengthens International Recognition 
of the Authority Representing a "People" 
7.2.1. Application of the Law of War and the Legal Status of 
Parties to a Conflict 
7.2.2. International Recognition of Terrorism as a Method of 
Warfare 
7.3. Effects of Renouncing Terrorist Methods in Compliance 
with IHL Provisions 
7.3.1. Application of the Law of War and the Credibility of Group 
Claims 
7.3.2. The Use of Terrorism as "Justifiable" in Liberation 
Struggles 
xi 
7.4. Normative Effects of the Use of Violent Force to Achieve 
the Goals of Self-Determination 
7.4.1. Application of the Law of War and Considerations of 
Efficiency 
7.4.2. Terrorism and its Normative Development as a Method of 
Warfare 
Chapter 8 Legal Obstacles to Prosecution of Breaches oi. IHL 
8.1. The Nuremburg International Military Tribunal and the 
Development of the Notion of War Crimes Jurisdiction 
8.1.1. The Assumption of. Supreme Authority, over Germany, by 
the Allies 
8.1.2. The Jurisdictional Bases for the Trial and Punishment of 
the Major War Criminals of the European Axis Countries 
8.1.2.1. Crimes of No Geographical Location 
8.1.2.2. Diversity of Legal Systems 
8.1.2.3. Legal Objections to the Jurisdiction of Nuremburg 
8.2. The Prosecution of Viet Nam Atrocities 
8.2.1. The Obsolescence of Hague Law 
8.2.2. Obstacles to the Prosecution of Viet Nam War Crimes 
8.2.2.1. The Legal Issues 
8.2.2.2. The Nuremburg Arguments 
8.2.2.3. Judicial Restraint 
xii 
8.3. Obstacles to Prosecution Generally, and the Primacy of 
Politics 
8.3.1. International Norms and State Legislative Discretion 
8.3.2. The Primacy of Political Considerations 
8.4. Obstacles to Prosecuting Terrorist War Crimes 
8.4.1. Fundamental Humanitarian Concerns 
8.4.2. The Emergence of a Terrorist Norm 
Chapter 9_ Conclusion 
9.1. Resort to Violence 
9.2. Political Considerations 
9.2.1. The Presentation of a Legal Claim 
9.2.2. Consensus with Regard to IHL 
9.2.3. The Breakdown of Consensus 
9.3. Obstacles to Prosecuting Terrorist War Criminals 
9.4. Terrorism as a Separable Phenomenon 
x111 
PREFACE 
AND 
ACKN0WLEDGEMENTS 
All legal research can face the difficulty of having to follow 
political events, and few issue areas have been more in the news 
recently than armed struggles for rights of self-determination. With 
recent peace initiatives in the Middle East and at Downing Street, it 
appears increasingly likely that, while much progress has been made to 
achieve system change or transformation through democratic process, the 
use of terrorism to further group political aims remains topical. 
Should the recently-convened Yugoslav war crimes trials prove a fraction 
as successful as those which took place in Nuremburg and Tokyo after 
World War 2, the future role of international humanitarian law to deter 
the perpetration of acts of terrorism will, in my opinion, be assured. 
Sincere thanks are due to all those who have helped me in any way 
with this research and especially to my supervisors Hilaire McCoubrey 
and Michael Bowman, and to my husband Steve Giles. Thanks are also due 
to my employer Manchester Metropolitan University for the assistance it 
has given me in printing and binding this thesis. 
As a final point, I have adopted American spellings for the most 
part in this thesis, and the occasional abbreviated format for source 
materials indicated in the footnotes. In order to avoid any confusion, 
I have endeavored to give complete titles and references in the 
Bibliography. 
Elizabeth Chadwick 
xiv 
ABBREVIAT10NS 
Adelaide L. Rev. Adelaide Law Review 
A. J. I. L. American Journal of International Law 
B. U. Int'l. L. J. Boston University International Law Journal 
B. Y. I. L. British Yearbook of International Law 
Col. H. R. L. Rev. Columbia Human Rights Law Review 
Col. J. T. L. Columbia Journal of Transnational Law 
C. W. I. L. J. California Western International Law Journal 
Doc. Document 
For. Aff. Journal of Foreign Affairs 
Ga. J. of Int'l. Georgia Journal of International and 
and Comp. L. Comparative Law 
G. A. O. R. General Assembly, Official Reports 
G. P. R. A. Gouvernement Provisoire de la Republique 
Algdrienne 
Harv. Int' 1. L. J. Harvard International Law Journal 
Harv. L. Rev. Harvard Law Review 
H. R. Q. Human Rights Quarterly 
I. C. C. International Criminal Court 
I. C. J. International Court of Justice 
I. C. L. Q. International Comparative Law Quarterly 
I. C. R. C. International Committee of the Red Cross 
I. H. L. International Humanitarian Law 
I. L. A. International Law Association 
I. L. M. International Legal Materials 
I. M. O. International Maritime Organization 
I. M. T. International Military Tribunal 
Int'l. J. Law and International Journal of Law and Psychiatry 
Psychiatry 
Int'l. L. and Pol. New York University Journal of 
International Law and Politics 
Int'1. Lawyer International Lawyer 
Int'l. Rel. International Relations 
I. R. A. Irish Republican Army 
I. R. R. C. International Review of the Red Cross 
Isr. L. R. Israeli Law Review 
Isr. Y. B. H. R. Israeli Yearbook of Human Rights 
1. of World Trade Journal of World Trade 
lurid. Rev. (The) The Juridical Review 
L. of N. Off. J. League of Nations Official Journal 
Medico-Legal J. Medico-Legal Journal 
Melb. U. L. Rev. Melbourne University Law Review 
M. L. Rev. Modern Law Review 
M. R. G. Minorities Rights Group 
N. I. L. R. Netherlands International Law Review 
N. L. F. National Liberation Front 
Nouv. Obs. Le Nouvel Observateur 
Osgoode Hall L. J. Osgoode Hall Law Journal 
xv 
P. C. I. J. 
P. I. R. A. 
P. L. 0. 
Rev. Int' 1. Comm. of 
Jurists 
Stan. J. Int' 1. L. 
Supp. 
Terrorism: An 
I nt' 1. J. 
Vir. J. of Int' 1. L. 
U. K. 
U. N. 
U. N. T. S. 
U. S. 
U. Tasmania L. 
Yale J. Int' 1. 
Yale L. J. 
Permanent Court of International Justice 
Provisional Irish Republican Army 
Palestinian Liberation Organization 
The Review of the International Commission 
of Jurists 
Stanford Journal of International Law 
Supplement 
Terrorism: An International Journal 
Virginia Journal of Internatiornal Law 
United Kingdom 
United Nations 
United Nations Treaty Service 
United States 
Rev. University of Tasmania Law Review 
L. Yale Journal of International Law 
Yale Law Journal 
.J,. !.!. f011-. 
. 
11 
xvi 
1. The Utilization of International Humanitarian Law, and, in 
Particular. the Geneva Convention Treaty Regime. to Deter Acts q_f 
International Terrorism: 
Introduction and Terms of Reference 
In 1937, the international community agreed on a definition of 
international terrorism. Since that time, however, geopolitical 
40 
divisions, political considerations, and a lack of definition of the 
issues involved in international terrorism have made impossible any co- 
ordinated world community effort to deter effectively the occurrence of 
the phenomenon of internatiornal terrorism. Instead, there are numerous 
issue-specific codification efforts which deal in piecemeal fashion with 
particular acts of international violence, in particular circumstances. 
Within this context, specific categories of acts are made subject to 
criminal process and inter-state co-operation regarding extradition. 
Existing arrangements, thus, are between and among varying combinations 
of states party to each convention. 
In the post-1945 era, a satisfactory approach to dealing with 
acts of terrorism has been made difficult because of the U. N. Charter 
principle of the equal rights and self-determination of "Peoples". 
Initially considered a principle applicable only to former colonial 
territories, the concept of a "People" has gradually been expanded, in 
large part as a result of the successful use of violent force in armed 
struggles by auto- or self-determined "Peoples" for the right of self- 
determination, which use of force has included acts of terrorism. The 
term is now understood to include politically, ethnically and/or 
culturally distinct groups living in situations of colonial domination, 
alien occupation, or racist regimes, which modern delineation is 
-1- 
codified in the 1977 Protocol additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 
August 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of International 
Armed Conflicts, or Protocol 1. 
On the basis of the use of violent force in such armed conflicts, 
the protections and prohibitions contained in international humanitarian 
law and, in particular, the Geneva Conventions of 1949, were extended in 
1977, in Protocols 1 and 2 to the Geneva Conventions. This extension 
was mandated by the proliferation of largely unregulated "civil" wars 
for the right of self-determination. In that many wars for self- 
determination should now be considered "international" for purposes of 
the application of Geneva law, it is argued that acts of terrorism 
perpetrated by or on behalf of "Peoples" struggling for their rights to 
self-determination constitute a separable and "different" phenomenon to 
individual acts of terrorism having effect in the international arena. 
Thus, acts of terrorism perpetrated by "Peoples" struggling for the, 
right to self-determination should be prosecuted under the Geneva treaty 
regime, as breaches of the Geneva Conventions, or as grave breaches or 
war crimes. 
It is intended first in this brief introduction to outline 
working definitions for the basic terminology used in this argument. 
The issues involved and the theoretical structure into which they have 
been placed will then be discussed both singly and in combination, in 
order then to consider the viability of the Geneva legal regime to deter 
and prosecute acts of international terrorism. 
1.1. Working Definitions 
This argument is made complex by the absence of definition in 
each of the issue areas concerned in the analysis of terrorist acts 
-2- 
perpetrated by or on behalf of a "People" seeking its right to self- 
determination. For purposes of the discussion to follow, the following 
working definitions are made. 
1.1.1. "Terrorist Offense" 
As noted previously, there is no single definition of terrorism 
adopted by the world community. The expression "terrorist offense" is 
used in this discussion as follows. "Terrorist offense" includes, but 
is not limited to, acts of violence or deprivations of freedom directed 
against persons or their property for any political purpose. Such acts 
of violence or deprivations of freedom are often perpetrated regardless 
of the injured party's or parties' association or connection with the 
terrorist actor's political purpose. Instead, these acts are 
perpetrated in the main to spread fear or terror, in order to coerce a 
government in power to alter its policies. 
In this discussion, the expression "terrorist offense" is used 
interchangeably with the expressions "terrorism", "international 
terrorism", "acts of terror-violence", and "the phenomenon of 
terrorism". The use of the expressions "terrorist" or "perpetrators of 
terrorist acts" is intended to mean those persons involved in terrorist 
offenses. 
Acts of terrorism are considered to be one form of terror- 
violence. While acts of terrorism are frequently those of political or 
economic actors having little or no connection with an armed conflict as 
that term is understood, such acts often form a tactic in the overall 
political strategy of all parties to a liberation struggle for the right 
of self-determination. Liberation actors engaged in the use of such 
tactics, however, will be referred to as "freedom fighters", or other 
-3- 
terms in common usage, to that effect. 
1.1.2. "Self-Determination" 
The self-determination of "Peoples" is an aspirational goal of 
the U. N. era, the scope of which has been much expanded in its 
application within the contexts of state sovereignty and equality. The 
terms of the U. N. Charter pre-suppose a vision of state sovereignty, and 
the inviolability of territorial boundaries and political independence 
of states. However, the vision of state sovereignty pre-supposed in 
U. N. Charter provisions has come into frequent conflict with the U. N. 
principle of the equal rights and self-determination of "Peoples", in 
that a "People" frequently has a transboundary or border existence. In 
particular, this conflict arises when contexts of ethnic and/or cultural 
"nationality" must operate through traditional mechanisms of sovereign 
state administration and internal management. Thus, while most States 
in the world community concede that a "People's" right to self- 
determination exists, it is felt that it should be achieved through some 
form of democratic process or representation. 
Further, the identification and content of the rights 
entitlements involved in self-determination has never been made 
explicit. From its original context of colonialism, the notion of self- 
determination has expanded to include "Peoples" in post-colonial states, 
or in those states where human rights abuses by a government afford a 
justification for the use of force in self-defense. In other words, 
rights to self-determination may be restricted to some form of 
participation in an alrady existing governing process, or may include 
the grant of various issue-specific rights contained in the post-1945 
human rights documents. 
-4- 
Alternatively, self-determination may be viewed as a new standard 
for evaluating a government's right to rule, and to manage system 
change. Similarly, where claims to territory are asserted by particular 
groups or "Peoples" desiring to correct historic wrongs, demands for 
self-determination may take the form of a claim over territory and to 
the right to secede from the territorial state. Self-determination in 
commercial contexts becomes a proper allocation of property and 
management rights or privileges, and thus may concern issues of 
expropriation and ownership, compensation, investment rights, contract 
duration, and basic considerations of jurisdiction. 
The many issues underlying self-determination and the use of 
force to achieve it have eroded more traditional jurisdictional confines 
delimiting the areas between domestic and international concern. The 
post-1945 era has thus witnessed a steady expansion of the notion of 
self-determination, as many armed conflicts or liberation struggles have 
been waged by self- or auto-determined "Peoples" for their right to 
self-determination, and their rights to a separate nationality and 
territorial boundaries. 
In view of the above possibilities, the use of the expression in 
this discussion is intended to convey an expansive rather than a 
restrictive meaning. Such use will imply, unless otherwise indicated, 
the achievement of system transformation and/or territorial secession 
through the use of violent force. For purposes of the present 
discussion, the use of force to achieve self-determination will include 
the perpetration of terrorist offenses, as one tactic in an otherwise 
permissible political strategy. The use of the expression "struggles 
for the right to self-determination" is intended to include the 
-5- 
expression "wars of national liberation". 
1.1.3. "Peoples" 
The post-1945 problem of defining what "Peoples" are entitled to 
self-determine has been in large part created by U. N. unwillingness 
and/or inability to intervene in classification struggles by self- or 
auto-determined groups. U. N. goals regarding the notion of self- 
determination are indefinite, and juridically intrusive in areas of 
traditional state domestic jurisdiction. As is discussed in Chapter 2, 
U. N. practice regarding the idea of a "People" has largely been 
restricted by former colonial boundaries, so that their self- 
determination would not endanger existing territorial units. Such an 
emphasis thus ignores anything other than an already existing ethnic 
map. 
This fact, in addition to historic grievances or repressive 
regimes, means that a strict identification of those "Peoples" entitled 
to self-determination through contexts of colonialism cannot succeed. 
The result of such a strict approach has been a proliferation of 
unregulated violence by auto-determined "Peoples" as the preferred 
method of self-identification and of system change. A series of 
successful liberation wars has led to alterations in common 
understandings regarding which "Peoples" are entitled to assert claims 
for self-determination, and to use force to achieve their rights. As is 
discussed in Chapter 3, the term "Peoples" has thus evolved to mean 
those groups which have common political goals, a will to live together, 
and clear ethnical and/or cultural ties. Such "Peoples" frequently want 
independence from an administering state, and use force to achieve it. 
Given the predictable lack of resources available to them, as non-state 
-6- 
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entities, armed force frequently utilized to achieve self-determination 
takes the form of acts of terrorism. 
Mention is made in Protocol 1 Article 1(4) of those "Peoples" 
(F)ighting against colonial domination and alien 
occupation and against racist regimes in the exercise 
of their right of self-determination, as enshrined in 
... 
the 1970 Declaration on Principles of International 
Law concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation among 
States in accordance with the Charter of the United 
Nations. 
Thus, while the categories of liberation struggle to which IHL is made 
applicable appear narrowly confined in Protocol 1, express reference to 
the 1970 Friendly Relations Declaration implies a much broader approach. 
Further complicating the ready identification of what "Peoples" are 
entitled to self-determination is post-1945 ideological pluralism which, 
in juxtaposition with democratic presuppositions, has not been conducive 
to standards of congruence when the time arrives to interpret U. N. 
Charter provisions. As is discussed in Chapter 3, the result has been 
many successful liberation wars which have expanded the scope. of claimed 
rights entitlements made by "Peoples" struggling for these rights 
through the use of armed force. 
For these reasons, the use of the term "Peoples" in this 
discussion will be expansive. Among other things, it is argued that 
"Peoples" may be identified by their successful use of methods of force 
or coercion. The term is intended, unless otherwise indicated, to mean 
those "Peoples" which are ethnically and/or culturally distinct, and 
exhibit a degree of social and/or political cohesion sufficient to 
organize methods of force or coercion for use against a state, which 
methods are at least in part designed to give content to their claims to 
a right of self-determination. 
1% 
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1,1,4, "International Humanitarian Law" 
Referred to as "IHL", this area of law will be understood to be 
divided into two main branches: the law of war and limited aspects of 
human rights law. The law of war, as referred to in this discussion and 
as codified subdivides into those provisions contained in the Hague 
Conventions or law of war proper, and those provisions contained in the 
Geneva Conventions or humanitarian law. The law of war is intended to 
regulate states in the choice of means and methods of warfare utilized 
against each other in an armed conflict. The law of Geneva is intended 
to protect individuals and mitigate against the effects of an armed 
conflict. In that this body of law applies to safeguard the victims, 
and to mitigate the effects of hostilities, a degree of overlap exists 
between the law of war and the law of Geneva, particularly regarding the 
choice of means and methods of warfare employed. This overlap is 
particularly apparent in Protocol 1 to the 1949 Geneva Conventions. 
The second main branch of IHL - human rights law - governs 
relations between a state and its own nationals essentially during times 
, 
of peace as this body of law allows for derogation of many individual 
rights during times of armed conflict. However, certain fundamental 
rights are non-derogable and human rights law remains relevant in the 
case of a situation of armed conflict making the two main branches of 
IHL complementary. A degree of overlap implies the usefulness of 
adopting an integrated approach to IHL, which was expressly done in 
Protocol 1 of 1977, despite complaints that conceptual or legal 
confusion would be the result. Yet, while the two main branches are 
juridically distinct, an integrated approach to IHL provides the 
necessary framework through which an individual may be protected against 
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the actions of states in all circumstances. An integrated approach is 
also of assistance when the time comes to prosecute breaches of the 
Geneva Conventions, or grave breaches or war crimes. Thus, the 
expression "IHL", unless indicated otherwise, is intended to denote an 
integrated form of Hague law, Geneva law, and limited aspects of human 
rights law. 
As is discussed in Chapter 4, an integrated approach is codified 
in the 1977 Protocols 1 and 2 to the Geneva Conventions of 1949, and 
would appear to be generally accepted in customary international law. 
The use of an integrated approach is intended to make relevant its 
application to armed struggles by "Peoples" for their rights to self- 
determination. In that states continue to use the threat or use of 
force in their diplomatic relations, an integrated approach to the term 
IHL is further intended to emphasize the heightened need for the ready 
application of this legal regime to all situations of armed conflict. 
It is further argued that an integrated approach to IHL is supportive of 
the notion that Geneva law is appropriate for use in prosecuting and 
detering acts of terrorism perpetrated by "Peoples" during all 
liberation struggles, and thus, that such acts are a distinct and 
separable phenomenon to individual acts of international terrorism. 
1.2. 
- 
Discussion 
The argument that the IHL legal regime is appropriate to deter 
and prosecute terrorists acting for or on behalf of "Peoples" struggling 
to achieve their rights to self-determination is made complex by the 
absence of definition in the vast literature. In particular, the issues 
)of international terrorism, of the "Peoples" entitled to the right to 
self-determination, of the "Peoples" entitled to use force to achieve 
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self-determination, of the "Peoples" who employ acts of terrorism in 
pursuit of their aims, and of the scope and nature of the rights 
entitlements contained in the aspirational goal called "the right to 
self-determination" remain without prospective guidance. 
For the sake of clarity, these many issues will be discussed 
individually, and-in combination. It is considered that the extension 
of IHL in 1977 to liberation struggles reflects the need to regulate the 
use of violent force in such armed conflicts. As such, it is clear that 
this extension would be applicable to deter acts of terrorism 
perpetrated during such struggles. This extension further makes the 
inability of the international community to distinguish, deter and 
prosecute terrorist acts difficult to reconcile., 
1.2.1. Legality og he Use off, Armed Force in Liberation Wars 
By way of preliminary discussion and as discussed in Chapters 2 
and 3, the legality of the use of armed force in liberation wars is 
highly political, as the U. N. system only entitles states to use force. 
Even then, the threat or use of force is "legal" in highly restricted 
circumstances, e. g.. in self-defense. A perceived "right" to use armed 
force in liberation struggles in the post-1945 era has thus resulted in 
legal confusion regarding the outbreak of hostilities, and the actual 
content of the rules regulating the conduct of war. A customary use of 
terrorism by all parties to such conflicts further risks the normative 
development of clear exceptions to U. N. prohibitions against the threat 
of or use of force. 
As is discussed in Chapter 4, the IHL legal regime applies 
between states which are parties to the same treaties. It also applies 
between states or other belligerent parties which mutually accept the 
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treaties, and apply the relevant provisions. Whether or not a "People", 
as an "aspiring" state, can bind itself to the four Geneva Conventions 
as a "Power" is highly controversial, and is felt to be beyond the scope 
of this discussion. IHL is applicable nevertheless to domestic 
liberation conflicts through mutual acceptance of the 1949 Geneva 
Conventions, Protocol 1, Protocol 2, or, as a minimum, Common Article 3 
to the four Geneva Conventions of 1949, which latter Article applies to 
armed conflicts "not of an international character occurring in the 
territory of one of the High Contracting Parties, 
... 
". 
The twin failures in the U. N. era to define terrorism, and to 
deter successfully the perpetrators of acts of international violence 
are discussed in Chapter 5. These failures led to a gradual recognition 
of the unregulated nature of liberation conflicts, and mandated the 
extension of the protections of IHL in 1977 to such situations. 
Nevertheless, the world community has yet to prevent the violent actions 
either of liberation movements or of states which such movements 
threaten. As discussed in Chapters 6 and 7, this seems to indicate that 
the rationale underlying the law of war is not yet considered by many 
states to be entirely relevant to struggles for self-determination. 
State refusal to apply IHL to all liberation struggles, it is argued, is 
political, and constitutes a rejection of the notion that "Peoples" have 
the "right" to use armed force in liberation struggles. 
1.2.2. IHL as Neutral Forum 
One consequence of the 1977 extension of IHL to wars of self- 
determination is that acts of international violence or terrorism 
perpetrated by or on behalf of struggling "Peoples" may be regarded as 
grave breaches of Geneva law, or war crimes. In that IHL prohibitions 
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focus more on the nature of an illicit act, and less on the identity of 
the actor, each state party to the Geneva Conventions is required to 
search for the perpetrators of war crimes, and must either prosecute 
them or extradite them for trial. As there is no political offense 
exception to this duty, IHL offers a content-neutral forum in which 
terrorist actors may be prosecuted. Thus, it is argued in Chapter 5 
that issue-specific anti-terrorism codifications cannot ever be truly 
effective. This is so because most such instruments contain a political 
offense or humanitarian exception clause applicable to the extradition 
of an alleged offender. Where extradition is denied, the remaining duty 
to bring the offender to trial may result in a "friendly" prosecution, 
and/or in the grant of political asylum. These exception clauses, thus, 
are a barrier to effective interstate co-operation to deter acts of 
international terrorism. 
As is discussed in Chapter 6, terrorist violence is frequently 
used by liberation groups as part of a political and ideological 
strategy. Such violence is therefore a tactic frequently designed to 
gain international sympathy, to achieve a degree of political 
interaction with states, and to indicate a legal relationship with a 
threatened incumbent for purposes of parity in negotiations to end the 
violence. The continued failure to pursue and prosecute these violent 
actors is made difficult to reconcile with the existence of a "neutral" 
forum offered by the IHL legal regime. Further, a characterization of 
terrorist acts as grave breaches or war crimes implies that acts of 
terrorism perpetrated during a liberation struggle constitute a 
phenomenon which can be distinguished from individual acts of 
international terrorism. Given this delineation, it would appear that 
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state unwillingness so to characterize terrorist acts perpetrated during 
armed conflict is one source of the international community's inability 
to deter violent actors. 
1.2.3. State Unwillingness to Invoke IHL 
State unwillingness to invoke or implement the IHL regime in 
liberation struggles represents a legal evasion, and causes normative 
confusion. This is so for many reasons. The IHL legal regime provides 
for both individual and state responsibility for breaches of Geneva law. 
As is discussed in Chapter 5, issue-specific anti-terrorist instruments 
do not refer to acts of state terrorism. Further, states are unwilling 
to recognize a liberation struggle as such, as this implicates the 
implementation of IHL, and may afford liberation fighters their "window 
of opportunity" to gain a degree of status, to be recognized as 
combatants, and to act as a protogovernment. Instead, states frequently 
prefer to regard all acts of terrorism as criminal, and to prosecute 
them within sovereign, domestic frameworks of criminal law. 
As discussed in Chapters 6 and 7, most states are prepared to 
concede cautiously that the right to self-determination is a principle 
of the U. N. system and of international customary law. On the other 
hand, states are often not prepared to accept the practical results of 
such a concession. Should IHL be implemented from the first acts of 
violence or hostilities in a liberation struggle, as required, its 
application carries considerable factual and political significance as 
an indication of the scope of the conflict. Implementation of IHL 
implies that an incumbent government is no longer able to protect 
sectors of the population from acts of unregulated violence. It also 
implies a "right" to shoot at target state police or military units 
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empowered to conduct public order missions. Should such a situation 
occur, concerned third states have a duty, if not a right, to assess the 
situation, and to proceed in their own interests. Thus, third states 
may make their own accommodations with both sides to an armed conflict 
by re-aligning their diplomatic and investment interests in anticipation 
of a future alteration in target state sovereignty. 
Further, the notion of the right to self-determination of 
"Peoples" has evolved within the opposing frameworks of state 
sovereignty and state equality. Many "new" states have achieved their 
independence after successful liberation struggles. Each state in the 
U. N. General Assembly has one vote, and Western states which oppose the 
"right" of liberation fighters to use force to achieve self- 
determination are outnumbered, in voting terms. General Assembly 
Resolutions may be passed by large majorities, in the context of state 
equality, yet never be observed by large or influential states when 
exercising their sovereign authoritative interpretation of the content 
of particular domestic uprisings to which the Resolutions potentially 
apply. 
Thus, states are unwilling to invoke IHL in wars of self- 
determination. To do so means that a threatened state should no longer 
decide within purely domestic confines the means by which to ensure its 
own survival, or to repress the armed violence. To do so in effect 
delimits state jurisdictional competence, and constitutes an erosion of 
the carefully preserved balance of competence in the U. N. system between 
domestic and international concerns. 
1.3. The Use of Violent-Force Define g_i Liberation War 
Various attempts have been made during the U. N. era to identify 
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what "Peoples" are entitled to assert the right to self-determination, 
as the terms of the U. N. Charter regarding the peaceful and orderly 
attainment of independent statehood by dependent territories and/or 
"Peoples" are uncertain or controversial in content. In this way, the 
use of force has entered into the discussion. This has led to the 
transformation of the notion into a political vehicle through which 
rights assertions having no or little connection with colonial contexts 
may be made. In that many "Peoples" have settled the controversy for 
themselves and achieved self-determination through the use of force, the 
status of liberation wars in contemporary international law has evolved 
in large part through the use of violent means and methods of warfare, 
which include acts of terrorism, and the extension of IHL to regulate 
them. Auto-determined "Peoples" wishing to right historic grievances or 
effect system transformation thus employ the rhetoric of self- 
determination, in order to use force. 
The proliferation of self-determination armed struggles also 
implicates a return of the Eighteenth Century right to revolt against 
repression which initially gave rise to the political offense exception. 
When coupled with political, ethnical and/or cultural criteria which 
potentially define nationality in a new way, it is hardly surprising 
that the right to self-determination has proved to be a transboundary 
vehicle through which to correct historic wrongs, and reacquire lands 
and natural resources. The resulting clash between state sovereignty 
and new notions of nationality has led to a proliferation of violence by 
auto-determined "Peoples". This is an aspect of the use of violent 
force going far beyond the original intended scope of U. N. Charter terms 
regarding self-defense, or the peaceful and orderly attainment of 
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independence of non-self-governing territories and/or "Peoples". 
For these reasons, it is considered in Chapter 2 that the 
evolution in status of liberation wars in contemporary international law 
has been achieved through the "justified" use of violence. Some 
examples of successful and on-going liberation struggles are given in 
Chapter 3. The extension of IHL to regulate liberation struggles is 
discussed in Chapter 4, which extension is intended to re-assert the 
primacy of law in war. As such, IHL provides an additional forum in 
which to pursue individual and state perpetrators of grave breaches of 
the Geneva Conventions, and war crimes. IHL thus can be utilized as the 
legal regime through which to deter and prosecute all parties to a 
liberation struggle should they utilize acts of terrorism. 
1.4. The Issue of Self-Determination and The Content QL IHL 
As previously indicated, the effect wars of self-determination 
have had on the development of IHL is discussed in Chapter 4. The 
international community notably failed in 1949 to develop the content of 
the laws of armed conflict, other than minimally in the Geneva 
Conventions. The laws of armed conflict thus retained for the most part 
their late-Nineteenth Century frameworks. The U. N. Charter prohibited 
the threat or use of armed force in diplomatic relations, and the law of 
war was felt in some quarters to be obsolete. Thus, by examining the 
separate historical development of each branch of IHL in Chapter 4, it 
is hoped the integrated approach achieved in 1977 will be better 
understood. Nevertheless, a rule must be relevant for its intended 
purpose, and it is of concern that in 1977 many Western states opposed 
an integrated approach in IHL applicable to armed conflicts waged by 
"Peoples" struggling against alien occupation, racist regimes, and 
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colonial domination. 
1.4.1. Recognition of Conditions of Modern Warfare 
Paradoxically, the integration of Hague and Geneva law in 1977 
represents the recognition by the international community of the 
realities of modern warfare. In other words, each of the three 
subdivisions found in IHL 
- 
Hague law, Geneva law, and aspects of human 
rights law - has a well-defined-but-separate jurisdictional basis. 
Further, and as previously discussed, these subdivisions would appear, 
on the face of it, to have little to do with one another. Nevertheless, 
wars of self-determination by definition impinge on notions of state 
sovereign authority, and on notions of nationality, territorial 
integrity, and individual protections. It is clear that the modern 
integrated approach represents a development in integrated, fundamental 
notions of justice, applicable in all circumstances. 
Chapter 3 discusses the adaptation of an integrated approach in 
IHL to struggles for self-determination. This adaptation reflects the 
single-vote context of U. N. state equality, and thus, majoritarian 
recognition of the realities. of operational conditions in modern armed 
conflicts. The adaptation serves to delimit traditional domestic 
jurisdictional confines, and erodes a degree of state sovereign 
authority. The extension thus reflects the need for individual 
protection against the actions of states, particularly in contexts of 
matters of domestic concern, national security and military necessity. 
1.4.2. Jurisdictional Conflicts 
It is further considered in Chapter 4 that the jurisdictional 
conflicts implicated by the interrelation of the laws regulating armed 
hostilities, humanitarianism, and limited aspects of human rights law 
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have been minimized by the adoption of an integrated approach to IHL. 
Traditionally, Hague law restrained the military actions a state could 
take. Geneva law governed the factors states were required to consider 
regarding the victims of an armed conflict, and thus exerted another 
restraint on the actions states took under Hague law. Both Hague and 
Geneva law comprise the law of war. Human rights law, as a post-1945 
issue area, makes use of many humanitarian guidelines in its provisions 
regarding a state's treatment of its own nationals during times of 
peace. Should a time of war occur, fundamental human rights continue to 
be observed, Thus, IHL contains limited aspects of human rights law. 
While frequently resulting in the same or similar result, the 
mechanisms competent to apply and enforce these three areas are 
different, and an integrated approach to IHL in 1977 was criticized as 
juridically confusing. Protocols 1 and 2 of 1977 made massive 
incursiona into notiona of state sovereign authority to suppress 
formerly "domestic" uprisings. Further, the issues underlying self- 
determination and the right to use force to achieve it are highly 
political, and erode traditional jurisdictional confines delimiting the 
areas between domestic and international concern. Many states are not 
yet party to Protocols 1 and 2. Many states remain unwilling to 
recognize the legitimacy of armed liberation struggles. Thus, the 
potential for confusion increases should the point of application of IHL 
under such circumstances arise. Nevertheless, IHL provides a neutral 
forum, universally acceptable, to deter and prosecute "terrorists" 
acting for or on behalf of "Peoples" or threatened states engaged in an 
armed conflict for the right of self-determination. 
- 
18 
- 
1.4.3. Terrorists and Freedom Fighters 
Given individual state unwillingness to date to relinquish 
sovereign authority both to identify terrorist groups, and to suppress 
domestic uprisings as mere criminal undertakings, regional and 
international attempts have been made to reconcile the related-but- 
separate notions of acts of international terrorism, terrorist acts of 
liberation movements, and the issue of a "People's" right to use force 
in self-defense against state aggression taking the form of alien 
domination, racism, or colonial domination. States in the post-1945 era 
have been reluctant to recognize a state of war, preferring to treat an 
uprising or insurrection as a matter solely of domestic concern, 
suppressable as such through use of the police, paramilitary units, or 
international assistance in public order missions. 
In this vein, the largely unsuccessful law enforcement approach 
through individual penal suppression of acts of terrorism is discussed 
in Chapter 5 from domestic, bi-lateral and multi-lateral points of view. 
Given the hesitance of States to recognize a state of war, it is clear 
that the extension in full of the provisions of IHL to struggles for 
self-determination confounds in the attitudes adopted by some states the 
legal and political considerations inherent in the separate treatment of 
the right to wage war, and the regulation of war. The problem, once 
again, is of definition, and of individual state authoritative 
competence to interpret the nature of a particular use of violent force, 
be it by the police or military in pursuing terrorist groups, or by a 
liberation group struggling for system transformation. 
It is thus considered that the various approaches taken by the 
world community to deter acts of international terrorism through 
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criminal co-operation are made unworkable by the states themselves. 
Domestic criminal schemes are an inherent facet of state sovereignty. 
Even between politically similar state systems, sovereign function to 
inquire into the nature of a violent act and the reasons for an 
extradition request is not conducive to non-interference in sister-state 
domestic matters. The political offense exception and humanitarian 
clauses contained in most anti-terrorist conventions and extradition 
treaties are based on this issue of inquiry. Individual state sympathy 
for the notion of a legitimate right to use violent force to achieve 
self-determination may lead to a "friendly" prosecution should an 
extradition request not be granted. IHL has no political offense 
exception, focuses on the nature of an illicit act, reflects the 
recognition of the realities of modern armed conflicts, and thus 
provides a neutral forum in which to prosecute violent acts perpetrated 
in wars of self-determination. 
1.5 The Proper Legal Placement of_ Terrorist Offenses 
The basic problem in any approach to acts of terror-violence is 
that of the legal qualification of the act. Where a liberation group 
employs methods of force to achieve its goals in the face of incumbent 
government opposition, the sovereign function of state authoritative 
interpretation regarding such acts allows states to interpret the use of 
force restrictively, and within frameworks of individualized domestic 
criminal law. On the other hand, IHL, where made applicable, allows for 
a legal qualification to be attributed to an act of terrorism through 
contexts of military necessity, proportionality, indiscriminateness of 
effect, and responsibility. 
Thus, the application of IHL must be made to appear realistic and 
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relevant to an armed conflict. As is considered in Chapter 6, the use 
by liberation groups of methods of terror-violence constitutes an 
attempt to claim attention to group rights assertions. System change or 
transformation may be contemplated, and achieved through the use of 
"direct action" which circumvents government regulatory repression, or 
any stalled democratic processes which may be in place. The use of 
violence is also employed to create the appearance of a legal 
relationship with a threatened government, and to force that government 
to consider the "People" as equals for purposes of negotiating an end to 
the armed hostilities. As acts of terrorism form one tactic in such a 
political strategy, they may be distinguished as a separable and 
"different" phenomenon to international terrorism, and as such, are 
capable of deterrence under IRL. 
It is considered in Chapter 6 that an analysis of the context and 
motivations underlying terrorist acts is first mandated in order to 
properly place the alleged terrorist offenses within appropriate 
juridical frameworks. Should IHL not be implemented after the outbreak 
of armed hostilities for self-determination, and a pattern of liberation 
violence be approached as a violation of peacetime behavior, the legal 
contradictions inherent in situations where political activity is under 
domestic military control are clear. Further, an ineffective law 
enforcement approach risks the loss of a degree of psychological 
commitment to the existing system of public order. Such a result, in 
turn, has diplomatic and foreign investment consequences. 
Where "crimes" of political violence are perpetrated under the 
I 
aegis of struggles for self-determination, it is conaidered that the 
immediate application of IHL to them, if'only for purposes of guidance, 
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is appropriate on two levels. First, the resulting issue structure 
allows for no political offense exception for acts of politically 
motivated violence. Second, the separability of acts of terror-violence 
as grave breaches and/or war crimes preserves, within existing 
parameters of international law, both the overall political strategy of 
struggling groups claiming the right to use armed force to achieve 
system transformation, and potential frameworks for negotiation and 
inquiry into the relevant goals or contexts of terrorist acts. 
1.6. Effects of Assessments gL Responsibility for Violence 
The qualification given to violations of legal norms affects 
subsequent assessments of responsibility for such violations. Chapter 7 
explores the implications of this issue within the context of the 
application of IHL to deter the use of methods of terror-violence in 
liberation wars. Where interests protected by law such as life or 
property are damaged by terror-violence, sovereign state authoritative 
assessments of responsibility for such damage act to determine the legal 
qualifications to be given to violent acts. Complicating assessments of 
responsibility for damage are the legal qualifications given to violent 
political acts by affected third states, if only for purposes of 
insurance coverage. It is considered, therefore, in Chapter 7 that it 
is primarily for political reasons that threatened governments do not 
invoke the IHL legal regime in liberation wars. 
This is so because struggles for self-determination implicate the 
potential alteration of the juridical status of a troubled state in the 
world community, legitimize the use of violent force to achieve self- 
determination, and risk a normative development in the means or methods 
of warfare employed, to include terrorism. The right to wage a "just" 
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war becomes confounded with the rules regulating its conduct. 
Authoritative state demarcations between states of war and peace to 
determine levels and legal effects of culpability are eroded. 
Conversely, the ready implementation of IHL risks carving a clear 
exception to U. N. Charter prohibitions against the threat or use of 
force, Once a state of war is recognized through humanitarian 
treatment, certain acts committed in peacetime, such as killing, become 
permissible. More importantly, acts of terror-violence utilized 
tactically propel affected third states prematurely to put their 
relations with a challenging group on a regular basis in an attempt to 
contain potential damage to foreign property and interests. The 
encouragement of a new definition of nationality risks the erosion of 
the inviolability of territorial borders, and the existing ethnic map. 
Chapter 7 thus considers whether the consequences of assessments 
of responsibility for political violence mandate a legal qualification 
of terrorist acts which will not adversely affect existing diplomatic 
relations. This presumably implies a law enforcement approach, and a 
non-negotiable stance as regards "terrorists". As such a political 
consequence is not calculated to strengthen the primacy of law in 
situations of "internal" armed unrest, it is further queried whether 
state hesitation to invoke IHL risks the disregard of IHL, even as a 
framework for reference, in struggles for self-determination. 
1.7. Legal Obstacles to the Prosecution of Terrorists under IHHL. 
State unwillingness to utilize the IHL legal regime is in 
evidence in the context of war crimes trials. In other words, despite 
the obligation contained in the Geneva Conventions to seek out and 
prosecute or extradite for trial all persons, whatever their 
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nationality, committing or ordering to be committed any of the grave 
breaches defined in the codifications, this obligation has rarely been 
undertaken by individual states. 
The difficulty in establishing a system of humanitarian law 
involving penal sanctions appears linked mainly to the still widespread 
ignorance of the role IHL plays in protecting minimum standards of 
treatment due to human beings in all circumstances. It is considered in 
Chapter 8 that state 'unwillingness to characterize acts of terrorism as 
"grave breaches" or war crimes ignores the ultimate supremacy of the 
laws of humanity. States are unwilling to assume IHL duties and 
obligations which restrain state action. Further, ideological pluralism 
in the post-1945 international community has meant that many self- 
determination struggles were alternatively characterized as anti- 
imperialist, and anti-capitalist wars. This politicized such wars, and 
in turn, politicized the implementation of IHL. 
Chapter 8 considers that the neutral forum offered by the IHL 
legal regime has been disregarded since the Nuremburg Tribunal for 
political reasons. It is considered that the first war crimes trials at 
Nuremburg and in the Far East only occurred because of the unconditional 
surrender of the aggressor nations, and the occupation of defeated 
territory. The ready identification of war crimes perpetrators since 
that time has been hampered by the lack of attention paid to up-dating 
and developing Hague law, the lack of agreement in the international 
community regarding exceptions to U. N. prohibitions against war, and the 
absence of political will, generally. 
For example, the attrocities perpetrated during the Vietnam war 
prompted the 1977 Protocols. Prosecutions of Vietnam war criminals were 
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infrequent, as U. S. domestic legislation does not easily contemplate the 
liability of civilian war policy makers. Geneva provisions which impose 
the universal duty to seek out and prosecute or extradite for trial all 
persons committing or ordering to be committed any of the grave breaches 
defined in the codifications resulted only in U. S. military prosecutions 
which were few in number, presumably on the ex post facto basis which 
proved unsuccessful at Nuremburg. The up-dating of IHL in Protocol 1 
also led to the inclusion of wars of self-determination as automatically 
"International", which inclusion was opposed by the U. S. The U. S. has 
yet to ratify Protocol 1, and applies only those provisions which it 
believes form part of customary international law. Such application in 
fact does not include a recognition of wars of self-determination as 
"international", nor does it include many of the new prohibitions as to 
permissible means and methods of warfare. Thus, the application of IHL 
to a particular conflict remains a matter for sovereign state 
authoritative interpretation, and not the result of majoritarian 
decision-making within contexts of state equality. 
Thus, states are unwilling to implement IHL generally, and in 
particular, during wars of self-determination. States which utilize 
methods of terror-violence to control domestic situations of armed 
unrest ignore the ultimate supremacy of the laws of humanity, prefering 
instead to maintain domestic legal frameworks through which the military 
may control violent political processes. Sovereign or executive power 
to interpret and legally qualify violent acts of war as terrorism means 
that the judiciary are politicized, and that the criminal justice system 
is just another mechanism to protect existing political frameworks of 
analysis, rather than to assess ultimate responsibility for damage. 
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Where wars of self-determination are in issue, the existing fact 
of sovereignty is endangered. In such circumstances, it is clear that 
the political consequences of rejecting the applicability of IHL 
outweigh the legal and humanitarian benefits of observing its 
provisions. Given the interlocking considerations of national security 
and the safeguarding of vital national interests, state unwillingness to 
utilize IHL represents a denial of the individual protections afforded 
by IHL against the power of states, and constitutes rejection in fact of 
the restraint required'under the second most important treaty regime in 
the international community. The friction created between contexts of 
state sovereignty and state equality in the U. N. system would appear to 
produce this conclusion. 
Thus, obstacles to prosecuting war crimes perpetrated during 
liberations wars would appear to arise from the very state volition 
which initially accepted IHL as one indicia of sovereign state 
authority. Actual utilization of the opportunity to separate acts of 
terrorism from war crimes perpetrated during liberation struggles would 
not appear to be relevant to the rationale underlying state 
implementation of IHL, or relevant for purposes of state compliance with 
and enforcement of its provisions. This result would appear to confirm 
not only the fact of state terrorism, but further, the unwillingness of 
states themselves to eschew the tactics of fear. 
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2. The Evolution oL the Right to Self-Determination through 
the Perspective of Resort to Violence 
The U. N. Charter begins with the words "(w)e the Peoples of the 
United Nations", yet membership of the Organization is confined to 
Member states. (1) While the Charter also makes provision for non-self 
governing territories to progress "towards self-government or 
independence", and thus, presumably, to become Member states if 
appropriate in the circumstances (2), the possibility of graduating into 
statehood is viewed by some Member states as extended only to former 
mandate territories and areas detached from the Axis Powers. (3) Other 
states take a more expansive view, in that Chapter XII of the U. N. 
Charter allows additional territories to be termed "trust territories", 
and to be placed under the administration and supervision of the United 
Nations. (4) More expansively still, the procedures outlined in U. N. 
Charter Chapter XII are felt perhaps to include such other non-self- 
governing territories, or "Peoples", as might wish to break from the 
institutionalization of the "inviolability of territorial boundaries and 
Political independence" of their respective metropolitan authorities. 
(5) 
Unfortunately, the terms of the U. N. Charter regarding the 
peaceful and orderly attainment of independent statehood by dependent 
territories and/or "Peoples" are uncertain as to their actual content 
and practical application, and any perceived flexibility in approach 
arguably contemplates a degree of self-help. Nevertheless, Article 2(4) 
of the Charter prohibits the threat or use of force by Member states in 
f their international relations against the "territorial integrity or 
political independence of any state". U. N. Charter Chapter XII Article 
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84 imposes a duty on administering authorities to ensure trust 
territories play their part "in the maintenance of international peace 
and security". 
Despite these provisions, an expansion in the applicability of 
self-determination has been accomplished in large part, in the post-1945 
era through the success of various domestic armed uprisings by auto- 
determined "Peoples" demanding rights entitlements as against 
recalcitrant states. These demands at times have included the right to 
territorial secession which, given the various elements of nationality, 
are conditioned by the geographic environment. (6) In effect, 
therefore, the assertion of a right to self-determination often implies 
the use of force to achieve territorial secession, in potential breach 
of U. N. Charter Article 2(4). 
Strictly speaking, such uses of force as have been in evidence in 
post-1945 liberation wars are frequently legally suspect. In 
particular, terrorist tactics utilized as means and methods of warfare 
remain condemned generally throughout the international community. (7) 
Nevertheless, given that the use of force to achieve self-determination 
may be one of many forms of political violence, the world community has 
gradually come to see liberation struggles as "internationalized", if 
not strictly international by nature, through their underlying purpose, 
general duration and intensity. Given, further, the scale of foreign 
assistance involved in many liberation struggles, it can hardly be 
argued that such armed conflicts are not international in fact. (8) 
The recognition by the world community of the actual nature of 
liberation armed conflicts has, in turn, resulted in the extension of 
the prohibitions and protections of IHL to them. This is due in large 
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part to the numbers of persons, in, particular civilian persons, 
involved. The extension of IHL to these conflicts was further mandated 
by the perceived need to adapt IHL to reflect existing general 
international law. While objections have been voiced that the codified 
recognition of non-interstate wars as "international" for purposes of 
the extension of IHL grants legitimacy to terrorist organizations and to 
their use of non-conventional methods of force, such an extension has 
been strictly confined in IHL to "Peoples" struggling against "colonial 
domination and alien occupation and against racist regimes". (9) The 
extension of IHL thus reflects both the need to regulate political 
violence, including acts of terrorism, and to extend individual 
international humanitarian protections to a broader group of 
individuals. 
This section describes the evolution of the content and meaning 
of the modern right of self-determination of "Peoples" as resulting from 
the use of force by liberation groups. In large part, this evolution 
has occurred from liberation groups using illegitimate and illegal means 
of force against the territorial integrity and political independence of 
Member states in ways not contemplated in the original U. N. Charter 
system. Of further interest is the evolution of the modern right of 
self-determination through uses of force by liberation groups in armed 
struggles which do not fall within the above-indicated strict confines 
of IHL. (10) It is argued, in particular, that the use of non- or 
unconventional means and methods of warfare, as terrorist tactics may be 
described, in liberation struggles has resulted in an expansion of the 
original intended scope of U. N. Charter provisions regarding the equal 
rights and self-determination of "Peoples". It is further argued that 
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the result of such an expansion is that Member states have recognized 
the need to take account of this evolution within the confines of IHL. 
By way of preliminary discussion, the issue of self-determination 
arose mainly as an Eighteenth Century philosophy which gained influence 
as an inherent right up to the time of the League of Nations. Brought 
into actual play to right the historic wrongs of colonialism and thus to 
restore the original sovereignty and land title of conquered peoples in 
colonial territories, the concept has been linked this Century to 
territorial and alliance interests. (11) By 1919, colonialism, with its 
aspects of territorial and resource allocation, was heading into its 
twilight, and the ideas underlying the modern notion of self- 
determination were beginning to re-appear. While the Covenant of the 
League of Nations did not specifically mention self-determination, the 
idea of a right of "Peoples" to self-determination during the time of 
the League attached in mandate arrangements, as provided for by Article 
22 of the Covenant. 
The needs of the time also were met by interpreting the notion 
through the mechanism of the mandate system, which re-distributed German 
and Turkish dependencies among the principle victorious Powers 
participating at Versailles in 1919. Such re-distribution did not 
involve any usurpation of original sovereignty, and thus did not equate 
to conquest (12), nor was the modern notion of self-determination, 
including potential territorial secession, in issue as regards these 
mandate territories. Thus, self-determination, as interpreted through 
the mandate system, was politically and territorially linked. The 
territories placed under mandate were perceived as originally sovereign, 
and the mandatory powers technically had only the power of disposition. 
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As the mandatory powers had no claims of sovereignty, the status of the 
inhabitants of mandate territories could not be a domestic question for 
purposes of Article 15(8) of the Covenant of the League of Nations. 
This territorial and political confinement of the notion of self- 
determination was to change in the U. N. era. The Charter, in Article 
1(2), made the principles of the equal rights and self-determination of 
"Peoples" the foundation of the Organization's purpose to "develop 
friendly relations among nations 
... 
". Article 55 also refers to these 
principles "(w)ith a view to the creation of conditions of stability and 
well-being which are necessary for peaceful and friendly relations among 
nations 
... 
". The U. N. Charter thus made the self-determination of 
"Peoples" a principle of universal application, while provision for the 
trusteeship of the former mandated and other non-self-governing 
territories was made separately. 
Rather than utilize League of Nations provisions regarding the 
disposition of former mandate territories (13), the U. N. Organization 
preferred to play a referee role. U. N. Charter Chapter XII Article 79 
leaves trusteeship terms to the Member states directly concerned, 
approval of such terms to fall either to the Security Council, or the 
General Assembly, as provided for in Articles 83 and 85, respectively. 
(14) This conceivably left the status of the inhabitants of such 
territories in question, as title to former non-self-governing 
territories was not assumed by the U. N.. Nevertheless, boundary 
integrity was expected to continue to and beyond the point of full 
independence, presumably on the principle that "the territory of a state 
furnishes the title for the competence of the state". (15) As a result, 
the issue of self-determination remained a colonial, and hence, 
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territorial, problem. 
Difficulties in the practical operation of self-determination 
quickly arose. The peaceful and orderly attainment of independence by 
dependent territories and/or "Peoples" did not always occur, primarily 
for reasons which involved redefinitions of the concept of nationality. 
One reason for this was that U. N. Charter terms stretched beyond the 
League confines of Axis Power colonialism to include any territories a 
colonial power might wish to bring under the trustee system through 
individual agreement. This was seen as one method by which to unburden 
states of the expense of foreign administration. Further, a new breadth 
of option was presented. 
In combination with the subsequent U. N. recognition of the 
separate, distinct status of the "Peoples" of formerly non-self- 
governing territories (16), nationality under the Charter, arguably, 
could now be viewed as having been redefined in an entirely new way, to 
cover such other territories and/or "Peoples" as might subjectively wish 
to break from state administrative institutionalization, Should U. N. 
Charter provisions which were susceptible to different interpretations 
be relied on, the right to self-determination could be a transboundary 
vehicle for the assertion of new cultural and political identities. The 
concept of "self-determination" having evolved through years of 
substantive interpretation, new emphases were then used to support these 
arguments for redefinitions of nationality. Where presuppositions 
regarding the doctrines of democratic choice, economic liberty, the 
sanctity of property and individual human rights were in issue, the 
right of self-determination could be the means by which historic wrongs 
could be righted, and lands and natural resources re-acquired. (17) 
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The resulting clash between sovereign and national function 
directly implicated the careful allocation of competences in the U. N. 
era. Reluctance on the part of administering states to lose the 
benefits of such territories led to conflict. Rather than the 
anticipated peaceful and orderly attainment of independence by 
inhabitants of former non-self-governing territories, the scope of self- 
determination thus broadened to include auto-determined "Peoples" 
struggling for basic rights entitlements through the use of force, even 
though sovereign claims to territory continued to define issues of 
nationality as domestic matters, beyond the purview of international 
"concern". (18) A proliferation of violence resulted. This mandated 
the extension of the IHL regime to liberation wars, to control these 
asymetric armed conflicts and their use of nonconventional means and 
methods of warfare such as terror-violence. (19) 
In these ways, the right of self-determination has proven to be 
an explosive issue in the post-1945 era. It is argued in this Chapter 
that, as a result of the use of force and in particular, terror- 
violence, the principle of self-determination has divided the world 
ideologically regarding the true meaning and effect of the notion. The 
issue has further divided the world into different states supporting 
competing interpretations of the U. N. Charter principles of equal rights 
and self-determination of "Peoples". 
The structure of this argument is as follows. Twentieth Century 
treatment of self-determination, and the "Peoples" considered to be 
entitled to it are reviewed in Part One. Various of the definitional 
problems are examined in Part Two. In particular, the problems of 
defining for modern purposes which "Peoples" are entitled to use force 
- 
33 
- 
against Member states to achieve the right of self-determination are 
examined. This latter issue is developed in Part Three, and the growth 
of the status of liberation groups in the international community 
through the community's recognition of the legitimacy of using all 
necessary means, including armed force, in liberation wars to achieve 
independence and the right to self-determination is discussed. In 
particular, groups characterized as terrorist organizations may'also be 
viewed as liberation groups employing nonconventional means and methods 
of warfare. 
It is concluded that the world community has come to accept the 
self-determination of "Peoples" as a rule of customary international 
law, despite individual state objection to the practical results of such 
a notion, due in large part to the use of force by liberation groups. 
(20) In that terrorist tactics are frequently employed in these 
asymmetric conflicts, the need to control liberation struggles through 
international law has also been mandated. Thus, these conflicts have 
come within the ambit of IHL. 
2.1. The Self-Determination ssu : the Principle . Opposed to the 
Right 
The evolution of the principle of self-determination in the post- 
1945 era has occurred within opposing frameworks of sovereign rights and 
state equality. The evolution of the notion of self-determination has 
in turn resulted from, and in, alterations to the bases of international 
relations. The modern notion of the right of self-determination of 
"Peoples" is, thus, an example of a gradual state jurisdictional 
delimitation of domestic issues to the international domain. (21) 
Delimitations of jurisdiction from various reserved domains of 
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Member states sovereignty further involve time lags between the 
interaction of political forces within existing frameworks, and changes 
in law and custom. A proliferation of alternative models for the 
applicability of rights of self-determination has resulted in the non- 
coincidence of normative orders with jurisdictional arrangements which, 
in the last analysis, define them. (22) 
Taking the common thread of the right to self-determination, and 
tracing its development through various sources of international law, 
the growth in strength of the notion is apparent. As previously 
discussed, the right was initially linked this Century to territorial 
and political alliance structures. Modern opposition to the notion of 
self-determination centers on the fear that the uncontrolled exercise of 
the right to self-determination will threaten international peace and 
security. (23) As a means to delimit domestic jurisdictional confines 
and broaden the appropriate areas of international "concern", the right 
of self-determination has provided a mechanism of instrusion into 
traditional confines of state sovereign authority as diverse as minority 
rights, individual human rights, the new economic order, and the modern 
law of war. Conversely, when viewed as a threat to international 
stability, it is clear that any apprehension as to the scope of self- 
determination relies on overly-broad interpretations of U. N. Charter 
provisions which presuppose the existence of Western-style democratic 
choice, e. g . economic liberty, the sanctity of property and individual 
human rights. 
It is argued that, in what was originally an aspirational goal 
employed to better demarcate state responsibility and function within 
the League of Nations and United Nations systems, the right of self- 
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determination has been transformed into a political, and legal, concept. 
As such, it forms a principle of international customary law, and is 
part of individual state supra-national obligation. 
2.1.1. Evolving Basis: Post-Colonialism, the "Aaland Islands" Dispute. 
and the U. N. Charter System 
The course of the growth of the concept of self-determination 
this Century is remarkable. When viewed as clear evidence of the 
delimitation of the traditional political divisions inherent in 
autonomous state competence, it is even more so. 
2.1.1.1. The League of Nations 
Through the re-distribution of former German and Turkish 
dependencies in the League mandate system, "an unprecedented, albeit 
mild, form of international accountability for administration" was 
provided. (24) While the Covenant did not specifically mention self- 
determination, it met what were considered the needs of the time through 
provisions for the protection of minorities. New standards to govern 
the integration of minorities in the new states created after 1919 
served a peace-making function, and were intended to prevent 
transboundary alliances. (25) 
In that self-determination was a primary theme of a staunch 
supporter of the League system, American President Woodrow Wilson, it is 
perhaps surprising that the League system did not expressly provide for 
a right of self-determination. Nevertheless, Wilson's conceptual 
starting point was that of "an undifferentiated mankind" (26), relying 
on peoplehood rather than on individual personhood. Standards to govern 
the integration of minorities, as set out in paragraph VI of the Wilson- 
Miller draft of the League Covenant, reflect this original emphasis: 
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The League of Nations shall require all new states 
to bind themselves, as a condition precedent to 
their recognition as independent or autonomous 
states, to accord to all racial or national minor- 
ities within their jurisdiction exactly the same 
treatment and security, both in law and in fact,. 
that is accorded to the racial or national majority 
of their people. (27) 
On the other hand, the rights ideals of the mandate system and of 
the minorities policies were not made directly applicable to the victor 
states, which states were, instead, the guarantors of the peace 
settlement. Yet, although the major powers did not undertake to free 
their own colonies, they presumably rejected the notion of new colonial 
acquisition by not annexing these former German and Turkish colonies as 
their own. (28) 
The resulting political inequity was expedient, and considered to 
be "necessary for the perfection of international organization". (29) 
The protection of minorities was left to special agreements, the 
Minorities Treaties, and the League of Nation's guarantee. The common 
rights concerned such matters as nationality, the free exercise of 
belief, employment and identity rights. Nevertheless, the limited 
application of the protected common rights led to a lapse in observance. 
(30) Self-determination under the Covenant, thus, served as a basic 
guidelines and was: Operational either through the mechanisms for the 
attainment of statehood or as a matter of self-help. As an evolving 
concept in international law, self-determination implied that new 
colonial acquisition was prohibited. The Mandatories were obliged to 
move "those colonies and territories which as a consequence of the late 
war (... ) ceased to be under the sovereignty of the States which 
formerly governed them 
... 
" (31) towards independence. To graduate into 
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statehood, mandate territories had to meet League requirements of 
stable government, capable administration, and equal application of law. 
2.1.1.2. The "Aalend Islands" Dispute 
The League system favored security concerns over those of 
Justice, where there was conflict between the two. (32) As such, the 
notion of self-determination was merely one principle among others to be 
considered during the formation of states. For instance, one competing 
factor to be weighed against the notion of self-determination was the 
preservation "as against external aggression of the territorial 
integrity and existing political independence of all Members of the 
League". (33) 
A test of the Wilsonian concept of self-determination occurred 
in 1920, with the Aaland Islands dispute, when the International 
Commission of Jurists determined that the mere recognition of a 
principle of self-determination, as made out in a number of treaties, 
did not create a positive rule of the law of nations. (34) The islands 
lie between Finland and Sweden. They were ceded by Sweden to Russia in 
1809 with the Swedish cesion of Finland. The island's inhabitants were 
predominately Swedes. When Finland became independent of Russia in 
1917, the islanders asked Finland to return the islands to Sweden. 
Finland had already granted the islanders limited autonomy, when a local 
referendum resulted in near unanimity in favor of separation. The 
matter was referred to the League of Nations. 
The Committee of Jurists appointed by the League Council to 
render an opinion found that the islanders had no right to secede from 
Finland. The Committee noted that the islanders represented less than 
10% of the Swedish population of Finland, and could not claim the right 
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of self-determination, which applied to national groups as a whole. It 
was further felt that encouragement of secession in international law 
would result in complete anarchy. Language indicating that the 
Committee found no normative content regarding self-determination is as 
follows: 
Although the principle of self-determination plays 
an important part in modern political thought, espe- 
cially since the Great War, it must be pointed out 
that there is no mention of it in the Covenant of 
the League of Nations. The recognition of this 
principal in a certain number of international 
treaties cannot be considered as sufficient to put 
it upon the same footing as a positive rule of the 
Law of Nations. (35) 
Although this decision is still used to support opposition to 
modern territorial claims by "Peoples" attempting to exercise their 
rights of self-determination, the Committee of Jupirit confined their 
decision to people within definitively constituted states. As such, the 
sovereign authority of a state may properly operate to restrict the 
self-determination of group factions within that state. The jurists 
stressed that their negative conclusion would not apply in a situation 
of unresolved sovereignty, in which situation a population had several 
options. This restriction of the principle of self-determination was 
later to support the post-1946 distinction between "internal" and 
"external" rights of self-determination. (36) 
The Committee's conclusion that the Aaland islanders had no right 
to secede was later modified by a Commission of Inquiry appointed by the 
League Council to give a second opinion on the issue. The Commission 
concluded that the islanders did have rights. If Finland, the 
Commission said, failed to provide the islanders with certain specified 
guarantees, the islanders would have a right under international law to 
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a plebiscite, which democratic procedure could result in separation from 
Finland. 
2.1.1.3. The U, N. Charter 
The foundation stones of the U. N. system - the peaceful 
settlement of disputes, the non-use of aggressive force, equitable 
trade, territorial integrity and political independence of states, and 
self-government on the basis of equal rights and self-determination of 
peoples - were first contained in the Atlantic Charter of 14 August 
1941. Initially agreed to and signed by U. S. President Franklin 
Roosevelt and British Prime Minister Winston Churchill in relation to 
the American Lend-Lease Act (37), the Atlantic Charter was later 
ascribed to by twenty-six Allied states on 1 January 1942. The Atlantic 
Charter provided, in pertinent part, as follows: 
... 
(T)hey desire to see no territorial changes that 
do not accord with the freely expressed wishes of 
the peoples concerned; 
... 
(T)hey respect the right of all peoples to choose 
the form of government under which they will live; 
and they wish to see sovereign rights and self- 
government restored to those who have been forcibly 
deprived of them. (38) 
The policies of the Allies thus highlighted the dangers to world 
civilization posed by German military aggression. Freely determined 
self-government, territorial integrity, equitable access to trade and 
raw materials, and economic co-operation were emphasized. The eighth 
point in the Atlantic Charter concerned the absolute need for the 
nations of the world to abandon the use of force. The "establishment of 
a wider and permanent system of general security" was envisaged. This 
included disarmament on the basis of "the crushing burden of armaments" 
on peace-loving peoples. (39) 
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In 1944, there was no mention of self-determination during U. N. 
Charter negotiations at Dumbarton Oaks in Washington, for various 
reasons. (40) In particular, Thullen notes that the U. S. stance 
regarding self-determination was viewed by Churchill as interference in 
the British colonial problem. This attitude was later altered through 
regional proposals. (41) Subsequent consultations at San Francisco led 
to a development which was to benefit the notion of self-determination 
- 
the substitution of the League unanimity rule for agreement on general 
multilateral treaties with the requirement of general acceptability. 
This was to result in alterations to the traditional nature of 
individual state responsibility. (42) While this development was also 
to lead in time to "unacceptable", yet binding, interpretations of the 
U. N. Charter, through majority vote, the development allowed faster 
growth in the substance of self-determination. 
The consultations in San Francisco in 1946 also saw an amendment 
tabled by the Soviet Union, which was to lead to the insertion of the 
words "based on respect for the principle of equal rights and self- 
determination of peoples" in the text of Articles 1(2) and 55 of the 
Charter. (43) Given the number of nationalities and minorities in the 
Soviet Union, its support for the notion of self-determination had 
traditionally been cautious. (44) While Lenin had accepted the notion 
in principle, such acceptance was qualified by the proviso that 
nationalities must not be allowed to fragment the ideal of a communized 
society. This point is of particular interest in view of the final text 
of the Charter. The Charter contains numerous presuppositions, e. g . 
of democratic choice, economic liberty, the sanctity of property, and 
individual human rights, which presuppositions remain capable of 
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different interpretations. The U. S. suggested the trusteeship system to 
the Soviet Union in an effort to forestall Soviet territorial claims 
after World War II. (45) Nevertheless, the ideological role played by 
Socialist theory in the formation and subsequent development of the U. N. 
Charter system has helped to erode certain, more traditional notions of 
sovereign state competence in the post-1945 era. This is so in that, 
through a number of competing interpretations, the issues of 
international "concern" have increased, which "concern" is in potential 
conflict with jealously-guarded confines of domestic control and 
authority. (46) 
Further, the words "(w)e the Peoples of the United Nations 
... 
have led to assertions of non-state-centric cultural identity, and to 
demands for redress of historic wrongs. The loss of both territorial 
unities and nations during Twentieth Century mass resettlements, 
administrative divisions, and excessive governmental centralizations has 
threatened the destruction of the linkages of "Peoples" who otherwise 
might possess strong claims to self-determination. (47) Armed struggles 
to overthrow the post-1945 status quo, to restore historic lands, and to 
re-acquire natural resources have been the result. Given the democratic 
presuppositions found in the final text of the Charter, and the 
ideological role of Socialist theory in the U. N. era, the path was paved 
for liberation struggles to be characterized as "just wars". 
This twist in interpretation made many Western states hostile to 
the notion of the self-determination of "Peoples". The waging of 
aggressive war had effectively been outlawed. Any "right" to wage war 
now presumably included the notion of a "right" of such "Peoples" to 
wage ideological war in the face of prohibitions against the threat or 
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use of force in international relations. Given the asymmetry of such 
conflicts, terrorism, though condemned worldwide, was frequently 
employed as the tactic of choice. 
U. N. Charter provisions which acknowledge the right of the 
colonial states to continue administering their territories under the 
trusteeship provisions were thus juxtaposed with the growing debate 
surrounding the right to self-determination of non-self-governing 
territories. Despite the institutionalization of colonial 
administration under U. N. Charter Chapters XII and XIII, the notion of a 
right to self-determination of "Peoples" in territories other than those 
contemplated in the early days of the U. N. system was encouraged. Of 
further note, anti-imperialist and -colonialist rhetoric which utilized 
the concept of self-determination proved to be a vehicle for Soviet 
expansionist ambitions. (48) 
Although the U. N. Charter did not call for an immediate end to 
colonialism, the continued existence of colonial occupation or rule came 
to be considered inconsistent with the prohibition against aggression. 
As noted by Quigley, "self-determination appeared to evolve into a norm 
that required immediate divestment of colonies" (49) by the time of the 
1960 Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries 
and Peoples (50), and the 1970 Declaration on Principles of 
International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation among 
States in Accordance with the Charter of the United Nations. (51) 
Nevertheless, the votes cast by the numerically superior small and new 
states forming the anti-colonial group in the U. N. were not felt to be 
sufficiently indicative, for guidance or normative purposes, of state 
practice. The force of these Declarations has also been contested as 
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not indicative of the habitual state deference to the major world 
powers. Regarding this point, Reisman notes as follows: 
(The) critical factor in the establishment of custom is 
the relative power balances, corrected by the context of 
the issue, of the parties concerned and the intensity of 
the interest they have in certain outcomes. (52) 
The first real indications of the potential of self-determination 
appeared during the "time of resolve" of what Thullen terms "a dynamic 
group 
... 
determined to convert the U. N. into an instrument for the 
final and accelerated settlement of colonial problems". (53) Formed by 
1955 of sixteen new Member states, and later enlarged by subsequent 
admissions to the U. N. organization, this group urged that "a study of 
the trusteeship system merely in terms of its established goals would 
evade the central thread determining its nature and developments". (54) 
In particular, Thullen remarks as follows: 
What few dared to dream of in 1945 came about 
in a short span of twelve years; anti-colonial 
sentiment which had gained momentum of irresist- 
ible force spared no continent in its forward 
sweep. (55) 
Thus, if viewed as the logical extension of democratic ideals, as 
mixed with Socialist ideology, the principle of "internal" self- 
determination of "Peoples" should not have proven divisive in the world 
community. Conversely, if viewed as an "external" force or mechanism 
through which to better demarcate state powers and functions, the League 
system through minority rights, and the U. N. system through the 
principles of equal rights and self-determination of "Peoples", have 
each attempted to delimit domestic jurisdictional confines and to 
broaden the areas appropriate for international "concern" and control, 
for the maintainance of international peace and stability. (56) 
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It is difficult to reconcile what appears to be the U. N. 
Charter's original intent 
- 
self-determination as an aspirational goal 
- 
with subsequent interpretations incorporating the notion of self- 
determination as a principle or right in areas such as human rights, 
IHL, the use of armed force, an implied right of secession, and 
international terrorism. (57) Through a common linkage, the notion of 
self-determination can be traced in interests as diverse as the right to 
life and to an identity, the "right" to use force, the rights of 
contract, and the right to control resource concession agreements in an 
ever-expanding interpretation of basic U. N. Charter principles. (58) 
Either way, the right of self-determination has provided a means of 
intrusion by the international community into traditional confines of 
state sovereign authority, where such authority previously would have 
been allowed to decide internally the nature and scope of domestic 
individual rights entitlements. 
2.1.2. The Right of Self-Determination, National Liberation. and 
Customary International Law 
Since 1945, "national liberation" to achieve the right of self- 
determination has gradually assumed the character of a legal right. 
Although it is perhaps difficult to reconcile what appears originally to 
have been an aspirational goal with subsequent interpretations, the 
incorporation of self-determination in the areas of human rights and 
IHL, in particular, is now considered to reflect the expression of a 
customary right. This legal turn is commensurate with the notion's 
importance and international dimension, and has been mandated by armed 
1 conflicts for national liberation calling for the application of rules. 
(59) 
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Nevertheless, attempts to create "instant" customary law through 
law-making codifications omit the evolutionary step of irrebutable 
evidence of state practice. This becomes problematic in codifications 
which combine customary law, "soft" law, and what may be termed "new" 
law. (60) For instance, most armed conflicts since 1945 have been of a 
non-international character in the sense that two or more Member states 
hve not confronted each other directly through the use of armed force. 
Instead, many of these conflicts have been confined through domestic 
control mechanisms by characterization as "domestic rebellions" or civil 
war. Thus, many post-1945 armed conflicts have remained largely 
unregulated by international law in that they arguably fall within state 
domestic jurisdictional confines. 
As briefly discussed previously, codification efforts in 1977 
to extend IHL provisions in full to liberation conflicts as 
"international armed conflicts" met with opposition, in that differences 
exist in world opinion regarding the appropriate scope of self- 
determination. This has led in large part to the politically 
controversial nature of liberation conflicts. (61) On this basis it is 
arguable that self-determination and the right to use force to attain it 
are not yet operative principles of existing customary international 
law. With regard to this point, Penna notes as follows: 
The proof of state practice is not an easy task. 
It becomes particularly significant with the 
interpretation of omissions. 
... 
The only clear 
cases of customary international law are those 
in which unilateral state conduct, internal and 
external, and international acts show an unbroken 
and uniform practice over a longer period of time, 
and is supported by opinio juris 
... . 
(62) 
While it has been noted that most states are prepared to 
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cautiously concede that the right of self-determination is a principle 
of international customary law, they are not prepared to accept the full 
consequences of the principle having evolved into a customary right. 
One practical result of such a concession, for instance, is the 
controversy surrounding the incorporation of the notion in the law of 
war. In particular, the upsurge of national independence movements in 
the 1950s and 1960s made assessments or evaluations of the use of force 
highly political. The re-appearance of the "just war" had the 
predictable effect of confounding the right to wage war with the rules 
regulating war. (G3) In addition to the many efforts this Century to 
deter the use of war as an extension of politics, such a re-appearance 
runs counter to post-1945 U. N. rules against the use of aggressive 
force. (64) 
The balance of carefully established fields of competences 
preserved in the U. N. system means that states retain control of all 
matters of domestic jurisdiction. The elimination of the League's 
unanimity rule in favor of U. N. majority consensus allows additional 
discrepancy in state practice, in that the nature of state, 
responsibility has shifted. Nevertheless, the obligatory nature of 
custom, and the growing body of rules of Jus cogens, or peremptory norms 
are evidence both of the existence, and state recognition, of "general 
principles". Binding in all circumstances, such rules become 
international standards, whether or not individual states ascribe to 
them. 
As such, the right of states to choose their internal political, 
economic, social and cultural systems, to suppress a domestic rebellion 
in opposition to such state choice, and to employ any methods in doing 
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so are no longer beyond dispute. (65) The U. N. system attempts to 
establish standards at many levels to control the manner in which states 
treat their own citizens. In particular, in circumstances where a state 
may be fighting for its very existence, the growth in number and content 
of the rules of IHL reflects the delimitation effects of self- 
determination on the traditional confines of state jurisdiction. 
What is clear is that self-determination has become a principle 
of customary international law. By continuously broadening the 
potential scope of its rights entitlements, the notion of self- 
determination has provided a substantial international mechanism of 
intrusion into domestic state autonomy. As a result, any discrepancy in 
state practice or attitude regarding the issue of self-determination 
does not affect the obligatory nature of self-determination as an 
international standard. To many commentators, this principle has fully 
evolved into a substantive right. 
2.2. Problems in Defining Which "Peoples" are Entitled to Use Force 
to Achieve Self-Determination 
As previously discussed, many of the stated goals and purposes of 
the U. N. Charter are capable of different interpretations, and many 
provisions have proven to be indefinite in meaning. Thus, to attempt at 
any particular point in time to definitively demarcate the 
organization's powers and functions more expressly, within the various 
aspirations, would lead to unworkable results. This situation may also 
be mirrored in Member state domestic affairs. It takes time for 
political forces and changes in law and custom to interact and evolve 
within existing frameworks. Where such interaction is successful, 
further jurisdictional assertions for delimitations of traditional 
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competences may be made. Where the interaction of such processes fail 
or become stalled, violence may occur. Thus, resort to violence in 
liberation struggles may be viewed as a reaction in frustration to 
failed attempts to achieve rapid system transformation. The previously 
mentioned "sovereignty explosion" resulted in part from such 
jurisdictional and functional classification struggles. Acts of 
violence further give increased publicity to the asserted substance of 
rights claims by various national groupings. In particular, terrorist 
tactics utilized by liberation groups have brought publicity to their 
goal structures. 
Modern struggles by "Peoples" for self-determination rarely begin 
as independence or secession movements. U. N. Charter provisions for the 
peaceful and orderly graduation of non-self-governing territories into 
statehood seem to obviate the need for violence to attain a least some 
measure of autonomy. Nevertheless, the flexibility of U. N. Charter 
interpretations has at times exacerbated ideological splits in the post- 
1945 world community. The absence of any international consensus as to 
the exact degree of political legitimacy to be afforded liberation 
groups has meant that resort to extremist tactics is often portrayed as 
provoked by, or in self-defense against, stalled democratic processes. 
(66) Alternatively, 
-where an auto-determined "People" has never 
acquiesced in the loss of its territory, international stability cannot 
settle around "new" state boundaries. Publicity of such claims is often 
sought through terrorist tactics, thereby giving a prominent role to the 
use of violent force. (67) 
The problems of defining what "Peoples" are entitled to self- 
determine in an international legal system which is unwilling to 
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actively intervene in classification struggles waged by auto- or self- 
determined groups attempting to come within the terms of U. N. Charter 
Chapter XII are discussed in this Part. By contrast, the League of 
Nations political and territorial contexts for the implementation of 
self-determination, through an eventual return of sovereign title to 
land and the equal operation of law, were clearly delineated. Thus it 
is argued that U. N. goal structures surrounding self-determination are 
too indefinite and juridically instrusive to transform in a peaceful 
manner what was an aspirational goal into a substantive right. In view 
of this weakness, a proliferation of unregulated violence, as the 
preferred method of interpretation of indefinite U. N. Charter 
provisions, has been the result. (68) 
2.2.1. The "Peoples" Entitled to Self-Determine 
The development of the notion of self-determination in the U. N. 
era may be seen in the regular incorporation of the phrase in legal 
instruments. For instance, the right to self-determination is 
constantly repeated in human rights documents, and in U. N. Resolutions 
and Declarations. The law of war incorporates provisions to protect 
individuals against the actions of states during struggles for self- 
determination. Anti-terrorist codifications frequently distinguish wars 
of self-determination and liberation struggles from rhetoric surrounding 
particular acts of international terrorism. This common linkage 
repeatedly asserts the right of "all Peoples" to self-determine, the 
illegality of the subjection of "Peoples" to alien domination and 
exploitation, and the inalienability of their human rights. Further, 
the 1970 Friendly Relations Declaration indicates that "Peoples" have a 
separate and distinct status. 
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Alternatively, the evolution of expectations underlying the right 
of self-determination may be viewed as having developed through 
international legal mechanisms which seek to co-ordinate post-1945 
political and ideological pluralism despite individual state deference 
to the world's major power blocks. The development of self- 
determination may be viewed as having occurred within separate 
ideological frameworks, through competing semantic analyses regarding 
the true intent underlying the various instruments incorporating self- 
determination as a right. Whichever view is preferred, the continued 
failure of the international community to reach a consensus regarding 
the exact identity of "Peoples" entitled to assert the various 
expectations of rights entitlements is of more importance for present 
purposes. (69) Had such a consensus been reached, it is clear that a 
more active role in the peaceful attainment of self-determination by 
"approved causes" might have been taken by the U. N. The self- 
determination of "Peoples" has instead gained content through a trial- 
and-error approach, and on the basis of majority voting. In particular, 
assessments of alterations in state policy and practice, and of 
jurisdictional assertions, have been required before normative content 
could be accurately ascribed to the right of self-determination as a 
rule of international custom, for purposes of identifying those 
"Peoples" entitled to assert it. 
The vision of state sovereignty presupposed in U. N. Charter 
provisions regarding equal rights and self-determination entails 
mechanisms of national authority in operation through state 
administration and internal management, in contexts of democratic 
process. For normative purposes, the notion of self-determination has 
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developed through the distinct branches of colonialism, individual 
rights, and the separatism and/or integration of "Peoples". For 
example, self-determination for commercial purposes becomes an 
allocation of property, management rights, and privileges, and thus 
concerns issues such as ownership, expropriation, compensation, 
investment rights, contract duration, and basic jurisdiction. Self- 
determination for political purposes becomes a question of internal 
organization, whether through an allocation of representation rights, or 
general rights of self-management linking into those more commercial 
purposes previously outlined. Self-determination has thus been framed 
within various legal instruments in alternate and frequently 
contradictory motifs of the U. N. system, as in now outlined. 
2.2.1.1. The Evolving Basis of Self-Determination 
The Universal Declaration of Human Rights in 1948 (70) does not 
repeat the reference to "the principle of equal rights and self- 
determination of Peoples" found in U. N. Charter Articles 1(2) and 55. 
The Declaration adopts instead an individualist and universalist style 
which can be traced back to the American and French Revolutions. 
Thornberry notes that, by so doing, the Declaration relegated 
particularized rights of minorities to past history. (71) Wilson notes 
that a Soviet amendment to the Declaration, that "every people and every 
nation has the right to national self-determination", was expressly 
rejected. (72) 
The omission in the Universal Declaration of U. N. Charter 
language is later rectified in Common Article 1 of the Civil and 
Political Rights Covenant and the Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 
Covenant, of 1966. (73) Common Article 1 of the Covenants provides, in 
- 
52 
- 
pertinent part, as follows: 
1. All peoples have the right of self-determination. By 
virtue of that right they freely determine their poli- 
tical status and freely pursue their economic, social 
and cultural development. 
2. All peoples may, for their own ends, freely dispose of 
their national wealth and resources 
... 
3. The States Parties to the present Covenant 
... 
shall 
promote the realization of the right of self-determination. 
Thornberry notes that the text and travaux of the Covenants 
support the view that their content reaches beyond the colonial context. 
(74) The Covenants follow U. N. General Assembly Resolution 1514 (XV) of 
1960, which provides that "(t)he subjection of peoples to alien 
subjugation, domination and exploitation constitutes a denial of 
fundamental human rights". Resolution 1514 further provides that armed 
action or "repressive measures of all kinds" employed against such 
"Peoples" must stop in order to allow them to exercise these rights. 
The rights enumerated are termed "inalienable", and territorial 
disruption is felt to be incompatible with U. N. Charter purposes. 
Resolution 1514 was later supplemented in 1961 by Resolution 1654 (XVI), 
which contained a supervisory mechanism designed to ensure 
implementation. Of interest, one purpose of the General Assembly in 
implementing Resolution 1654 was to pressure recalcitrant states to 
accept the principles contained in Resolution 1514. Nevertheless, the 
unwillingness of some states to accept Resolution 1514 led to a refusal 
to accept or co-operate with the Special Committee established by 
Resolution 1654. (75) 
2.2.1.2. Self-Determination and The Law of War 
The steady expansion of the concept of the right to self- 
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determination increased international awareness of a need to provide the 
protections of IHL to the victims of armed conflicts which flowed from 
liberation struggles. From the early 1950s there were calls to revise 
and update the laws of war. A number of U. N. Resolutions were hinting 
at the legality of the use of force in such conflicts through an 
interpretation that such a use of force was not aggressive, but was 
instead employed in self-defense against, e. g . colonialism. Better 
protection of civilian populations was required. The growing scale of 
foreign assistance involved in liberation struggles and the 
sophistication of weaponry used were additional reasons to update the 
1949 codifications. (76) 
Prior to the opening of the Diplomatic Conference convened in 
1974 to revise and update the four 1949 Geneva Conventions, the General 
Assembly passed a number of Resolutions which indicated that the law of 
war might be appropriate to regulate armed struggles for self- 
determination. In 1965, it passed Resolution 2105 (XX) which 
"recognized the legitimacy of the struggle of colonial peoples against 
colonial domination in the exercise of their right to self-determination 
and independence". Resolution 2936 (XXVII), in 1972, "(r)eaffirm(ed) 
its recognition of the legitimacy of the struggle of colonial peoples 
for their freedom by all appropriate means at their disposal". In 
December, 1973, Resolution 3103 (XXVIII) recognized that combatants 
struggling for freedom and self-determination were entitled to the 
application of the provisions of the Third and Fourth Geneva Conventions 
of 1949. This last Resolution also recognized that armed conflicts 
resulting from such struggles "are international conflicts in the sense 
of the Geneva Conventions", a conclusion which effectively delimited the 
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role of state authoritative interpretation in characterizing many 
"civil" wars. 
Attempts to delimit state jurisdictional function are further 
apparent from the identity of the participants attending the 1974 - 77 
Diplomatic Conference. The number of states varied from 107 to 124. 
Eleven liberation movements and 51 intergovernmental or non-governmental 
organizations participated as observers. All decisions on substantive 
matters and the adoption of articles were subject to a two-thirds 
majority vote whenever there was no consensus. For example, Article 
1(4) of Protocol 1 extended the provisions of the Geneva Conventions to 
well-defined liberation struggles (77) as if they were international 
armed conflicts. Article 1(4) was accepted with 80 votes in favor, 1 
vote opposed (Israel), and 11 abstentions by mostly Western countries. 
Of interest, the evolution of such conflicts to the status of 
international conflicts by means of a consensus approach, for purposes 
of the extension or the provisions of IHL, further served as a 
recognition that U. N. Resolutions form a potential source of 
international law. 
2.2.1.3. Alternative Analyses of Self-Determination 
Although the idea of self-determination raises a number of 
issues, the notion is generally expressed through the separate 
frameworks of colonialism and individual rights. Separatism and 
integration are also presented as alternative, and highly contradictory, 
motifs in the Charter system. (78) This has resulted in what has been 
termed a "schizo" approach to self-determination. (79) Such duality is 
further evident in the conflicting attitudes adopted by Member states, 
if only through different linguistic analyses of the true intent 
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underlying the various texts or instruments which incorporate the notion 
of self-determination as a right. For example, it has been argued that 
General Assembly Resolution 637A (VII) of 1953 effectively placed the 
manner states implement self-determination beyond the confines of U. N. 
Charter Article 2(7). (80) Nevertheless, many states retain the power 
to interpret authoritatively the content of their own domestic armed 
struggles, and the view continues that only the Charter is binding in 
law, as Resolutions are purely political declarations. This latter view 
is based on the negotiations in San Francisco. (81) 
Another contradiction may be seen between U. N. General Assembly 
Resolution 1514 (XV) in 1960, and the International Covenant on Civil 
and Political Rights of 1966. Resolution 1514, the 1960 Declaration on 
the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, contains 
doctrines of statehood and notions of decolonialization which suggest 
that the right of self-determination inheres in a "People" as part of 
the process by which international juridical entities are created. On 
the other hand, the expression of human rights law and notions of 
personal liberty and equality in political participation contained in 
the 1966 Covenant suggests that the right to self-determination inheres 
in persons as part of the ways in which international juridical entities 
are restricted in their actions. (82) 
These juxtapositions are highlighted and complicated by 
assertions of a right to use armed force in liberation struggles. Of 
interest regarding this point is the General Assembly Declaration on 
Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Co- 
operation among States in Accordance with the Charter of the United 
Nations, of 1970. The Friendly Relations Declaration builds on the 
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decolonization process contained in the 1960 Declaration. While 
exhorting Member states to refrain "from any forcible action which 
deprives peoples 
... 
of their right to self-determination and freedom 
and independence", it proceeds to impose on Member states express duties 
to desist from encouraging armed bands, acts of civil strife or 
terrorist acts. The 1970 Declaration further states that "(n)o 
territorial acquisition resulting from the threat or use of force shall 
be recognized as legal". "Peoples" have the right to "freely determine, 
without external interference, their political status". Member states 
have the duty "to respect this right in accordance with the provisions 
of the Charter". Most importantly, the Friendly Relations Declaration 
declares as follows: 
The territory of a colony or other non-governing territory 
has, under the Charter of the United Nations, a status 
separate and distinct from the territory of the State 
administering it; and such separate and distinct status 
under the Charter shall exist until the people of the 
colony or non-self-governing territory have exercised 
their right of self-determination in accordance with the 
Charter, and particularly its purposes and principles. 
(Emphasis added. ) 
Given the absence of identification regarding which "Peoples" are 
entitled to the right of self-determination, it is argued that the use 
of armed force by auto- or self-determined "Peoples" has revised common 
understandings regarding the prohibitions contained in U. N. Charter 
Article 2(4). It is further argued that the extension of IHL duties and 
protections equally to all parties engaged in such armed struggles 
impliedly recognizes the right to revolt against, for example, 
repression. (83) Should this be the case, it is clear that any 
international political support of self-determination which underpins 
the use of particular forms of violence provides a most serious obstacle 
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to dealing squarely with international terrorism. In particular, 
undefined rights of non-approved "Peoples" have resulted in competing 
interpretations of claims assertions through the use of armed force. 
Codified attempts not yet reflected in state practise to delimit notions 
of state sovereignty appear to confound the justness of a "People's" war 
with the regulation of war, in that "the use of all appropriate means" 
does not imply the primacy of law in war. (84) Thus, tension in the 
U. N. system regarding these many developmental dilemmas has led to 
opposition to the operation of self-determination in general, even to 
its operation in the peaceful manner originally envisaged in the U. N. 
Charter. 
In view of such opposition, liberation groups may be 
characterized as terrorist organizations, and their tactics as terrorism 
without further inquiry. (85) Alternatively, where political sympathies 
or ideology underpin and support national liberation, states may 
disagree as to the existence of an international ddlit for purposes of 
enforcing anti-terrorist codifications. The international community has 
thus to date been unable effectively to deter the proliferation of 
political violence, much less to agree on a definition of it. 
Uavecthalesae, acta of terrorism perpetr, ate4 4iuri. ng +a libartattan tr4ggle 
may be universally dealt with through mechanisms provided by IHL. 
2.2.2. The "Right" to Use Force I eve Self-Determination 
The repeated use of armed force in particular contexts may work 
to revise common understandings as to the right to its use, or it may 
lead to strong state condemnation of such a use of force. However, the 
broad limits of "permissible revolutionary activity" (86) in the 
Twentieth Century are indicative of a coercive normative order which 
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depends in the last analysis on the application of physical force for 
purposes of authority and control. In this way, liberation wars may be 
viewed as exceptions to the prohibitions found in U. N. Charter Article 
2(4), in that they may be justified through their cause. 
A justification to wage war in the face of U. N. prohibitions, 
however, is one of degree. A "Just cause" to wage war, by definition, 
is the righting of a wrong, perhaps where other efforts have failed, and 
the many attempts to legitimize a war with reference to a "just cause" 
which dominated older debates in the classical bellum just um cannot yet 
be said to have been satisfactorily resolved. The righting of a past 
historic grievance, e. g. 
. 
the acquisition of territory through conquest, 
may not fall squarely within U. N. frameworks of colonialism or human 
righs violations. Nevertheless, the ideological input of the righting 
of a past grievance would imply that liberation wars, as based on a 
"just cause", cannot be "just" on each side. Assuming this point for 
purposes of argument, it is further argued that war waged in the pursuit 
of a perceived international right is the highest test of the substance 
of that right. However, war is to be contemplated only as a last 
resort. Should a liberation group have system transformation as its 
goal, the "justness" of engaging in an armed conflict must be gauged 
through the many prohibitions against the aggressive threat or use of 
force, the exhaustion of other available remedies, and the last resort 
nature of war. Thus, where auto-determined "Peoples" use force to 
achieve their right of self-determination, the "justness" of the cause 
is analyzed within competing legal and political frameworks in order to 
determine the true legitimacy of the struggle. 
As previously discussed, any presupposition of democratic ideals 
I 
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in the U. N. Charter has not resulted in firm standards of congruence 
between expectations of control and authority in post-1945 Member state 
practice. Charter emphasis on "Peoples" as defined through common 
political goals as well as clear ethnic or cultural ties which do not 
endanger existing territorial boundaries or the political independence 
of states thus ignores anything other than existing distributions of 
cultural or ideological regionalism. (87) In particular, the presence 
of Socialism and totalitarianism in the U. N. era has paved the way for 
the use of violence to attain political and ideological ends. Anti- 
colonialism, as a form of anti-imperialism, has been used as a vehicle 
for Soviet expansionist ambitions. When these expansionist policies 
have come into conflict with expansionist Western regional security 
concerns, the result has been a delayed or prevented compliance with 
U. N. Charter requirements regarding independence or statehood of the 
formerly dependent territories. 
Further, territorial grievances and ethnicity continue to play 
important roles in demands for self-determination. The original context 
of colonialism is far too narrow to contain the developed notion of 
self-determination. In particular, an increasingly complex human rights 
regime has kept the issue of the legality of humanitarian intervention a 
current theme. (33) The steady growth of this regime reflects a growing 
support for a right to interfere in sister state domestic affairs, if 
only to provide humanitarian relief and assistance to embattled 
populations. The repetition of support and respect for liberation 
struggles asserted in anti-terrorist codifications and U. N. documents 
reflects the difficulty of identifing terrorist acts outside of 
politicized contexts. The developments in IHL have reflected an, 
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acceptance of the fact of war between non-state entities, and the need 
to protect the victims of such struggles. Yet, nowhere are "Peoples" 
defined sufficiently to make the rights inherent in self-determination 
concretely operational. There are only instruments which list the 
rights that "Peoples" hold, and which re-affirm respect for those 
"Peoples" engaged in struggles to secure them. 
As such, the phenomenon of liberation wars presents a danger to 
international peace and security by carving an exception in U. N. 
prohibitions regarding the inter-state threat or use of force. In a 
primitive system of law such as exists in the international community, 
where enforcement of the rules in existence must depend on individual 
state observance of them, this is particularly so. Despite the presence 
of international custom, and the growing body of peremptory norms, or 
Jus cogens rules, valid expectations of state practice may be gauged 
only through individual state observance of a given set of perceived 
operational rights. In view of this, there is a need to adjust the time 
parameters of particular incidents before selecting the relevant norms 
to apply for purposes of future guidance. (89) It is thus argued that 
the repeated use of armed force in liberation classification struggles 
has expanded both the right to self-determination, and the understanding 
of the content of the justifications for the use of force. 
As previously discussed, the "right" to use force to attain self- 
determination as against Member states has been developed after the 
fact. The right to use force in such struggles has been recognized and 
repeated in a number of U. N. General Assembly Resolutions which 
juxtapose the prohibition of the threat or use of force in international 
relations, the inviolability of territorial boundaries and political 
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independence, the non-interference of states in sister state internal 
affairs, the "justness" of the struggle against colonialism, alien 
occupation and racist regimes, and the right to the self-determination 
of "Peoples". Of note are Resolution 2936 (XXVII) of 1972, which 
reaffirmed U. N. recognition "of the legitimacy of the struggle of 
colonial peoples for their freedom by all appropriate means at their 
disposal", and U. N. General Assembly Resolution 3103 (XXVIII) of 1973, 
which recognized the applicability of the Third and Fourth Geneva 
Conventions of 1949 to liberation wars. 
The eventual "graduation" of liberation wars from the status of 
domestic matters to proper subjects of international concern and 
jurisdiction thus reflects both the realities of modern ideological and 
territorial armed conflicts, and the contentious notion that U. N. 
Resolutions form a potential source of international law. For present 
purposes, this is of note to illustrate the effect of the self- 
determination issue on the evolution of perceptions regarding the 
boundaries of appropriate state power and function within the broader 
confines of international law. As liberation wars are popularly 
perceived as having carved an exception in U. N. prohibitions against the 
threat or use of force, it is felt that the confounding of the right to 
wage war with the regulation of war has been the result. 
2.3. The Use of Nonconventional Means and Methods off, Warfare to 
Achieve Self-Determination 
As previously discussed, delimitations of jurisdiction from 
domestic to international confines should lead to greater harmonization 
in world organization. Instead, they are a constant source of tension 
in the international community. This is so for several reasons. 
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Contexts of state sovereignty are jealously guarded against the inroads 
implicitly made through formal notions of state equality. For instance, 
the issue of self-determination has already potentially been removed 
from the confines or Charter Article 2(7). State Socialism has offered 
interpretations in competition with Western-style democratic ideals 
regarding the developing content of international law and the scope of 
state sovereignty. U. N. majoritarian decision-making has led to a shift 
in views of absolute Member state responsibility in that agreements 'tend 
more to be maximalist rather than minimalist. Further, the presumed 
inviolability of territorial boundaries ignores the non-correction of 
historic territorial acquisitions, which grievances are kept alive by 
occupied or dominated "Peoples". 
It is argued in this Part that the gradual recognition of the 
authority. of liberation groups to use violent force to end colonialism 
and/or territorial domination, and to achieve system transformation, has 
resulted in a proliferation of asymetric armed conflicts in contemporary 
international law. In that struggling groups are often characterized as 
terrorist, employing terrorist methods, it is further argued that the 
gradual recognition of the authority to wage "just wars" has encouraged 
the use of cheap and easily available terror weaponry. Nevertheless, 
the "justness" of struggles for self-determination is not made any less 
so because of some terror impact. Further, a type of armed struggle, if 
repeatedly waged to interpret the substance of perceived rights, may 
work to revise substantive law by changing prospective expectations of 
state action. A repeated use of "justified" armed force, as 
distinguished from waging a "just" war, may inject sufficient legal and 
conceptual confusion into the pertinent issues to become a test of the 
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substantive meaning of a multitude of asserted rights. In the absence 
of effective international diplomatic efforts to forestall, or sanctions 
to prevent, such repeated uses of force, it is further clear that resort 
to the use of armed force to resolve classification struggles is 
dangerous because of the anticipated effects on precedent or norm 
development. 
However, in the case of terrorist methods of war, this has not 
yet occurred. Strong international condemnation of acts of terrorism, 
whether perpetrated during liberation wars or within purely political or 
economic contexts, remains the case. However, while individual states 
frequently engage in acts of terrorism to maintain frameworks of public 
order, the ready use of terrorism as one tactic in an otherwise 
legitimate political strategy has not resulted in a conclusion of 
permissibility when utilized by liberation groups struggling for rights 
of self-determination. Should IHL be made applicable to an armed 
liberation struggle, states, too, are prohibited from engaging in such 
practices. 
2.3.1. The Right to Wage War 
The ending of colonialism coincided with a proliferation of 
Marxist theories which were conducive to the pursuit of the goals of 
self-determination. Anti-imperialist/capitalist rhetoric also worked to 
encourage the notion of a right to wage war and thus nurtured in 
particular a number of Asian and African independence movements. 
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discussions, which in turn further supported the notion of a right to 
rebel. By mixing anti-colonial and anti-imperialist arguments with 
self-determination issues, political and territorial demands could be 
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constructed in such a way as to compete with Western-style democratic, 
albeit expansionist, ideals. This injected the requisite political 
content into competing semantic analyses of U. N. Charter rules and 
principles. Resulting rebellions could now be characterized as "just", 
even though in contravention of domestic and/or international 
prohibitions regarding the use of force to achieve political aims. 
The confounding of the right to wage war with the regulation of 
war, in the context of liberation armed conflicts for rights of self- 
determination, further confuses the theories of a "just war" to effect 
system transformation with more traditional theories of "just war", 
e. g.. 
. 
to right a grievance. Early Twentieth Century efforts to 
establish tests for the formal legality of waging war were first a 
search for restrictions on the use of force where employed to conduct 
international relations. (90) Efforts then sought to encourage peaceful 
relations among states, and the creation of new law and system 
transformation through political processes rather than through the use 
of armed force. Issues of war guilt, beyond the emphasis placed on 
legal questions alone, nevertheless survived, as was seen at the end of 
both World Wars, and presumably, such issues of guilt continue to rely 
both on formal legality, and distinctions between "just" and "unjust" 
wars. (91) U. N. Charter prohibitions against the use of aggressive 
force between Member states in their international relations go further 
than those of the League of Nations, which only had mechanisms to retard 
the escalation of a particular dispute. 
As such, any perceived modern "right" on the part of liberation 
groups to use armed force for self-determination rests on two main 
premises. The first is that of self-defense against the aggression of 
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colonialism, alien occupation, or racism. The second constitutes what 
could be construed as a gap in the original U. N. Charter system. 
Charter prohibitions apply between and among Member taten, Maintenance 
of international peace and security in dependent territories is an 
additional Member state responsibility. The potential gap, which 
pertains to the use of armed force in non-interstate national liberation 
struggles, was in part filled by the the 1970 Friendly Relations 
Declaration, and by Protocol 1 in 1977 which extended the protections 
of IHL to liberation struggles against colonial domination and alien 
occupation, and racist regimes. 
However, where an auto-determined "People" asserts rights to 
self-determination on the basis of other, perhaps more historic grounds, 
there is controversy as to the true content of the right to use force to 
achieve self-determination. Whether a resulting armed conflict is 
internal, and falls within U. N. Charter Article 2(7), or whether the 
issue of self-determination raises the particular dispute to an issue 
better dealt with under either U. N. Charter Chapters VI or VII, remains 
primarily a political question in each particular case, the resolution 
of which in turn affects the potential for the application of IHL to the 
conflict. 
2.3.2. War tg Create New Law or System Transformation 
War, as a means of creating new law has, as its counterpart in 
the domestic sphere, revolution, yet the purposes of interstate war go 
far beyond the traditional and limited purposes of revolution. In 
particular, revolution occurs to achieve system transformation and/or to 
end various forms of repression. Thus, revolution has historically been 
viewed as a domestic matter, and not an appropriate concern for 
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international jurisdiction until it threatened international peace and 
security. (92) 
A separate and distinct issue is the primacy of law in war. 
Regulation of the conduct of interstate hostilities occurs after the 
creation of expectations' by states as to the means and methods to be 
used. These expectations do not constitute a derogation from the modern 
prohibition against war, nor do they result in a legitimation of 
aggression. The primacy of law in war simply means the regulation of 
the means and methods employed to wage war. Regulation of the conduct 
of a domestic uprising or civil war has generally been left, until 
recently, in the hands of the parties to the conflict. For modern 
purposes, whether or not a particular conflict is characterized as a 
"war" for potential applicability of IHL thus remains primarily a 
political question. (93) 
As previously discussed, the survival of the colonial system 
under the U. N. Charter system was qualified by Charter provisions which 
were designed to ensure the peaceful and orderly attainment of 
independence by dependent territories and/or "Peoples", the full 
identity of which and whom were uncertain in 1945. The use of anti- 
colonialism as a vehicle for Soviet ambitions led to the popular view in 
some quarters that not only former mandates and areas detached from the 
Axis Powers were intended, but also, such other non-self-governing 
territories or "Peoples" as might wish to break from dominant state 
institutionalization. This is seen particularly when a dominated 
"People" does not fall within clearcut colonial confines, but instead, 
within frameworks which call into play post-1945 human rights regimes. 
The explosive growth of an "individual-focused" human rights 
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regime in the U. N. Charter system is arguably intended in part to 
prevent transboundary alliances of dislocated population, 
Nevertheless, self-determination is considered a fundamental human 
right, and one which is potentially more important than the right to 
life. Human rights law has thus promoted the growth of the notion of 
self-determination, if only in the direction of democratic process, or 
"internal" self-determination. Where democratic process proves too slow 
to effect new law or system transformation, violence frequently results. 
Confusion then arises regarding the prohibition of acts of international 
terrorism, in that a right to the self-determination of "Peoples" which 
is asserted individually through operative human rights frameworks 
frequently results in the deprivation of the right to life through 
terrorist violence. Should IHL be made applicable to armed struggles 
for self-determination, however, the taking of life may be lawful, and 
where not lawful, prosecuted as a grave breach or war crime. Further, 
humanitarian intervention in reaction to sister-state rights violations 
potentially permits interference in the internal affairs of target 
Member states. (94) Such interference is made doubly offensive in that 
it calls state sovereignty into question (95), it leads to inquiry into 
the propriety of a government's mandate to rule, and it may encourage 
foreign state assistance and/or support to lib ration groupti fighting in 
a "just" cause. 
The post-colonial power of disposition over acquired territories 
was intended initially to encourage peaceful system transformation and 
later, independence of foreign colonial territories. Instead, its 
actual operation has injected conceptual and legal confusion into the 
content of wars of self-determination. The ending of colonialism did 
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not rectify all historic grievances founded on conquest or cession. War 
waged for territory, for purposes of system transformation, or as a 
means of creating new law has thus become a tactic of choice when 
political or constitutional processes have proven too slow to effect the 
perceived requisite changes required for true autonomy. In particular, 
many liberation groups otherwise characterized as terrorist 
organizations seek such system transformation when confronted with 
repressive state mechanisms. They thus employ legally suspect tactics, 
such as terrorism, both to publicize the fact of repression, and the 
fact that they have never acquiesced in the original loss of territory 
or autonomy. 
2.3.3. Nonconventional Means and Methods of Warfare 
Revolution, as a means of changing law or of effecting system 
transformation, is evidence that the power of disposition by states over 
acquired territories still lies outside the fields of competence 
reserved to the U. N. Where the U. N. does take an interest in such 
conflicts, the political questions underpinning them retard the 
seemingly clear mechanisms contained in Charter provisions for dealing 
with issues which endanger international peace and security. The fact 
of revolution further implies the existence of an asymmetric conflict. 
The success of particular classification struggles by national 
groupings in the post-1945 era has occurred largely through the use of 
nonconventional means and methods of warfare. This success has thus 
widened the wording of U. N. Charter provisions regarding equal rights 
and self-determination, and has side-stepped U. N. Charter prohibitions 
regarding the use of armed force. As a result, pre-existing 
interpretational language giving substance both to the Organization's 
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powers and functions, and to the content of self-determination, hasbeen 
altered dynamically. This is not to suggest that successful 
classification struggles in the U. N. era imply that the notion of 
"sovereign state" is no more than a aeries of linguistic assertians, if 
only of rights and duties potentially achievable through revolution. 
This would encourage war. Instead, any power shifts achieved through 
violence merely delay the reorganization of a new coherent process of 
government and alliance structure, through which international order is 
maintained within an enduring scheme. 
Conversely, in that the right to revolt against severe repression 
its not seriously disputed, an entitlement to resort to force is repeated 
in a number of U, N. Resolutions. Thus, while a notional entitlement to 
resort to force has been achieved through the actual use of violence in 
liberation struggles, a perception of an ideological entitlement to use 
force is now first required. With particular regard to the use of 
terror-violence in struggles for self-determination, ready access to 
weapönry ensures revolutionary potential. However, a perception of 
entitlement must also be communicated. Thus, when functioning within 
confines of historical grievance and/or patterns of state repression, 
the terrorist him- or herself must bed transformed into a "national" 
hero, and thus into a political weapon. (96) This, in addition to 
access to and use of more traditional arms, makes terror methods of war 
both highly personified and personal. 
As previously mentioned, a terror impact in a "just" cause, and 
in an otherwise permissible political strategy for achieving the goals 
of self-determination, need not delegitimize the national grouping any 
more than it does the threatened state utilizing extreme methods for the 
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maintenance of public order. Nor does a terror impact need to result in 
any conclusion of permissibility regarding the means and methods used to 
achieve particular goals. (97) An entitlement to use force to achieve 
self-determination is now recognized, and modern weaponry is available. 
Thus, the control of the use of weaponry through international law was 
mandated for purposes of all parties to a liberation conflict. Such 
control was developed in the recent IHL codifications. (98) Given the 
breadth of Charter provisions regarding the right of "People; a" to attain 
independence from state institutionalization, and given the separate and 
distinct status of such "Peoples", liberation wars thus had to be 
regulated through international law as if the parties to such asymmetric 
conflicts were Member states, bound by full U. N. Charter and war law 
provisions. 
The use of force in liberation. struggles has expanded the 
original intended scope of Member state agreement regarding self- 
determination and has limited the prohibition of the threat or, use of 
force in international relations. The proliferation of the use of cheap 
and easily available weaponry in liberation struggles has further made 
interpretation of the content of such struggles increasingly difficult 
to assess, particularly where the degree of "justness" of a cause is in 
dispute. Thus, all such armed conflicts must be viewed as capable of 
regulation and interpretation through international law, despite the 
nonconventional means and methods of war frequently employed during 
their course, and despite the tenancity of contexts of state sovereignty 
to authoritatively interpret the content of particular armed uprisings. 
Despite individual Member state objection, the use of terror methods by 
all parties to a liberation armed conflict should fall within the 
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jurisdictional framework of IHL, if only for purposes of guidance, 
rather than within sovereign domestic criminal confines. 
It is concluded that the expansion of self-determination through 
the use of force has resulted in the U. N. Charter aspirational principle 
evolving into a substantive right in international law. It is further 
clear that the notion of self-determination has been expanded to include 
groups which auto-determine that a "People", entitled to assert its 
claims to territory and political independence, is in issue. In this 
way, self-determination has proven to be a divisive issue in the post- 
1945 era, and in particular, an issue which has undermined individual 
state compliance with IHL. The expansion of self-determination has led 
Member states to recognize that an extension of the laws regulating 
warfare was mandated in order to regulate such conflicts under 
international law, to delineate better the confines of the "justness" of 
waging war, and to emphasize the primacy of law in war. Nevertheless, 
the political content of wars of self-determination has led many states 
to observe new IHL provisions only through confines of existing 
customary law, as the use of nonconventional means and methods of 
warfare for the sole purpose of injecting terror is prohibited with 
regard to all parties. To do otherwise would mean that repressive state 
mechanisms for the maintenance of public order should a liberation war 
be in issue are also prohibited, as are all those methods which involve 
a terror impact utilized during liberation struggles. 
It is concluded that the use of force has expanded the notion of 
self-determination far beyond colonial contexts, and the use of force 
during liberation struggles can thus be clearly distinguished from 
individual or random acts'of international terrorism. Thus, liberation 
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groups otherwise characterized as "terrorist" may, and should, be 
prosecuted under the laws of war for acts of terror-violence perpetrated 
in armed conflicts for self-determination. 
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3. Examples g. [ "Peons Achi eving jtig Right ja Self-Determination 
through Resort la Violence 
The struggle for more jurisdictional space in which to expand the 
principle of self-determination in the U. N. Charter system may be seen 
through assertions of "rights" to use armed force, rights to ownership 
and control of material resources, and individual rights, generally. On 
this basis, it is clear that any strict constructionist approach to the 
meaning of self-determination may miss the mark, forestall the 
successful interaction required for system change, and provoke an armed 
conflict. (1) 
As previously discussed, the notion of self-determination is 
frequently expressed through the two separate branches of colonialism 
and individual rights. Separatism and integration are also presented as 
alternative, and highly contradictory, motifs underlying self- 
determination in the U. N. Charter system. Further, despite an 
International legal system which prohibits the aggressive use of force, 
national liberation struggles have now been recognized theoretically as 
international for purposes of the applicability of IRL. (2) It is thus 
argued in this Chapter that the recent "automatic" extension of IHL to 
wars of self-determination provides a legal structure within which to 
view liberation struggles. IHL also provides a structure for the 
effective prohibition and punishment of many instances of politically- 
based violence, and in particular, violent acts which otherwise might be 
characterized as acts of international terrorism. (3) However, such a 
development first required the occurrence of a number of successful 
armed liberation conflicts, and some examples of the role of the use of 
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force in such conflicts, are now discussed. 
By way of preliminary discussion, the extension of IHL 
protections to wars of self-determination means that a neutral forum in 
which to gauge the legality of the means and methods employed in such 
armed conflicts is now available. This extension further provides 
guidelines through which to delineate the parameters for entitlement to 
self-determination by auto-determined "Peoples", e. g . through the 
willingness of such groups to comply with applicable provisions of 
humanitarian law, which delineation in turn would facilitate any 
differentiation between "terrorists" and "freedom fighters" for purposes 
of the protections provided by humanitarian law. An additional effect 
should also be the re-characterization of some "prima facie" terrorists 
as freedom fighters, with a concommitant decrease in the exercise of 
extra-territorial jurisdiction by states affected by acts of terrorism 
perpetrated by liberation groups, in that grave breaches or war crimes 
are punishable by the national courts of each Member state party to IHL. 
(4). 
It is argued generally in this Chapter that the 1977 extension of 
substantive Itü. law provides a legal structure within which to view and 
prosecute acts of terror-violence perpetrated by recognized national 
liberation groups. (5) IHL is also applicable, if only for purposes of 
guidance, to the treatment of unrecognized "Peoples" engaged in the use 
of armed force. Nevertheless, objection has been made that the codified 
recognition of wars of national liberation as "international" grants a 
measure of legitimacy to terrorist organizations. The use of terrorism 
as a tool for achieving the right to self-determination has thus been 
both an aid to publicizing a group's rights demands, and a stumbling 
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block to universal ratification of Protocol 1. (6) 
In particular, objection has been voiced that the 1977 extension 
of IHL unreasonably Intrudes into state sovereign authority to interpret 
the nature of a domestic armed uprising, and that it results in 
jurisdictional conflicts. (7) The Intrusion into state sovereignty in 
part involves the issue of the legality, or "justness", of the use of 
armed force by "approved causes". Jurisdictional conflicts arise when 
stetes differ regarding the proper characterization to be attributed to 
particular uses of armed force by aggrieved "Peoples". These objections 
could, in turn, undermine interstate co-operation in matters such as 
extradition. Thus, while it has been argued that the codified 
recognition of "International" wars of national liberation obviates 
further inquiry as to their true nature, the underlying lack of state 
consensus demarcating the concepts Involved In the "self-determination" 
of "Peoples", and the use of force in liberation conflicts, does little 
to discourage their occurrence. 
Political rationales for the use of terror-violence in support of 
self-determination thus provide one of the most worthwhile perspectives 
with which to explore the substance of the rights claims involved. Such 
political underpinnings are also the greatest' obstacles met with by 
states when attempting to deal with international terrorism by means of 
crime-specific codifications. It is therefore argued that the lack of 
consensus between, in particular, the first and third worlds as to the 
identity of the "Peoples" entitled to self-determination has encouraged 
the use of force in the post-1945 era in a succession of "just wars" 
which are waged as the highest test of the substance of asserted rights 
entitlements. (8) This, in turn, endangers the U. N. Charter system, in 
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that the course and results of such ware in practical terms are 
undemocratic, legally suspect, and dangerous for use as precedent or 
norm fabrication. (9) 
The structure of this argument is as follows. In Part One, the 
issue of national choice involved in self-determination is discussed. 
Some examples of "Peoples" emerging as politically and territorially 
sovereign. and in free association are Algeria, Micronesia and Hong 
Kong. As regards integration, the cases of Northern Ireland, Goa, and 
the Occupied Territories are used to illustrate the tension inherent in 
U. N. conceptual duality. In Pert Two, the East-West ideological split, 
Resolution 2625, and the laws of war are briefly discussed in order to 
Illustrate the tension created by the U. N. system between aspects of 
external and internal self-determination, which tension leads to high 
requirements for emancipation. 
It is concluded that the international rules regarding armed 
classification struggles for self-determination require not only 
agreement as to form and procedure, but also a more harmonized view of 
the substantive choices available to "Peoples" wishing to exercise their 
rights to self-determination. In other words, to make the rules in 
existence effective, Member states must first agree on the meaning and 
application of self-determination. Once this occurs, state action which 
is utilized to contain and/or defend against domestic liberation 
conflicts need no longer plague the international fight against 
terrorism. In'that acts of terrorism have played a major role in 
achieving the extension of IHL to liberation struggles, it is further 
concluded that Protocol 1 extends sufficient enforcement mechanisms to 
all states to enable them to distinguish acts of political or terror 
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violence perpetrated as one tactlc"in a liberation struggle from acts of 
international terrorism. Such a distinction has obvious consequences 
for the prosecution of alleged offenders. 
3.1. $Q Issue gj Choice 113. Self-Determination 
U. N. Resolution 1514 (XV) of 1960 (10), as previously discussed, 
stresses that "Peoples" are to be left to "exercise peacefully and 
freely their right to complete independence 
... 
". Resolution 1514 is 
complimented in the same year by Resolution 1541 (XV), which provides 
non-self-governing territories with a choice regarding national destiny. 
This choice is as follows: 
(1) Emergence as a sovereign independent state; 
(2) Free association with an independent stete; or 
(3) Integration with an independent state. 
According to the International Court of Justice in the Western 
ra CAS, Advisory Opinion, 1975 (11), free association must occur 
through free and voluntary choice, and must be expressed through public 
and democratic process. This view of free association is based on 
Western-style democratic presuppositions of free choice, economic 
liberty, the sanctity of property, and individual human rights, as 
contained in the U. N. Charter. Nevertheless, the political and 
ideological roles played by Socialist theory in the post-1945 era have 
been fundamental in the loss of traditional territorial unities, and in 
demands for redress of historic wrongs going far beyond the original 
League of Nations and U. N. Charter confines of colonialism. In order to 
"re-seize" natural resources, national wealth, and territorial control, 
for example, a right to rebel has, in particular instances, been based 
at least in part on Marxist rhetoric. (12) 
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Conversely, and depending on the history and constitutional 
arrangements, if any, in territories and/or of "Peoples" making a claim 
for self-determination, the choices involved in the determination of 
national destiny need not include full secession or governmental 
separation from a dominant state at all. According to this view, opting 
for less drastic solutions perhaps reflects a more practical attitude 
towards, and aptitude for, the political and economic realities of 
sovereign state responsibility which underlie particular forms of means- 
end utility. Further, the processes which actually constitute "public 
and democratic process" remain uncertain. (13) Current debate also 
considers " 
... 
whether there can be an universal understanding of 
specific rights 
... 
contained in an international instrument". (14) As 
a result, the economic and strategic considerations involved in a choice 
of national destiny or self-determination have increased in number and 
become more varied. 
For example, the role of choice in the operation of U. N. Charter 
provisions regarding non-self-governing territories was particularly 
clear for the Asian and African states which emerged in the post-1945 
era, and the double appeals of the rights contained in the International 
Covenants on Human Rights of 1966 were often placed in these regions in 
a "hierarchy of need". It is thus argued that traditional freedoms will 
be taken seriously by a government when the people's economic and 
social expectations have been reasonably met". In other words, "(a)11 
aspects of human rights need not be given the same status of importance. 
A new nation should be free to determine its own national values, 
political, social and economic priorities, uninfluenced by the 
preference of the West", in a nation-building exercise which imposes 
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citizen burdens as well as citizen rights. (15) 
Given these many political, ideological and practical 
considerations, it is clear that the issue of choice in the exercise of 
self-determination has worked to exacerbate some kinds of group 
division. (16) Nevertheless, by 1978,60 territories had achieved joint 
or separate independence, 13 were integrated, 7 were associated states, 
17 were still dependent, and East Timor and Western Sahara were still 
controversial. (17) 
3.1.1. Algerle 
- 
Energence 
. 
Sovereign 
Confusion has resulted from the juxtapositions which have 
occurred between V. N. Charter provisions regarding self-determination, 
and post-1945 interpretations of the various levels of territorial self- 
management originally contemplated in them. When examined within the 
context of the "justness' of the use of force, successful assertions of 
a right to use force in liberation struggles have worked to revise 
common understandings as to the prohibitions against the threat or use 
of aggressive force contained in the Charter. This point is illustrated 
by the successful assertion by the Algerians of a right to use force 
against France, In the Algerian War of Independence. 
From November, 1954, to March, 1962, Algeria fought France to 
achieve independence and statehood. (18) Initially, the conflict was 
considered to be a domestic, and not an international, armed 
disturbance. France avoided calling the conflict a war at all. 
Nevertheless, it was necessary to ascertain the precise normative 
framework through which to interpret the conflict in order then to 
characterize the use of armed force for purposes of guidance, and to 
evaluate the applicability of IHL. (19) Given the uncertain stance of 
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the international community regarding self-determination at that time, a 
preliminary question was the purpose of the rebellion. In other words, 
was the rebellion merely intended to effect political and economic 
reform? Depending on the answer to this, the conflict could then be 
characterized either as a struggle to end colonialism, or as a struggle 
to effect territorial secession. Of further interest to the present 
discussion, it was argued as the conflict progressed that a continued 
pattern of rights violations placed the call for territorial secession 
beyond the strict confines of a sovereignty or decolonialization 
struggle. This latter interpretation effectively placed the role played 
by rights infringements outside the original mandate/trusteeship 
contexts for purposes of normative theory. The U. N. evaluated the 
conflict for purposes of such a characterization throughout the 
conflict, and factors found to favor the self-determination of the 
Algerian "People" involved allegations of colonial oppression, French 
opposition to territorial and administrative separation, and claims of 
discrimination and genocide. 
Casualties were high on both sides. The war was conducted mainly 
through guerilla action and sabotage operations. Inhumane practices, 
summary executions, and the widespread use of torture led increasingly 
to calls for the application of the 1949 Geneva Conventions. At a 
miniaum, the application of Common Article 3 to the 1949 Geneva 
Conventions was required, in that this Article requires observance of 
minimal standards of humanity. Nevertheless, France found this 
problematic in that the application of Common Article 3 was felt to 
imply a recognition of the status of the conflict, if not of the 
insurgent forces, and might constrain the government's handling of 
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"traitors". 
Given these disagreements regarding both the nature and scope of 
the conflict, both sides ultimately applied relevant provisions of 
Geneva low without formal agreement. Initially, this was on a limited 
basis, but towards the end of the conflict, Geneva law was applied in 
full in the interests primarily of reciprocal treatment. Nevertheless, 
questions of authority and responsibility persisted throughout the 
conflict. Of interest, the insurgent forces sought and obtained re- 
categorization of their own captured as political prisoners about mid- 
way through the struggle. Such re-categorization, it was felt, would 
result in greater protection than prisoner of war status within French 
contexts of penal liability. (20) 
The insurgents further sought and obtained a degree of 
International personality and competence which were directly 
attributable to the conflict. This, in turn, strengthened publicity of 
their cleima to full Independence, and the augmentation of territorial 
control and authority. The separate notions of colonial and "rights" 
self-determination, or "external" and "internal" self-determination, in 
this Instance come to be seen as fully interconnected (21), and by thus 
developing a completely new area of rights entitlement, the Algerian War 
led to on evolution of the right to self-determination from purely 
colonialist confines to include claims for representative government, 
and freedom from outside interference, alien or foreign domination. 
Irrespective of, yet arising from, colonial contexts, claims to full 
entitlement to the underlying human rights filled the legal vacuum, 
retrospectively. 
The facts and circumatences behind the use of force by the 
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Algerians to achieve Independence from France thus gave normative 
support to the Idea of a legitimate entitlement to use force to achieve 
self-determination. Through the successful use of force in this 
instance, a factual basis of human rights violations, which basis was 
connected with but Independent of the colonial context, was added to 
support claims for a right to self-determination, and to encourage other 
such conflicts to occur. 
3.1.2. Micronesia. fig, Log Free Association 
Micronesia is the only strategic trusteeship ever established. 
(22) The underlying 1947 Trusteeship Agreement with the United States 
contained no procedures for its termination. Ultimate responsibility 
for the former Japanese mandate remains in the Security Council. (23) 
As a strategic trusteeship, Micronesia is also unique in that its 
sovereignty was reserved in political trust pending the development of 
the foundations of self-government. Thus in this instance, the use of 
force was not required in order to attain desired rights entitlements. 
The result of the area's eventual exercise of self-determination is as 
three emerging states, and as a new United States commonwealth, in a 
compact of free association. (24) 
Hong Kong is another strategic area in which there could 
theoretically be a claim for at least a limited degree of self- 
determination, in terms of association. In contrast with Micronesia, 
the notion of self-determination seems not to have beep seriously 
considered In the Sino-British Joint Declaration of May, 1985, governing 
the 1 July 1997 turnover of the island by the United Kingdom to the 
People's Republic of China. Instead, the sole relevant question for 
purposes of the turnover appears to be the rights of the P. R. C. as the 
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successor state of Imperial China. (25) 
Hong Kong presently consists of Hong Kong Island, Kowloon and the 
New Territories. In 1841, British forces occupied Hong Kong Island and 
a civil administration was established. The Treaty of Nanjing was 
signed in 1842, and ratified In 1843. Kowloon was ceded by the 
Convention of Beijing In 1860. The New Territories was leased by the 
Convention of Beijing in 1898 for a term of 99 years. Thus, Great 
Britain has 'ownership" of two parts of the colony, and a leasehold 
interest in one. Until enactment by the British Parliament of the Hong 
Kong Act in 1985, Hong Kong was to remain a British Crown Colony. This 
was in spite of post-1945 British policy which allowed self- 
determination to British colonial possessions. Prior to the Joint 
Declaration, the British had expressed an interest in enforcing their 
"legal right' to Hong Kong Island and Kowloon, but the idea was 
abandoned when it became apparent that the economy and stability of the 
colony could not be maintained were this to be done. China has relied 
on historic title, and the invalidity of "unequal treaties", i, e, 
treaties which are not based on mutual sovereign recognition and 
reciprocity in benefit, as the bases for its claim for the "return" of 
the colony to the P. R. C.. 
This re-assertion of sovereignty over Hong Kong, albeit with a 
degree of autonomy remaining in island administration, highlights 
several current problems which are sourced in modern notions of 
sovereignty, and in particular, in the P. R. C. 's eventual power to amend 
the Basic Law. There is no definition of autonomy in the Sino-British 
Declaration. Ultimate constitutional jurisdiction will remain with the 
P. R. C. after the turnover, and in particular, central governmental 
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control over the selection of judges will ensure that matters of state, 
international commercial relations, and local court jurisdiction in 
general will be affected. 
While by no means an example of free association, the situation 
of Hong Kong is instructive to show the compromise aspect of self- 
determination. Nevertheless, an increasingly penetrative human rights 
rdgime, and questions regarding the legal system generally, have kept 
alive the issue of the self-determination of the "People" of Hong Kong, 
leaving open the question of humanitarian intervention should the future 
situation of the colony so require. Further, its prosperous economy is 
another potential source with which to maintain aspects of autonomy 
independent of Chinese control. In the transfer of sovereignty and 
control of a colonial area, and of a culturally and economically 
distinct "People", however, the wishes of the islanders would not appear 
to have been taken into serious consideration. Nevertheless, the 
British Government continues to monitor the situation, and to protest 
against usurpation of the islanders' legal and human rights, and rights 
of self-management generally, which rights link internal organization 
with more commercial purposes in competing models of self-determination. 
3.1.3. T Integration gL Northern Ireland. QgA. jg Occupied 
As has been noted, the notion of self-determination is usually 
expressed through the two separate issue-areas of colonialism and 
individual rights. Separatism and integration are additional, and 
frequently contradictory themes of the U. N. Charter system. These 
juxtapositions are further conplicated by assertions of a right to use 
armed force to achieve rights of self-determination. In this context, 
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the example of Northern Ireland is of interest. 
In 1920, Britain claimed to be motivated by considerations of 
self-determination when Ireland was partitioned. (26) Subsequent 
statements were made that the Northern Six Counties were freely 
integrated with the Mainland through fair and universal suffrage, and 
with mechanisms for limited self-rule. Nevertheless, armed sabotage 
operations and terrorist attacks by Irish groups advocating re- 
unification with the Irish state, and Loyalist groups demanding 
continued integration with the Mainland, continue to occur, particularly 
since 1972. As for the characterization given to I. R. A. activities in 
particular, it is of interest that this group projects an image of 
struggle against colonial oppression for its American sympathizers, 
while the conflict is depicted as a class struggle to British and Irish 
constituents. (27) 
As regards the armed unrest in the Province, Wortley notes that 
the British Government refuses to accept that the "Troubles" constitute 
a Common Article 3 situation, for purposes of Geneva law. The 
Government further refuses to view the unrest as coming within the terms 
of reference of either Protocol 1 or Protocol 2 (28), preferring to view 
all Irish acts of terrorism as isolated, criminal occurrences. This 
point is of interest In that were IHL made applicable to the situation 
in Northern Ireland, there are clear prohibitions both against the use 
of terrorist means and methods of warfare, and the wanton targeting of 
civilians. Nevertheless, the Government denies that this area of 
international law has any relevance to police and military operations 
carried out to maintain a degree of public order in the area. For 
example, the I. R. A. view cabinet members as legitimate military targets, 
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but I. R. A. efforts to differentiate between the meaning given to 
official and civilian casualties have failed, as the Government denies 
there can be any difference in the illegality of I. R. A. "murder" which 
is dependant on the status of the victim. 
The non-applicability of IHL is of further importance. Special 
prisoner category status, l. e. 4 not grouping Loyalists and Republicans 
together, was withdrawn as of March, 1976, for fear that such special 
status appeared to recognize a political status. Occurring at the same 
time as the on-going Diplomatic Conference to up-date and revise the 
1949 Geneva Conventions, the withdrawal of special status led to hunger 
strikes among the political internees, and local and European election 
successes for Irish unification sympathizers. (29) Jackson and McHardy 
note that these subsequent events gave "the lie to the British 
government's determined assertion that they (the I. R. A. and its 
sympathizers) were only mindless criminals to be ignored, never 
negotiated with". They further note a "steady erosion of civil 
liberties (in Northern Ireland) 
... 
", which is attributable to denial by 
the British Government of a situation to which IHL is applicable. (30) 
Britain signed Protocols 1 and 2 in 1977, and has not expressed 
its intention to ratify Protocol 1 until Autumn 1993. (31) After 
signature, the Pope condemned all killing as murder during his visit to 
the Irish Republic in 1979. In April, 1980, all special category 
prisoner status was withdrawn. The violence continues, and has 
disrupted recent Initiatives by John Hume, the Social Democratic and 
Labour Party K P. for Foyle, and Sinn Fein President Gerry Adams, who 
urged the British Government to become involved in round-table talks on 
the future of Norther Ireland, and to recognize the right of the Irish 
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"People" as a whole to self-determination. Soon after, a Joint Anglo- 
Irish Peace Declaration incorporated parts of the unpublished Hume-Adams 
Initiative, and was signed at Downing Street on 15 December 1993. 
Nevertheless, the Declaration emphasizes that the "democatic wish of a 
greater number of people in Northern Ireland" will determine the future 
political shape of the province, subject to a Unionist veto. (32) 
It is also to be feared that with the full integration of the 
European Community, armaments supply routes and transboundary movements 
of groups utilizing terrorist methods of violence will be facilitated. 
As the British Government does not view the armed civil unrest in 
Northern Ireland as related to U. N. Charter principles concerning the 
self-determination of "Peoples", the lowering of internal E. C. barriers 
to trade is made more problematic. (33) Further, in that there is no 
official recognition of a situation in the area which might require 
analysis through the issue-structure provided by IHL, consensus 
regarding the evolving content of self-determination is made difficult, 
even among otherwise similarly-minded Western democracies. 
Another example of tension in the U. N. Charter system approach to 
any self-determination conflict involving the use of armed force is the 
case of Goa. Wilson regards the Goa incident as a turning point in the 
evolving norm of self-determination. (34) The latitude afforded in 
Resolution 1514 (XV) to the use of force by "Peoples" struggling against 
alien subjugation, domination and exploitation was, in this instance, 
put to the test. 
In December, 1962, India invaded Goa, Damao and Diu, Portuguese 
enclaves eligible for eventual self-government. India, however, had 
never accepted Portugal's claim of right by conquest, and justified its 
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invasion on the grounds of historic title, territorial proximity, and 
ethnic homogeneity. India's official reason for the invasion was self- 
defense, in that Portugal had committed aggression in not relinquishing 
the area under U. N. supervision. (35) Subsequently termed "armed self- 
help to oust colonialism", India's use of armed force highlighted the 
East-West split. in attitude both to the trusteeship system and 
aggression. This tactic of ending colonialism through a unilateral use 
of force was tolerated by third world states, and the merits of the 
dispute were obscured by the breach of the peace. (36) 
Despite strong diplomatic protest, particularly by the U. S., the 
issue of self-determination served as the vehicle with which the 
international community could tacitly accept the subsequent annexation 
by India of Goa, if not the actual use of armed force. The Goa incident 
is further evidence of the tension inherent in U. N. Charter 
interpretational duality. In view of the majoritarian decision-making 
process in the General Assembly, it was clear that where the organs of 
the system do not enforce U. N. Charter purposes in the face of breach or 
injustice, individual Member states accept the burden in modes of self- 
help. (37) 
Reliance on state self-help has thus worked to stretch the 
jurisdictional space set aside for the notion of self-determination. In 
this way it can be seen that expansionist ambitions use the notion as a 
vehicle to foster rebellion, to create international instability, and to 
interfere in sister-state domestic affairs, generally. As action on the 
basis of the concept of self-determination may clearly go beyond the 
original U. N. Charter confines of colonialism, the example of the 
annexation of Goa is illustrative of one manifestation of the use of 
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armed force in a self-determination situation in which reasons 
additional to colonial title are put forward. Yet, as regards the 
original intent underlying the notion, it is clear that the "Peoples" in 
these Portuguese enclaves had little say in the matter. 
In the case of Palestinian self-determination, on the other hand, 
U. S. interests in reducing British strategic interests in the area have 
played their part in the turmoil. (38) This factor, in addition to 
pressure from the American Zionist lobby, has resulted in a failure 
until recently to recognize the Palestinian right to self-determination. 
This failure manifested itself in a strict military administration of 
the Palestinians by the Israeli Government, discriminatory judicial and 
employment systems, and the "grant" of alien resident status. 
The Palestinian "People" constitute approximately 18% of the 
entire Israeli population. They also inhabit the Occupied Territories 
of the West Bank and Gaza Strip. Shehadeh (39) writes that the Israeli 
Government has made daily life intolerable for this group through 
discriminatory administrative procedures, the requisitioning of 
Palestinian land for military, then public, use, then subsequent private 
sale purposes, violations of minimal human rights, and the widespread 
demolition of house and property interests. The Israeli Government has 
refused to accept that sovereignty of the West Bank is Jordanian, yet 
residents of the area carry Jordanian passports. Through a sLe- facto' 
annexation, Israel has attempted to establish legal title to land, and 
to install settlements in the territory acquired from the "Six Day War" 
in 1967, despite widespread and continuing international protest. (40) 
The United Nations conferred quasi-governmental status upon the 
P. L. O. in 1974, as representatives of the Palestinian Arabs in their 
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claim of legal rights to their homeland, a former British mandate. This 
occurred despite the proliferation of Palestinian terrorist 
organizations which continue to splinter world opinion regarding the 
legitimacy of terrorist armed force to achieve the entitlements of self- 
determination. The conceptual problem for the world community is once 
again that within the proper confines of the Palestinian right to self- 
determination, which includes recognition of the legitimate use of armed 
force if necessary to achieve that right, Palestinian terrorist 
organizations have worked alongside the "legal representatives" of the 
Palestinian "People". As such, these legal representatives have 
purportedly shared in the responsibility for promoting an active, that 
is, violent, resistance against the Israelis. This implies that the 
Palestinian terrorist organizations have been empowered so to act in the 
name of Palestinian national liberation. (41) 
Not surprisingly, Israel cast the only vote in opposition to 
Article 1(4) of Protocol 1. While it is a signatory to the Geneva 
Conventions of 1949, it has refused to apply actively the provisions 
consistently. Preferring to "observe" the Fourth Geneva Convention 
through application, it has consistently refused to accept that the 
Third Geneva Convention is relevant to acts of Palestinian armed 
resistance. (42) For example, Shehadeh notes that in June, 1967, Israel 
announced its intention to apply Geneva law. By October, reference to 
possible conflicts between Geneva and Israeli law were deleted. By 
1970, Israel was making no reference to the 1949 treaties. 
In similar fashion, applicable provisions of the Hague 
Regulations of 1907 were not actively observed, or acknowledged as 
relevant to the "administered" territories. Israel continued to 
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imprison and deport Palestinians accused of and/or convicted of 
terrorist acts, in violation of Article 49 of the Fourth Convention. 
While acknowledging that Hague law obligated Israel as customary 
international law, Israeli courts consistently viewed Geneva provisions 
as having conventional force only, within a historic context, and thus 
were to be over-ruled in the event of conflict with Israeli domestic 
law. (43) Thus, even though Israel had, by 1990, acknowledged that it 
"retain(s) the territory by force of belligerant occupation", a recent 
Supreme Court decision rationalized the deportation policy by construing 
Article 49 of the Fourth Geneva Convention in light of the provisions of 
Article 43 of the Hague Regulations. In other words, it viewed 
deportation as the sole, viable option available to protect the local 
populations from terrorists. (44) 
With regard to economic aspects of self-determination, it is of 
interest that in November, 1986, the European Community announced it 
would accord the Palestinians of the Occupied Territories the same 
favorable trade conditions-enjoyed by Israel and Jordan. McDowell 
notes, however, that while welcome, "Israel will not tolerate any 
competition. If, therefore, the E. C. really wishes to provide access, 
it must also monitor Israeli and Jordanian interference with this 
intended access". (45) Thus, the economic contrasts between Israel and 
the Occupied Territories, for example, remain profound as Israel's per 
capita gross domestic product is seven times the level on the West Bank 
and fourteen times that of the Gaza Strip, and much prosperity was 
denied to the Occupied Territories when Israel closed its borders to it 
in March, 1993. It would also appear that economic aspects underlying 
the recent peace initiative signed in Washington have proven to be 
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persuasive, if only with regard to the continued expense of policing the 
areas soon to be returned to Palestinian self-management. (46) 
In this example of the struggle of the Palestinian "People", it 
is clear that international involvement since early this Century makes 
the continuing use of force in the area an international responsibility. 
While the U. N. continues to produce Resolutions condemning the continued 
occupation, and the denial of the right of self-determination to the 
Palestinians, the violence continues. ' This is despite recent 
developments, as more radical Palestinian groupings are not satisfied 
with the agreement achieved in Washington on 13 September 1993. 
Nevertheless, the use of force in the occupation both by the Israeli 
state, and the Palestinians, helped the P. L. O. to gain observer status 
at the U. N., and international recognition of a "People", albeit one 
without control over its territory. 
In addition to the colonial context of the situation, the human 
rights entitlements of the Palestinians have constituted an independent 
basis for the group's claim to possess a right to self-determination. 
Even more clear is the conclusion that the use of force to achieve 
claimed rights entitlements has reworked common understandings regarding 
many underlying concepts. Nevertheless, the on-going conflict continues 
to split world opinion regarding a satisfactory approach to the content 
of self-determination, and to the resolution of the continued violence 
in the Middle East. 
3.2. 
. 
"External" and "Internal" Self-Determination 
In view of the above-indicated examples of the role of the use of 
force in achieving self-determination, it is clear that the 
international community is not in agreement regarding the results of the 
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evolution of self-determination, nor is state practice entirely 
indicative of the normative theory underlying its exercise. On the one 
hand, self-determination may be viewed externally, for purposes of 
evaluating a particular government's right to rule, to require autonomy 
in certain instances. More critically, self-determination may be used 
externally as a mechanism of intrusion into sovereign state domestic 
affairs and human rights records. On the other hand, and if utilized as 
an instrument for internal administration, self-determination may be 
viewed as a statement of majority rule, or as a vehicle by which 
particular groups may be accorded a degree of self-rule through 
democratic process. 
One important cause of international inconsistency in approach to 
the twin principles of political and territorial independence, and the 
equal rights and self-determination of "Peoples", has been the East-West 
political and ideological split indicated previously. The presence of 
democratic presuppositions and competing Socialist interpretations of 
U. N. Charter provisions are particularly apparent when it comes time to 
vote on U. N. Resolutions and/or to ratify treaties which contain any 
reference to self-determination and the right to use force to attain it. 
In particular, this split is illustrated by the Western states which 
abstained in the vote on Article 1(4), of Protocol 1. 
3.2.1. The East-West Split 
The starting point of an analysis regarding "internal" and 
"external" self-determination is the duality of U. N. Charter provisions 
and the presence of competing interpretations of them. Originating in 
philosophical concepts shaped by Locke or Kant, it is presently accepted 
that it is in the nature of being human to be endowed with certain basic 
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rights. This is an individualist focus. The post-1945 human rights 
regime is based largely on this premise, as is the U. N. principle of 
equal rights and self-determination of "Peoples". Taking a more 
functional, U. N. Charter-based point of view, the issue of self- 
determination can be traced in treaties and U. N. Resolutions which deal 
in different issue-areas, and which have been agreed to by sovereign 
states in an effort to establish ascertainable rules of administration 
and procedure in the post-1945 international community. 
Yet, until 1970, Western states consistently abstained on U. N. 
Resolutions which recognized a right of self-determination, and/or the 
right to use force to achieve self-determination. (47) Mainly in this 
way the "rules" regarding self-determination appear to have fallen into 
incoherence. (48) By way of example one need only note that the former 
territories and states of Eastern Europe were seemingly frozen into 
their annexed status, until recently. Although full members of the 
U. N., it could not be said that such states were. sovereign. They 
possessed, instead, only a tenuous measure of international personality. 
With the recent disintegration of the U. S. S. R., however, calls for 
change have frequently employed the rhetoric of self-determination in 
contexts completely devoid of colonial content. Instead, the demands 
are for territory, for the righting of historic wrongs, for economic, 
social, civil, and political rights, and for human rights. (49) This 
development, and this use of the rhetoric of self-determination, have 
been approved by the West. 
It would thus seem that, despite post-1945 East-West political 
and ideological differences, and a level of incoherence appearing in 
state practice regarding the content of the notion of self- 
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determination, actual demands for rights entitlements appear to rely at 
least as much on legal as on political considerations, e. g . the 
legality of the use of force, albeit within highly politicized contexts. 
The proliferation of the use of force in liberation struggles has thus 
not only divided world opinion regarding the propriety of the use of 
force in particular situations but also regarding the prospective 
direction in which the notion of self-determination is to develop. This 
is also true with reference to the direction the laws of war are taking. 
The absence of guidance regarding these issues has further 
complicated attempts to deter acts of international terrorism, and has 
led to the loss of the political offense exception in modern anti- 
terrorist treaties for purposes of extradition arrangements. (50) 
3.2.2. U. N. General Assembly Resolution 2625 (XXV) of 1970 
The growing capacity of non-state units to fully participate in 
international life has helped to create a mutual deterrence model in 
which legal functions may quickly be taken over in decaying systems, and 
normative theory developed. (51) Thus, a primary factor in the more 
legal focus which has arisen from the East-West split and the 
incoherence in state practice regarding the notion of self-determination 
is the adoption in 1970 of U. N. General Assembly Resolution 2625 (XXV). 
This Resolution, the General Assembly Declaration on Principles of 
International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation Among 
States in Accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, marked a 
first departure from the prior split in world opinion regarding self- 
determination. (52) It was the first U. N. instrument to reflect 
unanimous recognition of a right to self-determination. It further 
recognized that a colony or non-self-governing territory had a status 
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which was separate and distinct from that of the administering state. 
As previously discussed, this development was more in line with 
League of Nations mechanisms than with the "referee role" taken by the 
U. N. in supervising compliance with U. N. Charter provisions. Of further 
interest, the relative strength of U. N. Resolutions generally in shaping 
state practice was bolstered by Resolution 2625. Through its repetition 
by reference in subsequent Declarations, Resolutions and in particular, 
in Article 1(4) of Protocol 1, and its application in determining the 
criminal responsibility of Member states in international law, the 
International Court of Justice was led to decide in 1986, in the 
Nicaragua case, Merits Phase, that the rules stated in Resolution 2625 
amounted to a statement of custom. (53) 
While Resolution 2625 does not expressly mention any right of 
secession from a state authority, Member states recognized that 
governmental duties to comply with the principles of equal rights and 
self-determination might lead to such a result should a "People's" right 
to self-manage its political status, and economic, social and cultural 
development be ignored. The conflicts inherent between states as groups 
of citizens, and states as elite governing bodies are thus in part 
mitigated. (54) Of more importance, Resolution 2625 may be viewed as a 
interpretational tool by which to extend the categories of armed 
conflicts to which Protocol 1 is applicable. 
Resolution 2625 supports the right of the self-determination of 
"Peoples", supports the notion of the separate and distinct status of 
the territory of many of such "Peoples", and urges the use of democratic 
process when the choice of internal administration is made. Yet whether 
or not self-determination is viewed as a statement of majority rule, as 
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a vehicle by which to intrude into sovereign state notions of domestic 
control, or as a form of institutional camouflage used to conceal 
administrative manipulation, what is clear is that self-determination is 
an agent of political change, and constitutes a new standard with which 
to evaluate a government's right to rule and to manage system change. 
Thus, the duty of governments to adequately represent the "whole people" 
contained in Resolution 2625 may be translated into the duty to comply 
with the principle of equal rights and self-determination by combining 
sufficient levels of rights entitlements so as to interlock the right to 
life, and the right to self-preservation. 
3.2.3. The Right to Use Force and The Laws of War 
As discussed previously, the East-West political and ideological 
split regarding the right to use force to achieve self-determination 
helped to ensure that the Western states abstained in the vote on 
Article 1(4), of Protocol 1, in 1977. Though Resolution 2625 of 1970 
was adopted without a vote, different semantic interpretations of U. N. 
Charter prohibitions continue to plague Member states when the use of 
aggressive force between them in their international relations is not 
directly in issue. Further, surviving powers of disposition by states 
over their territories inject conceptual and legal confusion into 
different views of the use of force in wars of self-determination, and 
in assessments of the gains made in the content of self-determination 
achieved through such use of force. 
The right to wage war has thus re-appeared as the notion of self- 
determination has grown in strength. This right to wage war has little 
to do with the regulation of war, and in fact, until recently, the laws 
of war rarely seemed to be an issue, as acts of terror-violence were 
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utilized as the means and methods of choice for more rapidly achieving 
asserted rights entitlements. In the context of liberation armed 
conflicts for rights of self-determination, the "justness" of the cause 
typically seemed to allow such excess. Theories of a "just war" to 
effect system transformation thus were confounded with more traditional 
theories of "just war", i. e., to right a grievance (55), and a measure 
of self-help by means of the use of violence has led to confusion 
regarding the more traditional separation between the issues involved in 
waging a "just" war and the regulation of war. Given the steady 
repetition of the prohibitions against violations of territorial 
integrity and political unity, this would seem a logical conclusion. 
The validation techniques underlying governmental uses of force 
should depend for their ultimate authority on power-sharing with the 
citizenry. (56) Governments are exhorted to provide sufficient levels 
of rights entitlements to a populace to ensure the right to self- 
determination is satisfied, which duty represents a derogation of. state 
sovereignty in the sense of the use of legal and political power. (57) 
Governmental resort to violence in a domestic conflict thus may 
constitute a crime against its own communities, and lead to models of 
mutual deterrence in the form of organized domestic armed uprisings. 
(58) 
For this, and additional reasons examined later in this 
discussion, the laws of war were extended in Protocol 1 of 1977 to 
include, as international wars, various of the liberation struggles 
occurring in the post-1945 world community. (59) While ready 
identification of the "Peoples" entitled to use armed force in pursuit 
of rights to self-determination is made problematic by differing 
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interpretations of the content of the notion, what is clear is that the 
traditional reliance on the colonial system to confine the legality of 
such conflicts is misplaced, in that such a basis has been superceded by 
subsequent events. As Protocol 1 has extended to irregular forces the 
protections of international law, the degree of asymmetry in liberation 
struggles is potentially decreased. Similarly, methods of terror- 
violence utilized by any party to such an armed conflict are now 
strictly forbidden. National groupings must be sufficiently united in 
political purpose to be recognized as representative of a particular 
"People". If wishing to be recognized as a proto-government, it is not 
in the interests of such groups to engage in activities which are in 
breach of international' obligations. (60) 
Terrorism has played a major role in the extension of the laws of 
IHL to liberation struggles, and it is clear that Protocol 1 
appropriately extends sufficient enforcement mechanisms to all parties 
engaged in liberation conflicts to deter acts of political or terror 
violence. Given the examples briefly outlined in this Chapter, it is 
clear that the classification struggles in the post-1945 world, some of 
which are on-going, have both afforded and created sufficient 
jurisdictional space within the wording of the U. N. Charter to 
dynamically alter meanings of underlying concepts, and in particular, 
the appropriateness of the use of armed force. 
Further, the course of the growth of self-determination from 
colonial origins to include a "rights" context, while often "incoherent" 
for normative purposes, has resulted in international scrutiny of the 
way in which a state manages, democratic processes and organizes its 
society. When viewed through the growth of non-state units having 
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powers of resource control and transboundary interdependence, the 
diminution in state power to dictate to non-state units the extent of 
their powers and functions is a highly visible feature of modern 
international law. 
The diminution in state power to control the processes 
autonomously of system transformation in evidence in the recent 
extension of IHL is an additional feature of the strength of the twin 
external and internal aspects of self-determination. Thus, the tension 
created by the multiple demands of self-determination leads to high, 
requirements for emancipation. The extension in full of IHL to self- 
determination armed conflicts requires that liberation groups behave as 
proto-governments, and eschew terrorism as a tactic in their overall 
strategies. This extension further mandates that states involved in 
such conflicts forego the use of overly repressive law enforcement 
mechanisms in the interests of maintaining public order. 
In that a harmonized view of substantive choice is mandated by 
the modern emphases propelling state practice regarding the right to 
self-determination, it is concluded that the extension of Protocol 1 to 
such conflicts reflects an acknowledgement of the Member state duties 
agreed to in Resolution 2625. (61) Even though the use of force and the 
use of terror-tactics gave content in earlier days to the right to self- 
determination, which in turn led to the recognition of liberation 
struggles as international, the demands of such a graduation in status 
now mean that acts of terror-violence perpetrated in liberation armed 
conflicts should be prosecuted as breaches or grave breaches of the 
Geneva Conventions, or as war crimes. Once this occurs, there is no 
need to confuse the prohibition of acts of international terrorism with 
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the respect and recognition afforded to "Peoples" in their struggles to 
attain their right of self-determination. 
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4. The Effects a Wars of Self-Determination on the Evolution of 
International Humanitarian Law 
International humanitarian law (IHL), taken in its broad sense, 
is potentially applicable in any time or place individual human beings 
need legal protection against the activities of states. (1) This legal 
regime becomes relevant whenever a state has jurisdiction over an 
individual, whether the state exercises it in a time of "peace", or in a 
situation of "war". The protections provided by IHL, when exercised, 
restrict state jurisdictional functions and powers which allow that 
state to deal with the individual concerned. Thus, IHL in its broad 
sense encompases both the law of war and aspects of human rights law. 
The law of war, and its extension in particular on the basis of 
the right to self-determination, is the general topic of this Chapter. 
The law of war as codified subdivides between the provisions contained 
in the Hague Conventions or law of war proper, and the Geneva 
Conventions, or humanitarian law. (2) Gaps between codifided principles 
of IHL and IHL principles which form part of customary or general 
international law have obvious consequences for the content of the law 
applicable to a particular armed conflict. Nevertheless, codification 
of the underlying principles does not erase the independent existence of 
such principles as principles of customary law. The customary 
principles of IHL remain basic obligations in the context of assessing 
state and individual responsibility for violations of the relevant 
conventions. (3) In the context of an armed conflict to which IHL 
applies, gaps between traditional theory and operational conditions thus 
require as a minimum the application of IHL as contained in 
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international customary law. (4) 
In order to illustrate the way in which the use of force in 
struggles for self-determination has affected the development of IHL, 
the separate historical development of the three branches of IHL is 
discussed in this Chapter Also discussed is the growing co-operation 
among these three branches in developing a more integrated approach 
which emphasizes the international protection of the individual. In 
this way, the-continued adaptation of an integrated IHL to general 
international law is used to illustrate the effect wars of self- 
determination have had on the law of war, and that the extension of IHL 
to such wars in Protocol 1 Article 1(4) was mandated. (5) In 
particular, this extension of IHL to liberation struggles, it is argued, 
helps states to delineate between terrorists and freedom fighters for 
purposes of exercising jurisdiction over perpetrators of terrorist acts. 
Thus, state action utilized to deal with liberation conflicts need no 
longer plague the international fight against terrorism. Protocol 1 
extends to states sufficient enforcement mechanisms to allow the 
international community to prosecute organized, tactical acts of 
violence perpetrated in liberation struggles, and to distinguish such 
acts from individual acts of political or economic terrorism. 
By way of preliminary discussion, an assessment of the co- 
ordinated value of the three branches of IHL first requires a brief 
overview of each in isolation. Further, a degree of interdependence and 
permeability between and among the three branches of IHL is a function 
of their separate-but-similar emphasis on the protection of the 
individual against the activities of states. (6) As has been 
discussed, state jurisdictional over-assertions, and state distortion 
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through language paradigms regarding "the national interest" (7), have 
resulted in competing interpretations of U. N. Charter provisions, and of 
the appropriate allocation of competences in the post-1945 world 
community. As more matters may be of international concern than of 
international jurisdiction, the substitution of "concern" for 
"jurisdiction" through an emphasis on the protection of the individual 
against the activities of states, as contained in IHL, effectively 
removes from the domestic sphere matters considered previously to be of 
domestic interest only. (8) 
Further, state recognition of individual interests protected in 
IHL provisions means in legal terminology the provision of individual 
rights, and vested rights must have a remedy in the event of breach. 
Such remedies must be provided domestically by states parties to IHL in 
compliance with their international legal obligations (9), and the 
national remedy cannot negate the international right. (10) Thus, an 
integrated approach to IHL, through co-ordination of the law of war and 
human rights law, strengthens both legal certainty as to the terminology 
used, and the true meaning for individuals of IHL provisions. 
Nevertheless, permeability and integration may lead to conceptual 
and legal confusion when the time arrives to apply the content of IHL to 
a particular dispute. (11) Two rules of the same content may be subject 
to separate treatment as regards the organs competent to verify their 
implementation. The procedures underlying implementation of the three 
branches of IHL may vary widely, even though the same, or identical, 
outcome is comtemplated. In this vein, Dr. Pictet makes the following 
distinctions between the law of war and human rights law: 
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1. The law of armed conflicts comes into operation at 
the very time the exercise of human rights is prevented 
or restricted by war; 
2. Geneva law is valid only in the case of armed conflict 
while human rights are essentially applicable in peacetime, 
containing derogation clauses in case of conflict; 
3. Human rights govern relations between the state and 
its own nationals; the law of war, those between the state 
and enemy nationals; 
4. The Geneva Conventions are universal and of a manda- 
tory nature; 
5. The systems of supervision and sanctions differ; and 
6. If only for the sake of expediency, the two systems, 
while complementary, must remain distinct. (12) 
With this basic delineation in mind, Dr. Pictet further 
distinguishes Hague law and Geneva law as follows: 
7. The law of the Hague 
... 
determines the rights and 
duties of belligerants in the conduct of operations and 
limits the choice of the means of doing harm 
... . 
(T)he 
purpose is to regulate operations, and which are still 
partly geared to military necessity; and 
8. The law of Geneva 
... 
is intended to safeguard 
military personnel placed hors de combat, and persons 
not taking part in hostilities 
... . 
The Geneva texts 
were drawn up solely for the benefit of the individual. 
Generally speaking, they do not grant states any rights 
to the individual's detriment 
... . 
In Geneva, an era was 
opened in which the individual and the principles of 
humanity come first. The law of Geveva, in fact, applies 
to the effects of war rather than to the hostilities. (13) 
The adoption of an integrated approach to IHL consists of both 
codified and customary international legal obligations which are 
designed to protect and ensure protection of the individual in all 
circumstances. The extension of this legal regime automatically to wars 
of self-determination in Protocol 1 Article 1(4) incorporates such an 
integrated approach, and further, reflects the realities of the methods 
of modern warfare. In particular,, it is argued in this Chapter that the 
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need for protection during non-conventional armed conflicts, many of 
which utilize methods of terror violence, is recognized by the 
international community by means of the integrated approach to IHL 
adopted in 1977. 
The structure of this Chapter is as follows. The separate 
development of the law of war and limited aspects of human rights law 
are briefly discussed in the First Part in that the two are distinct 
legal regimes. The law of war is separated into Hague law or law of war 
proper, and Geneva or humanitarian law. On the basis that an evolving 
IHL has brought together these separate legal regimes, which development 
culminates in an integrated approach in Protocol 1 in 1977, IHL is 
examined by means of the sum of its parts. The necessity to extend 
integrated IHL protections to wars of self-determination as a function 
of the realities of modern warfare, which realities include the 
increased use of terror-tactics and irregular armies, is discussed in 
the Second Part. This latter point is developed in the Third Part, and 
the issue that wars of self-determination are international armed 
conflicts from their inception is examined in light of the separate 
status of approved "Peoples" in contemporary international law, and in 
view of the need to control the means and methods of warfare utilized in 
them. 
It is concluded that the separate branches of IHL may seem to 
have little relation to each other in that armed conflicts by definition 
impinge on both human rights and humanity. Yet, the evolution of 
integrated fundamental notions of justice in the IHL legal regime has 
resulted in codified and customary individual international protections 
in all circumstances. As such, the extension of IHL to wars of self- 
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determination, as international armed conflicts, reflects the adaptation 
of IHL to developments in war technology during the Twentieth Century 
and, in particular, to that employed in the post-1945 era. Further, 
while the extension of IHL to wars of self-determination restrains state 
action during what previously had been "civil" wars, it also means that 
states may use the provisions of IHL to deter acts of terror-violence 
perpetrated during struggles for national liberation. 
4.1. The Historical Development of International Humanitarian Law 
The development of IHL in the two separate branches of the law of 
war, which includes both Hague and Geneva law, and aspects of human 
rights law reflects a unity of purpose: the protection of the 
individual as against the actions of states. The re-interpretation 
required for an integrated philosophy of the two separate regimes has 
resulted nevertheless in conceptual and legal confusion, primarily 
regarding the content of the law to be applied during particular armed 
conflicts. (14) 
The different concerns reflected in the separate evolutions of 
Hague law, Geneva law, and aspects of the law of human rights are 
discussed in this Part, which concerns converged in codified form in 
Protocol 1 of 1977. Although the separate concerns reflected in each 
branch or subdivision have resulted in juridical conflict through an 
overlap in norms and jurisdiction, it is concluded that the resulting 
permeability of the fundamental principle of protection of the 
individual may better create a symbiotic relationship which is 
sufficient to ensure the continued development and observance of this 
area of international law. 
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4.1.1, Hague Law, and Control of the Means and Methods of-Warfare 
The 1899 and 1907 versions of the Hague Conventions (15) resulted 
from previous attempts to codify the law of war, the first of which may 
be said to have been the Lieber Code. in 1863. (16) Issued by the U. S. 
War Department as U. S. Army General Order No. 100 to regulate the 
behavior of the Northern Forces during the American War Between the 
States, the Lieber Code was nevertheless of a limited nature, and 
contemplated only the conduct of hostilities during a civil war. (17) 
Nevertheless, the provisions of the Lieber Code corresponded to and 
relied upon contemporaneous European practice. The Code provided in 
turn a format for later codifications to control the Jus in bello, and 
it formed the basis of subsequent projects to codify the international 
laws of war, most notably, the Brussels Conference of 1874 (18), the 
Oxford Manual of 1880 (19), and the Hague Conventions on land warfare of 
1899 and 1907. (20) 
The Brussels Conference was called at the initiative of Alexander 
II of Russia. The resulting Brussels Project was not approved but 
provided the basis for the Oxford Manual as formulated by the Institute 
of International Law in Oxford in 1880. Neither the Brussels Prolect nor 
the Oxford Manual had any legal force. (21) The 1899 Hague Convention 
was convened by Czar Nicholas II (22), during which conference all 
participating states agreed to provide instructions and regulations 
regarding the proper conduct of war to their land forces. The 1907 
Hague Conventions and annexed Regulations differed only slightly from 
the 1899 version, but fewer states ratified the 1907 instruments. 
Of particular interest, both the 1899 and 1907 Hague instruments 
were prompted by concerns about evolving war technology, and the 
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preamble of both expressed "the desire to serve, even in this extreme 
case (of war), the interests of humanity and the ever progressive needs 
of civilization". (23) The preamble to the Hague Conventions further 
reflected technological and humanitarian concerns by inclusion of the 
"Martens Clause", the 1907 version of which reads as follows: 
Until a more complete code of the laws of war can 
be issued, the High Contracting Parties think it 
expedient to declare that in cases not included in 
the Regulations adopted by them, populations and 
belligerants remain under the protection and the rule 
of the principles of the law of nations, as they re- 
sult from the usages established between civilized 
nations, from the laws of humanity, and the require- 
ments of the public conscience. (24) 
Despite the unfortunate placement of the Martens Clause in the preamble, 
it is considered to be of the same juridical character as the texts of 
the Conventions, and to provide evidence of intent as regards the 
guiding standard by which to interpret the treaties. (25) 
Subsequent attempts to harness technological development were 
made in 1922 at the Washington Conference. The resulting Treaty 
relating to the Use of Submarine and Noxious Gases in Warfare never 
entered into force. (26) In 1923 at the Hague, the Rules of Air Warfare 
were drawn up, but never adopted in legally binding form. (27) In 1925, 
the Geneva Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use of Asphyxiating, 
Poisonous or Other Gases and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare was 
signed, and entered into force on 8 February 1928. (28) A related 
development occurred in 1928 with the ratification by sixty-three states 
of the Pact of Paris, or. Briand-Kellogg Pact (29), by which the waging 
of aggressive war was denounced. When viewed in conjunction with the 
efforts at disarmament and the arbitration of international disputes 
characteristic of the League of Nations (30), the elements of the 
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international crime of waging war were present sufficient to be relied 
upon as customary law in 1945 - 46 at the Nuremburg International 
Military Tribunal. (31) 
These early attempts to codify the customary international law 
underlying the rules regulating hostilities were aimed at predictability 
in state practice during times of armed conflicts. (32) They were also 
aimed at restraint regarding the means and methods adopted for use 
within contexts of military necessity. Nevertheless, new developments 
in war technology outstripped state attempts to restrain the use of 
force in international relations, and when World War Two began, existing 
codifications were to a certain extent already obsolete. Thus, despite 
the many efforts to restrain states in their choice of military means 
and methods, "(t)otal war as waged during the Second World War saw a 
continued violation of the laws of war by all belligerents". (33) Kunz, 
writing in 1951, asserted that war law needed revision urgently, and 
termed the disregard of continuing efforts to develop war law the 
"policy of the ostrich". (34) Of interest, Kunz further asserted that 
"the laws of war pertain rather to the law of peace", as they formed a 
part of human rights (35). Nevertheless, many legal scholars felt that, 
war having been outlawed in 1945, the regulation of its conduct was no 
longer relevant to internatiornal law. Revision finally occurred in 
Protocols 1 and 2, in 1977, as is discussed later in this Chapter. 
4.1.2. Geneva Law and Humanitarian Concerns 
The development of Geneva law has paralleled that of Hague law in 
that the two treaty bodies haved proved effectively inter-dependent in 
their pragmatic effects. Yet, Hague law and Geneva law evolved in 
juridically distinct forms. (36) 
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The first Geneva Conference in 1863 resulted from the publication 
in 1862 of the book Ue Souvenir de Solfdrino. written by Henri Dunant, a 
citizen of Geneva who had witnessed the battlefield suffering at 
Solferino in 1859. Dunant's subsequent proposal to organize relief 
societies for the care of battle wounded sparked interest throughout 
Europe. Sixteen states were represented at this founding conference of 
the Red Cross in 1863, during which proposals for the creation of 
national committees were adopted (37), and this conference gave impetus 
to subsequent Geneva Conferences in 1864,1906,1929,1949 and 1977. 
In 1864, neutrality in medical treatment in particular was 
agreed, and entered into force on 22 June 1865. (38) Thirty-three 
articles agreed in 1906 included among other things provisions for the 
transmission of information and the express recognition of voluntary aid 
societies. The 1906 Convention remained in force until 1970. (39) The 
1929 instrument (40) included a new Convention for the protection of 
prisoners of war which "complete(d) similar provisions contained in the 
Hague Regulations of 1899 and 1907". (41) The 1929 Conventions were 
subsequently replaced in 1949. These early instruments maintained 
similar divisions into chapters and articles. All provided improved 
protections for the medical personnel involved in humanitarian relief 
and assistance, and for the victims of war, generally. New provisions 
filled gaps exposed in the operation of the instruments during actual 
armed conflicts. Intermediary draft conventions served as guidance to 
states regarding the growing potential of humanitarian law. Then, in 
1945, the U. N. system, working from the failure of the League of 
Nations, placed the rights of the individual on an improved footing. 
The unity of purpose resulting from the Second World War in the 
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international community made 1949 "a good time to discuss the rights 
during times of armed conflicts of the individual rather than of 
states". (42) The result of this heightened interest was a post-war 
Geneva conference convened to update existing provisions. 
The four Geneva Conventions of 1949 apply primarily to conflicts 
of an international character. The First Convention, for the sick and 
wounded (43), was the fourth version, previous Conventions having been 
in 1864,1906 and 1929. The Second Convention, for the wounded, sick 
and shipwrecked (44), replaced the 1907 Hague Convention for the 
Adaptation of Maritime Warfare of the Principles of the Geneva 
Conventions. The Third Convention, for prisoners of war (45), replaced 
the 1929 instrument. The Fourth Convention, for the protection of 
civilian populations (46), was a completely new codification though some 
provisions concerning the protection of civilian populations were 
contained in the Regulations annexed to the Hague Conventions of 1899 
and 1907. The 1929 Geneva Conference had recommended the drafting of a 
convention for the protection of civilians, to be discussed at the next 
scheduled conference in Geneva in 1940. World War Two intervened. 
While the 1949 revised version of this draft supplements the Hague 
Regulations on the same subject, it does not deal with the limitation of 
the use of particular weapons. (47) 
Of particular interest to the present discussion is Common 
Article 3 to the four Geneva Conventions of 1949. The subject matter of 
Common Article 3 is wars of a non-international, or civil, nature, and 
it is frequently termed "a treaty within a treaty" in that it provides 
for minimal humanitarian protections. (48) The standards contained in 
Common Article 3 have as their source the Martens Clause, and are based 
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on fundamental considerations of humanity. In so far as the Geneva 
Conventions of 1949 were applicable in liberation struggles prior to 
1977, it was on the basis of Common Article 3. (49) Common Article 3 
may be termed aspirational in that domestic law enforcement methods for 
the control of domestic armed conflicts are often incompatible with 
rules governing international armed conflicts, if only because there is 
merely discretionary provision for a Protecting Power regarding non- 
international armed conflicts. In that Common Article 3 provides for 
the observance of fundamental, or minimal rules of humanity during 
domestic armed conflicts, it is perhaps more a human rights document. 
Its application to a particular situation of domestic armed unrest is 
thus dependent on "good government", and unfortunately it has not been 
expressly invoked during the U. N. era, mainly for political reasons. 
(50) 
The 1949 Geneva Conventions managed to mix a sufficient amount of 
Hague and Geneva law, to be considered ideologically harmonious with 
Hague law, by emphasizing the proper confines of "military necessity" 
and "proportionality". (51) Rosenne, in particular, points to the 
"modernization" of the participation clause in 1949, which alteration 
evidenced an intent to combine the two branches of law by enhancing 
state responsibility for the conduct of war. (52) Further, the 
Nuremburg International Military Tribunal's rejection of the defense of 
superior orders, wherever moral choice existed (53), resulted in 1949 in 
the provision of individual international responsibility for "grave 
breaches" of Geneva provisions. (54) 
In conclusion, the preliminary mix of Hague and Geneva law in 
1949 was a first step in the, transfer of control of the development of 
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the rules of war from the individual states which might be involved in a 
conflict to the international community. This step was taken in a post- 
war atmosphere of heightened concern for the welfare of the individual 
as against the actions of states. Nevertheless, gaps in practice soon 
emerged which demanded new revisions to the existing law of war. These 
revisions were undertaken formally from 1974 to 1977 (55) and resulted 
in Protocols 1 and 2, as is discussed later in this part. 
4.1.3. Human Rights and IHL 
International individual interests should be protected in 
domestic law as forms of vested rights through state implementation of 
the IHL treaty regime. These interests should thus have available a 
national remedy in the event of breach. (56) Although individual 
rights, or human rights are generally applicable in "peacetime", at 
least four of the fundamental human rights remain non-derogable during 
emergency situations and thus continue to provide. protection to 
individuals as against the actions of states during times of armed 
unrest. These four basic rights are contained in IHL, and have 
continuous applicability: the right to life, the right to a fair trial 
and due process of law, the right against the application of gx post 
facto law, and the right to be free from involuntary servitude and from 
the infliction of torture. (57) 
It is beyond the scope of the present discussion to deal in any 
detail with the post-1945 human rights regime, particularly as the major 
U. N. documents on human rights 
- 
the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights, and the 1966 International Covenants on Civil and Political 
Rights, and on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 
- 
do not deal in any 
way with problems of armed conflict. Nevertheless, humanitarian law 
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contains limited aspects of human rights law. In addition to the 
minimum standards of humanity provided in Common Article 3, the Fourth 
Convention of 1949 has been termed "the greatest departure made by the 
Geneva law of 1949 and 
... 
may be regarded as a manifesto of human 
rights for civilians during armed conflicts". (58) Protocols 1 and 2, 
as discussed later in this part, further extend the protections of human 
rights in armed conflicts. 
The London Charter (59) may be viewed as the first codification 
of the reality of human rights during war, in that not only did it 
establish the Nuremburg International Military Tribunal, but it led to 
the condemnation of traditional war practices such as murder, 
deportation for slave labor, and plunder of property. (60) The complete 
rejection of the defense of superior orders also occurred at Nuremburg. 
This development holds particular interest for purposes of military 
codes and manuals by which armed forces are guided. Given the role of 
states' interests implicated in particular situations of armed conflict, 
national variations in implementing IHL and the subjectivity of 
strategic approaches to the law of war easily become re-inforcing agents 
of national interpretations of IHL provisions. Thus, domestic military 
codes continue to exist alongside Hague and Geneva law, reflecting 
individual state concepts of necessity, proportionality and national 
security. (61) Battlefield law as contained in some military manuals 
prior to the Second World War had to be modified subsequent to the 
Nuremburg Trials in accordance with the Tribunal's firm stand on the 
rejection of the defense of superior orders. (62) 
The role of limited aspects of human rights law in IHL has 
fundamental importance, as the deployment of the armed forces is rarely, 
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if ever, considered to be justiciable in the accepted sense of the word 
(63). In particular, the application of combat law tends to be 
discretionary. (64) Nevertheless, "(t)he theoreticl difficulty of a 
soldier challenging his orders on the ground of perceived illegality is 
answered by the law's insistence that each man is responsible for his 
own actions". (65) The assertion contained in Hague law that 
belligerants do not possess unlimited discretion as to the means they 
may employ for injuring the enemy or for achieving the purpose for which 
it has been inflicted further mandates a role for human rights in IHL. 
The significance of this latter assertion is that fundamental guarantees 
regarding the treatment of persons in the power of a party to the 
conflict cannot fall below nonderogable human rights. 
The inclusion of human rights in IHL is thus the natural result 
of the rationalization of the concepts underlying each branch of IHL, 
particularly for purposes of modern interpretation and subsequent 
implementation of the substance of the standards enunciated. Inherent 
in this rationalization process is the basic permeability of the 
protection of the individual as a distinct normative precept within 
separate modes of intervention in operation to produce system 
transformation during situations of armed conflict. 
4.1.4. Protocols L and 2 of 1977 
- 
Convergence of Previously' Separate 
Rdgimes 
The modification of the participation clauses in 1949 (66) led to 
a drastic lowering of the conceptual threshhold for ready implementation 
of IHL in situations of armed conflict. Further complicating state 
observance of humanitarian law in the post-1945 era was the steady 
incursion into matters of traditional state sovereign competence made by 
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the U. N. system. In particular, the upsurge of national independence 
movements in the 1950s and 1960s made assessments or evaluations of the 
use of force political, with pragmatic effects on prevailing notions of 
state sovereignty. (67) The modification of the participation clause 
theoretically made the Geneva Conventions of 1949 easier to apply during 
times of armed conflict, but states appeared unwilling to characterize 
post-1945 conflicts as international situations in which IHL should be 
implemented. While it is beyond the scope of the present discussion to 
review in detail the forms of armed conflicts and war practices which 
ultimately mandated the Diplomatic Conference of 1974 - 77 (68), many 
liberation wars occurring prior to this time revealed codification gaps 
in the applicable law. In particular, the absence of any provision in 
Common Article 3 for a Protecting Power allowed sufficient scope to 
states to supercede their authority regarding the legality of means and 
methods used in public order exercises. The war in Viet Nam also 
revealed gaps in the 1949 codifications. Thus, the role played by state 
authoritative interpretation regarding the characterization of armed 
unrest for purposes of applying the correct level of IHL in a post-1945 
armed conflict proved an important reason to convene the 1974 - 77 
Diplomatic Conference to update and supplement the existing laws of war. 
A major political victory was achieved by third world states at 
the Diplomatic Conference when wars of self-determination were 
automatically "internationalized" in Protocol 1 Article 1(4). (69) This 
Protocol, which is applicable to international armed conflicts and 
supplements the 1949 Geneva codifications (70), extends to wars of self- 
determination the full provisions of IHL on the basis of their 
underlying cause, rather than as the result of the scale or intensity of 
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hostilities. (71) This extension is of particular importance in that 
fundamental juridical, normative and jurisdictional notions implicit in 
domestic versus international law are implicated. (72) 
Further, Protocol 1 contains a larger element of Hague law 
through stricter provisions regarding new weaponry (73), proportionality 
(74), military necessity (75), and the identification of combatants. 
(76) This mix has led to questions whether Hague and Geneva law are so 
re-inforcing and interdependent that Protocol 1 can, make political 
positionings justiciable without undue conceptual and legal confusion. 
(77) There is concern, too, that states may oppose the elevation of 
national liberation conflicts to ones of an international character by 
making Common Article 3 inapplicable until a declaration to accept and 
apply the Geneva Conventions is made by a liberation movement, pursuant 
to Article 96(3) of Protocol 1, to make the Conventions and Protocol 1 
equally binding upon all parties to the conflict. (78) 
Protocol 2 has a purpose different to that of Protocol 1: it is 
designed to supplement Common Article 3. It is also more specific. (79) 
Protocol 2 "internationalizes" domestic or non-international armed 
conflicts by requiring threatened states to observe international 
standards of fundamental due process guarantees (80) and safeguards for 
persons whose liberty has been restricted. (81) Nevertheless, this 
"internationalization" of domestic armed situations potentially 
exacerbates international relations as it allows consensual humanitarian 
intervention, though there is still no provision for a Protecting Power. 
It is of interest that the preliminary drafts of Protocol 2 were far 
longer than its appearance in final form, which final version still has 
its critics. (82) Best remarks that "(a) strong doctrine of sovereignty 
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stalks through these Protocols like a riot squad" (83), and it must be 
queried whether incursions into sovereign matters resulted in this 
shorter, less satisfactory version. 
It is concluded that the confines and convergences of IHL are 
discovered through an examination of its parts. The present complex 
interlock of Geneva and Hague law, and aspects of human rights law, 
exhibits different treaty instruments striving for functional overlap 
and permeability. Variations in the levels of protections afforded 
could make assessments of responsibility more difficult however when all 
parties to a conflict consider themselves bound by different 
instruments. Of particular concern are traditional principles which 
states may believe allow them to act despite the presence of new 
codified provisions which purport to prevent states from acting. Thus, 
many of the political considerations involved in the allocation of 
competences in the U. N. system imply that any normative or juridical 
melding of these different philosophies may prove to be more apparent 
than real. (84) Nevertheless, the extension in 1977 of integrated 
notions of justice to wars of self-determination reflects international 
concern about operational conditions in liberation struggles, and the 
adaptation of IHL to other developments in general international law. 
(85) 
4.2. The Necessity to Extend iL two Wars of Self-Determination 
As previously discussed, the 1977 revisions to Geneva law were 
mandated by growing gaps between older codified rules governing armed 
conflicts and the emergence of new "rules" by virtue of technological 
developments and state utilization of such developments in the absence 
of express prohibitions. (86) Given the recognized separate status of 
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"Peoples" struggling for their rights of self-determination in general 
international law (87), there further seemed little legal contradiction 
in 1977 between prohibiting war and regulating resort to it through 
rules applicable to large-scale violence. (88) The unwillingness of 
states to apply IHL in their wars of self-determination in the post-1945 
era made the dividing line between violations of the existing laws of 
war and the creation of new rules of war, or trends in that direction, a 
vital issue to address. (89) The use of newly developed means and 
methods of warfare meant that the law of war by no means belonged to 
history. Yet, considerations of state sovereignty in the deployment of 
new war technology often outweighed the primacy of law, particularly in 
"domestic" armed conflicts. (90) 
This Part discusses the adaptation of IHL, in 1977, to liberation 
wars as a function, in particular, of the increased levels of assistance 
from foreign states to rebel factions, and of the perceived need to 
regulate resort to war. 
4.2.1. I. Failure of Common Article 3. and Foreign State Intervention 
in Struggles or Self-Determination 
The rules of international law apply to war regardless of its 
cause. (91) In other words, the study and correct application of the 
laws of war do not require the identification of the source of the right 
to wage it. (92) The unwillingness of states to apply humanitarian law, 
and, in particular, Common Article 3, in domestic armed conflicts 
resulted from the political context of the structured levels of IHL 
protections. For example, states are restrained from opting for certain 
means and methods of maintaining public order once a situation of armed 
unrest is recognized as such through humanitarian treatment. States 
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experiencing situations of domestic armed unrest prefer to refer to 
"police action", "pacification operations", or "fraternal assistance". 
(93) Given the prohibitions against the threat or use of armed force in 
the U. N. Charter, this hesitation to recognize a war appears prudent. 
In view of this political context, third states have proved willing to 
further their own aggressive policies by aiding and assisting liberation 
groups in strategically placed struggles for self-determination. 
Fryer, in his discussion of international armed conflicts in 
1977, notes the following: 
Despite the built-in deference of Common Article 3 
... 
for the primacy of law during internal uprisings 
against an incumbent government, the applicability of 
the Article has been skirted in even the most massive 
internal conflicts since 1949. Governments 
... 
have 
sought to preserve maximum flexibility, in the 
national interest, in dealing with internal armed 
conflicts by avoiding such formal international legal 
obligations 
... 
(as) might 
... 
attach in favor of a 
challenging group 
... 
by virtue of their treatment by 
the incumbent in any manner as a legal personality. (94) 
Liberation uprisings were initially the result of the U. N. ' 
approach to colonial policy. (95) However, the terms of the U. N. 
Charter were subsequently interpreted to cover not only former mandates 
and areas detached from the Axis powers but any territories that might 
be brought under the system. At its furthest extension, U. N. provisions 
potentially applied to auto-determined "Peoples" wishing to reverse pre- 
colonial grievances and reacquire possession and control of national 
lands and resources. 
This new approach to colonial policy was a clear recognition of 
the "right" of formerly dependent "Peoples" to an independent existence. 
This development further challenged traditional reliance on delineations 
between international and internal war, becoming instead 
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decolonialization and/or secession wars. (98) As such, the danger of 
recognizing a liberation struggle by virtue of Common Article 3 
treatment was clear to states unsure of the survival of their own 
sovereignty and territorial boundaries. (97) The claims of liberation 
movements posed additional problems to concepts of state sovereignty 
when such claims were based on opposition to human rights violations as 
practised in regimes pursuing policies of apartheid, racism, and 
genocide. (98) 
Considering themselves possessed of international rights on 
both peremptory and conventional levels, liberation movements asserted 
that their separate and distinct status permitted requests to foreign 
states for aid and assistance in their struggles to achieve self- 
determination through all means at their disposal, which include armed 
force and methods of nonconventional warfare. (99) Sympathetic states 
have afforded such assistance, which has led to accusations of premature 
recognition of liberation groups, and interference in the domestic 
affairs of sister-states. These developments, and the need to regulate 
them, thus led to the inclusion of wars of self-determination in 
Protocol 1 as international armed conflicts. 
The subjective, discretionary and interpretive elements 
inherent in characterizing liberation conflicts have raised questions 
whether the legitimacy of armed conflict to achieve self-determination 
is the proper subject of the laws regulating the conduct of war. In 
other words, is it appropriate to allow the cause of a war to determine 
the level of international regulation and protection to be made 
applicable to its participants? Nevertheless, the significance of this 
"political" extension of humanitarian treatment rests on the deeper 
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penetration into international law of the separate norms of Hague and 
Geneva law, and aspects of human rights law in the domestic sphere. 
This extension thus rests on other developments generally in the 
international order, and the realities of modern armed conflicts. 
4.2.2. Regulation of and Restrictions oo Contemporary Scales of 
Violence 
Humanitarian law, as formulated in the late Nineteenth and early 
Twentieth Centuries, reflected mutual states' interests in regulating 
and limiting the categories of permissible participants and strategies 
in the processes of armed violence. This body of law was also intended 
"to save from extinction the 'human rights' limitations on the exercise 
of armed co-ercion within the social process". (100) Yet, as noted by 
Kunz in 1951, 
These codifications presupposed the doctrines 
of democracy, capitalism, economic liberalism, the 
principle of the sanctity of property, the strict 
distinction between private enterprise and economic 
activities by the states, 
... 
and the strict distinc- 
tion between armed forces and civilian populations. 
... 
The appearance of state Socialism, even in democra- 
cies, and of totalitarian regimes has changed these 
conditions basically. They paved the way for the modern 
'total war', which made its first appearance in the First 
World War. (101) 
Kunz defines "total war" as "the result of the combination of 
technological progress in arms with a changed manner of waging war, of 
the combination of unlimited use of highly destructive weapons for 
unlimited war aims". (102) He adds: "(e)verything depends on the heart 
of men who use them". (103) 
Improved techniques for waging war, from mechanized to automated 
to economic, have proliferated in the U. N. era. (104) The continued 
refinement of chemical, biological, and incendiary weapons of warfare 
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have made prohibitions of weapons used in the First World War obsolete. 
Ready breach of the prohibitions against the threat or use of force 
achieved through the practice of liberation struggles have further 
confused the "right" to wage war with the need to revise and supplement 
the laws of war. (105) States have been unwilling, for political 
reasons, to invoke more than traditional frameworks of the laws of war. 
This has led to the development of "new" rules in practice, and the 
resulting inadequacy of the codified rules when deploying new weaponry 
resulted in the "non-regulation" of many post-1945 armed conflicts. 
As previously discussed, Protocol 1 supplements and expands the 
rules regarding new weaponry, the proportionality of its use, and those 
persons entitled to use it. (106) The inclusion of wars of self- 
determination in IHL thus effects an immediate alteration in state 
positive and negative obligations with regard to the liberationist 
participants in such conflicts. This inclusion further affects 
fundamental juridical, normative and jurisdictional notions implicit in 
the characterization of a domestic versus an "international" use of 
force. For example, the extension of prisoner of war status to 
irregular troops utilizing nonconventional means and methods of warfare 
places a heavy duty of care upon governments. Similarly, combatants 
must ensure that their military actions do not harm civilians 
unnecessarily, even those civilians who may be surreptitiously aiding 
the liberation cause. (107) 
Further, Hague law and Geneva law have different jurisdictional 
bases. (108) The former is regulated by notions of state security and 
military necessity, and allows states to act. The latter does "not 
grant states any rights to the individual's detriment", and thus aims to 
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restrict states in their actions. (109) To reinforce the provisions of 
both bodies of law, individual responsibility is provided, with each 
person responsible for his or her own actions. However, provision is 
made in Protocol 1 Article 96(3) for a liberation group to "assume(... ) 
the same rights and obligations as those which have been assumed by a 
High Contracting Party" only after unilaterally declaring itself 
prepared to do so. Should it not decide to deposit the discretionary 
Article 96(3) declaration, asymmetry in responsibility could be the 
result. Thus, a major problem is the difficulty of a "soldier" who 
challenges his orders as illegal in view of humanitarian prohibitions. 
(110) 
Further, much "new" law has been incorporated in Protocol 1, 
particularly regarding state restraint in the development and deployment 
of new weaponry. Much of this "new" law has proved controversial, and 
it must be queried whether codified international law can be so quickly 
transformed into operational practice absent the willing support of 
concerned states. (111) The absence of several major Western states 
from the ratification process would imply not. The complexity of IHL, 
its aspirational content, and its ideological divisiveness thus 
complicate individual state commitment to its observance and respect in 
times of actual armed conflict. Nevertheless, the 1977 supplements were 
a major achievement in bringing the laws of war into conformity with 
other developments in international law. (112) 
4.3. Protocol I and the Use of Violent Force to Achieve the Goals of 
Self-Determination 
U. N. principles regarding the equal rights and self-determination 
of "Peoples" (113), as developed in practice, have led to conflict when 
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juxtaposed with the specific rules regarding the inviolability of 
territorial integrity, and the political independence of states. (114) 
Further, the legal etymologies of the two sets of obligations share 
little in common. (115) For example, the balance of carefully 
established fields of competences preserved in the U. N. system means 
that states retain control of all matters within domestic jurisdiction. 
(116) A desire to safeguard traditional areas of sovereign control thus 
often leads to political distortions in the implementation and 
observation of international obligations. The rights claims of 
liberation groups may thus be viewed as demands for control, and for 
system transformation to occur. Where such rights claims conflict with 
sovereign state notions of political independence and territorial 
integrity, the use of force by national groupings claiming entitlement 
to an independent, self-governing existence has been the result. Given 
this basic competition in perception of the meaning of U. N. Charter 
provisions, liberation struggles remained largely unregulated by 
international law, until 1977. (117) 
This Part argues that the 1977 supplements to Geneva law, while a 
remarkable development, confound the "right" to wage war with the laws 
regulating war through a piecemeal approach to various forms of domestic 
uprisings, and, in particular, to wars of self-determination. As such, 
the effect of wars of self-determination on an integrated IHL threatens 
both the evolution in normative permeability of the three IHL branches, 
and the non-observance of the laws regulating the conduct of 
hostilities. 
4.3.1. The "New" Approach to Self-Determination 
In contrast to Article 22 of the League of Nations Covenant, the 
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terms of the U. N. Charter regarding the peaceful and orderly attainment 
of independence by dependent territories and/or "Peoples" are uncertain 
as to their possible application in fact. (118) Popularly viewed as 
covering not only former mandates and areas detached from the Axis 
powers, they arguably covered other territories or "Peoples" as might 
wish to break from traditional confines of the "inviolability of 
territorial boundaries and political independence" of states. For 
example, historic wrongs provide the source for at least two arguments 
that "current state boundaries are illegitimate". (119) The first is 
the acquisition of land through conquest by a state from which a 
national grouping wish to secede. The second is the post-colonial and 
post-war consolidation of incompatible "Peoples", through the drawing of 
artificial territorial borders by colonizing nations. As such, it is 
sometimes argued that self-determination claims must in part be based on 
reacquisition of historic territory. (120) 
The modern version of self-determination does not focus on the 
history of a particular territory, but instead relies on complex and 
conceptual political-legal interlocks, which operate to determine a 
"Peoples" status as "distinct", and which interpret nationality in ways 
additional to mere ethnicity or race. Criteria mentioned in Protocol 1 
Article 1(4) for the use of force in such struggles are strict, and 
include the existence of colonial domination, of a racist regime and/or 
of alien occupation. The I. C. R. C. Commentary however makes further 
mention of "a common sentiment of forming a people, a political will to 
live together as such", and "apart from a defined territory, 
... 
a 
common language, common culture or ethnic ties". (121) 
The actual contexts of historic grievance characteristic of many 
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liberation wars do not co-incide with the confines of post-colonialism 
or the U. N. 's existing ethnic map. The "right" to wage war for self- 
determination has been unevenly exercised, with a growing incoherance in 
the identity of "Peoples" auto-defining themselves as such, and in state 
practice and attitude towards "approved causes". The recognition of 
particular liberation conflicts as legitimate, while others are termed 
"terrorist action". is a development which allows political 
considerations to obscure the many causes of such conflicts, to the 
ultimate detriment of appropriately assessing their legitimacy and level 
of subsequent regulation. Thus, differing ideological approaches to 
interpretations of entitlement to self-determination have resulted in 
liberation wars becoming a politically sensitive area of international 
law, (122) The piecemeal approach to domestic armed conflicts taken by 
the strict criteria contained in the 1977 Protocols thus threatens the 
integrated IHL regime with non-implementation in fact, as states avoid 
self-regulation and -imposition of the duties and burdens required by 
this body of law. (123) 
4,3.2. The 1974 
- 
77 Diplomatic Conference. and Political Compromise 
As previously discussed, it is hard to establish exactly how and 
when the principle of self-determination became a component part of 
general international law (124), but the growth in strength of the 
notion through a series of U. N. Resolutions and its incorporation in 
different areas of international law resulted in increased support at 
the Diplomatic Conference for the 1977 extension of humanitarian law to 
liberation conflicts. In particular, it was felt that the protections 
of IHL must be extended to the participants and victims of the armed 
liberation struggles which flowed from frustrated claims assertions and 
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attempts at system transformation, the aims of which could only be 
achieved through the use of force. (125) 
While the legality of the use of force in wars of self- 
determination is dealt with elsewhere in this discussion (126), it is 
noteworthy for present purposes that U. N. General Assembly Resolution 
3103 (XXVIII) of December, 1973 recognized the extension of the Third 
and Fourth Geneva Conventions to liberation wars. This development, in 
addition to the publicity attrocities committed during liberation wars 
attracted, mandated the modernization of that treaty body. (127) 
The explosion in new 'states during the decades prior to 1977 
resulted directly from operation of the U. N. principles of equal rights 
and self-determination, and meant that the participants at the 1949 
Geneva Codification Conference were outnumbered in 1974. (128) There 
were also divergences in 1974 in politico-ideological terms, in that 
many of the new participants had been heavily influenced by state 
Socialism. This meant in real terms that political compromise would be 
required if the codification revisions were to proceed. (129) Thus, the 
results of accelerated delimitations in state jurisdiction through the 
growth of the notion of self-determination were in evidence at the 
Diplomatic Conference for the revision of the 1949 Geneva Conventions. 
State participants numbered from 107 to 124, while also present were 
eleven liberation movements and fifty-one governmental or non- 
governmental observers. Thus, political compromise was a major victory 
for those new and aspiring political units present, and served to 
encourage the furtherance of classification struggles after wars of 
self-determination were included in Protocol 1 Article 1(4) as 
international armed conflicts. 
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Throughout a three-year negotiation process, all views were heard 
and the underlying process could not be objected to by any participating 
state. Almost all provisions in the Protocols were adopted by 
consensus. Where there was no consensus, the adoption of articles was 
subject to a two-thirds majority vote. Article 1(4) of Protocol 1 was 
adopted with 80 votes in favor, 1 vote opposed (Israel), and 11 
abstentions (mostly Western countries). The number of states abstaining 
or opposed to the adoption of Article 1(4) resulted in large part from 
the failure to definitively make clear the type of situations to which 
that article is addressed. 
Objections were voiced to the confounding of the right to wage 
war with the rules regulating war through the potential lowering of 
thresholds of hostility intensity in the face of a "just cause". (130) 
The extension also has obvious implications for the use of 
nonconventional means and methods of warfare, such as terror-violence 
and guerilla tactics, but many provisions contained in Protocol 1 are 
intended to curb the excessess seen, e. g . during the Viet Nam war. 
Wars of self-determination were "internationalized" on the basis 
of their high profile in the U. N. 'era, and in view of the arguably 
separate status of some "Peoples" and their cause (131), rather than the 
scale of hostilities or the identification of their participants. This 
was felt to endanger the inviolability of state political independence 
and territorial borders, particularly as liberation struggles define 
nationhood in a new way and have many transboundary aspects. (132) 
Nevertheless, heavy abstention rather than opposition was voiced 
regarding Article 1(4) in order that the Geneva modernization process 
could continue. (133) 
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The "graduation" of such conflicts from the status of domestic 
conflicts to international armed conflicts for purposes of the extension 
of IHL provisions in full further served to reinforce the contentious 
notion that U. N. Resolutions form a potential source of international 
law. As noted by Gardam, 
Although most states probably are cautiously 
prepared to concede that the right of self- 
determination is a principle of customary 
international law, they are not prepared to 
accept the practical results of this acceptance 
as enshrined in Protocol 1. These states see 
as a dangerous outcome of the acceptance of the 
Protocol that such action may result in or hasten 
the transformation of these rules into custom. (134) 
In other words, evidence exists that self-determination forms an 
established rule of international custom. Nevertheless, a conclusion 
that U. N. Resolutions, regarding the separate and distinct status of 
some "Peoples", their rights to self-determination and their right to 
use force to achieve it, have alone transformed the principle into 
custom, regardless of instances of inconsistent state practice, would 
arguably require a redefinition of the traditional sources of 
international law. (135) The inclusion of Article 1(4), as the 
resulting codification of world opinion expressed in a growing number of 
General Assembly Resolutions, represented a massive political victory 
for third world states which had themselves exceeded existing limits on 
the right to use force. Such use of force having oftentimes meant the 
use of terror-violence, it was feared by certain major powers that third 
world numerical superiority would continue to undermine the content of 
U. N. Charter rules prohibiting the use of force in international 
relations, and in particular, the use of terror-violence. (136) 
Nevertheless, evidence of the existence of "instant" custom, as embodied 
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in a treaty body, may be measured from the perspective of subsequent 
ratification, and the ratification of Protocol 1, while initially 
disappointing, is improving. 
4.3.3. Problems in Ratification 
The view that states are not under any obligation to ratify or 
accede to particular treaties implies that treaty ratification may be 
declarative of a present intent, only. This stance, while not strictly 
in line with the duty of states to be bound by treaties to which they 
are parties, and to perform them in good faith, remains popular despite 
the obligatory nature of custom and the growing body of rules of jus 
cogens, or peremptory norms. In this way, the unwillingness of states 
parties to IHL to invoke this body of law in the post-1945 era is made 
more clear. 
For example, the right to suppress a domestic rebellion and the 
right to choose the methods of doing so were traditionally beyond 
dispute, and not considered to be the proper subject of international 
law. (137) With the advent of Common Article 3 in 1949, and the growth 
of the human rights regime, attempts are now made in the U. N. era to 
control the manner in which states treat their own citizens. This may 
be difficult to enforce, however, in circumstances where a government 
may be fighting for its very existence. (138) Thus, in tandem with 
evolving international norms and standards, the Geneva Conventions were 
supplemented and clarified in 1977, in order to extend to individuals 
international rights and remedies in all circumstances. (139) 
Protocols 1 and 2 made massive incursions into notions of state 
sovereign authority to suppress domestic uprisings. In particular, 
Protocol 1 provisions many states found unacceptable include the 
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recognition of combatant status for certain irregular forces (140), the 
restriction of attacks against traditional objects of military strategy 
(141), and the elimination of significant remedies in the event of 
breach by the enemy, for example, reprisal actions. (142) Offensive 
political provisions include the automatic extension of IHL provisions 
to wars of self-determination, as previously discussed. 
An additional fear, that "modernizing" the status of wars of 
self-determination and of their participants would substantially 
increase the risks to civilian populations by making it easier to 
conduct such conflicts, nevertheless reflects the "civilian" aspect of 
most liberation wars. In particular, unrestricted warfare rarely 
observes traditional distinctions between combatant and non-combatant, 
making all-out war inevitable. Liberation struggles receive much of 
their support from civilian populaces which may surreptitiously aid and 
abet the use of terrorist acts against a threatened incumbent 
government. Recognition of this fact, by mixing provisions regarding 
the right to wage war with rules regulating its conduct, disorients 
those states obsessed with security considerations and sovereign notions 
of control and authority. 
Such modernization further acknowledges the transboundary 
character of such wars. (143) "Peoples" having a separate, distinct 
status implicate territorial claims and the potential breakdown of 
existing state boundaries. While historic territorial wrongs are not 
evenly corrected at present in the U. N. system through the vehicle of 
self-determination, recent emphasis on the rights of indigenous peoples 
and particular ethnic national groupings in issue-specific codification 
efforts would indicate that a new international norm which recognizes 
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and respects territorial claims within these new contexts is emerging. 
(144) 
The issues underlying self-determination and the right to use 
force to achieve it have eroded traditional jurisdictional confines 
delimiting the arena between dameetlc and international. ccncern, and it 
is for this reason, and for those reasons discussed above, that several 
major world powers have not ratified Protocol 1. (145) Given the 
special status of these powers in the U. N. system, this non-ratification 
is a cause for concern for the future of IHL, as a body of law requiring 
practical observance for continued viability. 
The main problem of the continued viability of IHL thus may 
prove to be the interrelation of the laws of armed hostilities, 
humanitarianism, and limited aspects of human rights in that each area 
has its own separate juridical accommodation. Nevertheless, the 
rationalization of the concepts underlying each branch, for purposes of 
defining IHL's true content in the future, will depend on the success or 
failure of the 1977 revisions to IHL, and on each state's willingness to 
adapt jurisdictionally to overlaps between sovereign state function and 
international rights regimes. In other words, as the different branches 
of IHL involve rules of the same or similar content which nevertheless 
are implemented by different organs or enforcement mechanisms, state 
willingness to implement IHL is crucial to the viability of recent 
developments, to the control of future armed conflicts, and to the 
success of the fight against acts of international terrorism. 
The attempt in 1977 to make humanitarian concerns primary in 
times of "war" and "peace" through the inclusion of additional types of 
civil war was an attempt to protect the individual in all circumstances 
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as against the activities of states. The evolution of integrated 
fundamental notions of justice in the IHL legal regime thus reflects its 
adaptation to other developments in international law, and to the 
realities of modern armed conflicts. Given the prohibitions against the 
use of nonconventional means and methods of warfare frequently employed 
in liberation struggles, it is further clear that Protocol 1 contains 
adequate mechanisms and procedures to remove acts of terror-violence 
from the ambit of efforts to deter international terrorism. (146) 
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5. Terrorists and Freedom Fighters: The Failure of State-Centered 
Codification Efforts to Deter Acts of International Terrorism 
Concurrent with the Twentieth Century development of humanitarian 
law, states have worked to encourage the prosecution and punishment of 
terrorists through antiterrorist conventions, treaties on mutual 
assistance in criminal matters, and extradition treaties. It is thus 
argued that these concurrent efforts highlight the scope of the problem 
of international terrorism, and re-inforce the opinion "that many states 
accept as legitimate a degree of political violence by individuals and 
groups in a search for justice as defined by each state for itself". (1) 
In that acts of international terrorism, or political violence, 
are frequently perpetrated by small cells, or groups, such acts are 
rarely viewed by interested states as sufficient in intensity to cross 
thresholds of armed conflict regulated by the Geneva Conventions of 1949 
or the Hague Conventions of 1907. Even though such acts could be 
considered "armed aggression", or constitute interference in the 
internal affairs of states (2), state efforts are aimed at criminalizing 
individually-perpetrated political violence in multi- and bi-lateral 
agreements, thereby isolating such acts within structural confines of 
domestic criminal responsibility. (3) This then means that the 
underlying political contexts through which such forms of violence could 
be assessed, if only in part, are usually ignored. 
Various of the important codification efforts developed 
concurrently with the IHL treaty regime this Century are discussed in 
this Chapter, and it is argued that terrorism perpetrated during 
struggles for the right of self-determination cannot be defined, 
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ultimately, as pure criminal activity for these purposes. (4) On this 
basis, it is further argued that generalized extradition arrangements 
are not effective measures to eradicate terrorism perpetrated in the 
context of an armed conflict. This is due in large part to elements in 
extradition arrangements of imperfect legal obligation which involve 
both political and legal considerations, and a degree of legal system 
variation, none of which elements lends itself to objectivity in 
assessment of such forms of violence. 
The reasons for this are many. Efforts within the international 
community to promulgate clear rules and policies to limit the behavior 
of politically violent actors continue to clash with state and regional 
traditions of political asylum, and strong national sympathies. (5) 
There has never been a definition of terrorism mutually acceptable to 
the world community. (6) Furthermore, the issue of state responsibility 
for international terrorism is rarely, if ever, dealt with in codified 
arrangements for purposes of any satisfactory sanctioning mechanism. (7) 
Finally, for purposes of this discussion, the following has been 
observed: 
Only if international terrorism is defined as something 
which will not bring within its orbit wars of national, 
independence and struggles against racialism and 
colonialism 
... 
can its prohibition be in conformity with 
international law and the decisions of the United Nations". 
(8) 
By way of preliminary discussion, it is a longstanding principle 
of international law that states are obliged to prevent the perpetration 
of acts of international terrorism. (9) Beyond considerations of the 
standardization of domestic penal codes and treaties on mutual 
assistance and/or extradition, "a state is legally obliged to exercise 
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due diligence to prevent the commission of acts of international 
terrorism within its jurisdiction". (10) As noted by the I. L. A. 
Committee on International Terrorism, in 1984, "this statement codifies 
a basic principle of international tort liability" (11), and as such, no 
state may legally refuse, on the ground of lack of legal interest, to 
participate in measures to preserve international peace and security and 
prevent acts of international terrorism. (12) 
Nevertheless, where political violence is motivated by an auto- 
determined group during a self-determination classification struggle 
(13), the above-mentioned state legal obligations become confounded with 
competing political considerations inherent in separate juridical 
treatments. Competing jurisdictional considerations implicate the right 
to wage war, the right to regulate war, and the right to authoritatively 
interpret"as criminal individual or group acts which fail to cross 
recognized thresholds of armed conflict. 
Thus, it is clear that states are obliged, legally, to 
participate actively in the prevention and/or restraint of behavior of 
politically motivated actors engaging in violence. (14) As such, mutual 
co-operation and the free exchange of information would appear to be 
mandated. Nevertheless, continuing international efforts to close 
loopholes in current codifications are clear evidence of the failure by 
states to deal adequately with these legal obligations in the face of 
competing political considerations which in particular frequently 
underly the use of state terrorism for purposes of covert aggression or 
interference in the internal affairs of other states. 
Given the twin failures of the world community to define the 
phenomenon of international terrorism for purposes of a standardization 
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of efforts to prevent it, and to create reliable mechanisms through 
which to enforce prohibitions against individual, group, or state 
violence, it is argued that the only forum available to deal adequately 
with the problem of political violence in such contexts as struggles for 
self-determination is that offered by the IHL treaty regime. (15) The 
IHL system addresses degrees of the use of armed force, and has no 
political offense exception to the duty to extradite or prosecute 
perpetrators of acts which "are so reprehensible that they are of 
concern to the international community, whether they are perpetrated in 
times of peace or war, irrespective of the cause which the perpetrators 
pursue, and regardless of political motivation". (16) 
This point is made clear in a discussion of the League of 
Nation's Convention for the Prevention and Punishment of Terrorism 
("Terrorism Convention"), in 1937. (17) The Convention was an early 
attempt both to define terrorism and to ensure a sufficient 
standardization of individual state penal codes for the effective 
prosecution and punishment of international terrorists. This early 
Convention, which never, entered into force, required the High 
Contracting Parties to ensure that penal offenses for acts defined as 
"terrorist" existed in their domestic codes. (18) Provision was also 
made for the inclusion of laws relating to extradition. (19). Perhaps 
more importantly, a Convention for the Creation of an International 
Criminal Court ("I. C. C. Convention") was opened for signature on the 
same day as the Terrorism Convention. (20) Its signature and coming 
into force were made contingent on the coming into force of the 
Terrorism Convention (21), and the I. C. C. was to afford an alternative 
forum for the trial of terrorist offenses when interested states so 
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requested. (22) Thus, the Court's jurisdiction was optional. 
These early attempts to deal with acts of political violence were 
made, first, to standardize particular offenses of international 
terrorism, and second, to ensure that domestic law would be available to 
prosecute them, within a choice of fora. Neither Convention came into 
force, and it is argued that this early failure to achieve collective 
co-operation was the result of a perceived threat to the sovereign role 
generally played by domestic penal systems, including those laws 
relating to extradition. (23) More importantly, no further provision 
was made at that time either to deter acts of state terrorism, or to 
make states responsible for acts of terrorism. 
Subsequent offense-specific agreements have been more successful. 
The major global conventions which are listed as follows, are frequently 
refered to, as is discussed later in this section. 
Convention on Offenses and Certain Other Acts Committed 
on Board Aircraft (Tokyo Convention), 1963 
Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft 
(Hague Convention), 1970 
Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the 
Safety of Civil Aviation (Montreal Convention), 1971 
Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts of Violence 
at Airports Serving International Civil Aviation 
(Montreal Protocol), 1988 
Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes Against 
Internationally Protected Persons, Including Diplomatic 
Agents (Convention on Protected Persons), 1973 
International Convention Against the Taking of Hostages 
(Hostages Convention), 1979 
Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the 
Safety of Maritime Navigation (I. M. O. Convention), and 
Protocol for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against 
the Safety of Fixed Platforms Located on the Continental 
Shelf (I. M. O. Protocol), 1988 (24) 
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For purposes of the present discussion, a major problem in state- 
centered legal efforts to deter terrorism is the continuing absence of 
an agreed definition of the phenomenon. Regarding this point, it has 
been noted that "the definition of terrorism is itself part of a 
political labeling process", striven for within what may further be 
termed "the politics of terror 
... 
". (25) For present purposes, 
however, it is important to recall that the primary motives 
characteristic of acts of terrorism are, first, to spread fear (26), and 
second, to utilize that fear to pressure or co-erce a government or 
governing body to change its policies. 
In the wider sense of the ready use of violence by all 
participants in typical modern armed conflicts, it is argued that the 
deployment of the armed forces is a main distinguishing feature between 
state terrorism and individual/group violence, in that the former adds a 
rather unlimited nature to violent activities. It has been noted that 
the use by states of "indiscriminate violence against civilians which 
was made into a principle of policy in practice of 'collective 
punishment' and collective deportation of civilians in retaliation for 
acts of resistance" (27) is also a discrete form of terrorism. Thus, it 
would appear that acts of international terrorism cannot successfully be 
detered or prevented simply by defining them as an individual form of 
criminal activity. 
Assuming this point, it is clear that IHL at present constitutes 
the sole existing legal regime capable of providing the mechanisms to 
deal with the political uee Of armed force or violence. In particular, 
given the ready use of the military by states to control political 
processes (28), the control of criminal justice systems by governments, 
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and the asymmetry of forces involved in struggles for self- 
determination, it is clear that IHL provides the only forum capable of 
assessing both state and individual responsibility for violence. IHL 
focuses on the nature of particular acts, and prohibits the tactical 
perpetration of reprehensible acts of violence. (29) 
Acts of political violence may be considered aggression, or may 
constitute interference in the internal affairs of states. Post-1945 
state reluctance to recognize armed struggles as war has required that 
state-centric codification efforts exist concurrently with the IHL 
treaty regime in order to have available alternate structures within 
which to interpret the nature of violent offenses carrying international 
political significance. It is thus felt necessary to examine various of 
the terrorist codification efforts which have been developed alongside 
IHL documents. 
The structure of this discussion is as follows. The 1937 
Terrorism Convention and I. C. C. Convention are reviewed in Part One. A 
number of the treaties and agreements currently in existence which are 
considered relevant to the prosecution of terrorist acts perpetrated 
within the context of struggles for self-determination are reviewed in 
Part Two. It is considered in Part Three whether these attempts at 
interstate co-operation effect a rejection of IHL's blanket 'condemnation 
of illegitimate means or methods of warfare. The failure of the world 
community to deal effectively with the phenomenon of international 
terrorism as a form of individualized criminal activity via state- 
centric treaty instruments is also considered. 
It is concluded that efforts to criminalize acts of international 
terrorism have failed because the legal issues of individual and state 
- 
178 
- 
responsibility cannot be reconciled with competing political 
considerations which underly tactical forms of violence. In particular, 
it is clear that offense-specific codification efforts disregard many of 
the legal and political issues underlying wars of national liberation, 
by characterizing such acts through contexts of individual criminal 
activity. State reluctance to recognize a domestic liberation struggle 
as an armed conflict to which humanitarian law applies further obscures 
issues of state responsibility for provoking the use of force in self- 
defense. 
5.1. The League o Nations and International Co-operation with Regard 
to the Prevention of Terrorism 
Two Conventions were opened for signature on 16 November 1937. 
The first was the Terrorism Convention (30), and the second, the I. C. C. 
Convention. (31) The Terrorism Convention was promptly signed by the 
representatives of twenty states, and the I. C. C. Convention, by the 
representatives of ten European States. (32) 
The Terrorism Convention made an early attempt to define 
terrorism, and to ensure sufficient standardization in individual state 
domestic penal codes for the effective-prosecution and punishment of 
international terrorists. Only states which ratified or acceded to the 
Terrorism Convention could ratify or accede to the I. C. C. Convention. 
The entry into force of the latter treaty was conditional upon the entry 
into force of the former. The entry into force of the Terrorism 
Convention was to take place ninety days after the deposit of three 
ratifications or accessions. (33) As of 1 January 1941, only India had 
ratified the Terrorism Convention, and no state had ratified the I. C. C. 
Convention. (34) Neither Convention ever entered into force. 
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The initiation of both Conventions was prompted by the 
assassinations of King Alexander I of Yugoslavia and the French Minister 
for Foreign Affairs at Marseilles, on 9 October 1934. The extradition 
of certain persons accused of the assassinations was refused by Italy on 
the ground that the crime was political. After receipt by the Council 
of the League of Nations of a memorandum from the French Government 
regarding the bases for an agreement with a view to the suppression of 
terrorism, and the adoption of "international measures" for the 
suppression of political crimes, the Council set up a Committee of 
Experts to draft a Convention "to assure the repression of conspiracies 
or crimes committed with a political purpose". (35) Neither treaty came 
into force, however, due to the outbreak of World War Two, which event 
quickly interrupted international co-operation in the administration of 
justice for several years. (36) Tension was already apparent by the 
time the two Conventions were opened for signature. 
Underscoring the optimism involved in these early codification 
efforts, commentary in 1933 indicated that the unification of criminal 
law was not so much desired in the world community as that certain 
offenses should be proscribed and punished. (37) This observation was 
voiced within the context of a desire for international co-operation in 
the suppression of crime, which co-operation would ensure that domestic 
legislation would permit states to exercise jurisdiction over criminal 
acts wherever they might be committed. Of note, though, were two main 
objections. The first was that the divergence of law and procedure 
between legal systems would be difficult to reconcile for this purpose. 
The second was that the full exchange of information in a "logical and 
just division among the various countries of their sovereign 
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jurisdiction to punish for crime" might be difficult to achieve, as well 
as be expensive. (38) It is therefore argued that, while the Terrorism 
Convention actually defined terrorism, both treaties foundered in large 
part on the demands required on state sovereignty before the requisite 
active state co-operation to make effective the prosecution and 
punishment of terrorist crimes and offenses committed in a foreign 
country could be achieved. 
5.1.1. The 1937 Definition of Terrorism, as Contained in the 
Terrorism Convention 
As previously noted, a state has the duty to prevent the 
commission of acts of international terrorism within its jurisdiction. 
This duty is contained in the Terrorism Convention, pertinent provisions 
of which are now discussed. 
5.1.1.1. Pertinent Provisions 
The duty of states to prevent the commission of acts of 
international terrorism is a principle of international law. This duty 
is phrased in the Terrorism Convention in Article 1(1), as follows: 
The High Contracting Parties, reaffirming the principle 
of international law in virtue of which it is the duty 
of every State to refrain from any act designed to 
encourage terrorist activities directed against another 
State and to prevent the acts in which such activities take 
shape, undertake 
... 
Article 1(2) defines "acts of terrorism" as "criminal acts directed 
against a State 
... 
". Such acts must be "intended or calculated to 
create a state of terror in the minds of particular persons, or a group 
of persons or the general public". Article 2 specifies the acts which 
will constitute criminal offenses if they constitute acts of terrorism 
within the meaning of Article 1, and if such acts are "directed against 
another High Contracting Party". Such specification was to ensure that 
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the domestic legislation of the High Contracting Parties permitted the 
exercise of jurisdiction over terrorist acts, wherever committed. These 
acts are as follows: 
(1) Any wilful act causing death or grievous bodily harm 
or loss of liberty to: 
(a) Heads of States, persons exercising the prerogatives 
of the head of the State, their hereditary or desig- 
nated successors; 
(b) The wives or husbands of the above-mentioned persons; 
(c) Persons charged with public functions or holding 
public positions when the act is-directed against 
them in their public capacity. 
(2) Any wilful destruction of, or damage to, public property or 
property devoted to a public purpose belonging to or 
subject to the authority of another High Contracting Party. 
(3) Any wilful act calculated to endanger the lives of members, 
of the public. 
(4) Any attempt to commit an offence falling within the fore- 
going provisions of the present article. 
(5) The manufacture, obtaining, possession, or supplying of 
arms, ammunition, explosives or harmful substances with 
a view to the commission in any country whatsoever of an 
offence falling within the present article. 
Article 3 specifies acts preparatory to the offenses contained in 
Article 2, which preparatory acts are also made criminal offenses, 
"whatever the country in which the act of terrorism is to be carried 
out: 
... 
". These acts are as follows: 
(1) Conspiracy to commit any such act; 
(2) Any incitement to any such act, if successful; 
(3) Direct public incitement to any act mentioned under heads 
(1), (2) or (3) of Article 2, whether the incitement be 
successful or not; 
(4) Wilful participation in any such act; 
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(5) Assistance, knowingly given, towards the commission of 
any such act. 
These offenses are supplemented by Articles 13 (provisions for gun 
control and regulation) and 14 (provisions for the regulation of 
passorts "or other equivalent documents"). 
All the created offenses carried individualized criminal 
liability. There is no mention of state liability or responsibility for 
either terrorist acts or preparatory acts. (39) Instead, and in view of 
the state duties outlined in Article 1, Article 12 states as follows: 
Each High Contracting Party shall take on his own territory 
and within the limits of his own law and administrative 
organisation the measures which he considers appropriate 
for the effective prevention of all activities contrary to 
the purpose of the present Convention. 
Articles 4 and 5 ensure the harmonization of domestic law "in 
order to prevent an offender escaping punishment". (40) To this end, 
efforts to standardize domestic penal codes were made as follows. 
Article 5 states that "each High Contracting Party shall provide the 
same punishment for the acts set out in Articles 2 and 3, whether they 
be directed against that or another High Contracting Party". Article 8 
provides that Articles 2 and 3 offenses are to be extradictable 
offenses. Article 8(4) allows for a political offense exception, which 
is phrased as follows: 
The obligation to grant extradition under the 
present article shall be subject to any conditions 
and limitations recognised by the law or the practice of 
the country to which application is made. 
Article 9 allows, where applicable, for the non-extradition of 
nationals, who must nevertheless "be prosecuted and punished in the same 
manner as if the offence had been committed on that territory, 
... 
". 
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5.1.1.2. Discussion 
As is obvious from these sections of text, the decision to co- 
operate or not in the prosecution and punishment of political crimes of 
terrorism turned on domestic interpretations of the nature of the 
indicated acts. This is indicated in Article 2 as follows: "... if 
they (terrorist acts) are directed against another High Contracting 
Party and if they constitute acts of terrorism within the meaning of 
Article 1" (emphasis added). Article 18 states as follows: 
The participation of a High Contracting Party in 
the present Convention shall not be interpreted as 
affecting that Party's attitude on the general ques- 
tion of the limits of criminal jurisdiction as a 
question of international law. 
Further, Article 19 states as follows: 
The present Convention does not affect the principle that, 
provided the offender is not allowed to escape punishment 
owing to an omission in the criminal law, the characteriza- 
tion of the various offences dealt with in the present 
Convention, the imposition of sentences, the methods of 
prosecution and trial, and the rules as to mitigating 
circumstances, pardon and amnesty are determined in each 
country by the provisions of domestic law. 
Disputes between states are mainly contemplated in Article 20(1) with 
regard to "the interpretation or application of the present Convention, 
... 
", or, in Article 20, concerning dispute resolution between High 
Contracting Parties, in general. 
This codification effort was doomed to fail as states retained 
their full powers of sovereign authoritative interpretation as to the 
nature and target of particular acts of terrorism for purposes of 
characterization. It was further noted in 1933, with regard to the 
political offense exception in the context of criminal jurisdiction, 
that "(t>he definition of this category tends to become broader in an 
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era of exacerbated nationalism like the present 
... 
". (41) This is of 
interest to the present discussion of liberation struggles, in view of 
state and regional traditions of asylum, and strong national sympathies. 
Thus, the unsuccessful attempt made in 1937 to standardize different 
penal codes and thus to delimit state sovereignty was prophetic with 
regard to more recent efforts to codify extradition arrangements. 
Despite express provisions in the Terrorism Convention which 
defined the phenomenon of acts of terrorism, and which provided for 
standardization in domestic penal provisions for purposes of 
prosecution, it is argued that state authoritative interpretations would 
have interrupted effective co-operation measures in the identification 
of suspected terrorists, and in the characterization of the elements of 
particular offenses, as occurs today. It is argued that, had the 
Terrorism Convention entered into force with a minimal number of 
ratifications or accessions, modern difficulties with regard to the 
ready exchange of information, the extradition of alleged offenders, and 
the effective prosecution and punishment of international terrorists 
would have been present, even where particular High Contracting Parties 
shared the same or similar juridical sources. (42) It is also highly 
relevant to the present discussion that state terrorism, and perceived 
rights of self-defense against a government, were not yet contemplated 
as being appropriate subjects for an anti-terrorist Convention. (43) 
For these reasons, the modern failure of the world community, 
inter-se, either to define or provide reliable mechanisms for the trial 
of acts of terrorism is foreshadowed by the 1937 Terrorism Convention, 
which codification effort was expressly intended to deal with the 
suppression of acts of political violence. 
t 
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5.1.2. The I. C, C. Convention of 1937 and Jurisdictional 
Problems 
As previously noted, objections to the international 
standardization of criminal offenses are in the main based on dissimilar 
juridical principles, as derived from divergent cultural sources which 
involve competing labeling processes and procedures. Definitions of 
terrorism result from state sovereign authority over the labeling 
process, which process is frequently a political one. Given these twin 
elements of categorization - legal tradition and political 
considerations, it is of interest that the Terrorism Convention 
contemplated a common approach by defining the political actions which 
were to incur individualized criminal liability in the domestic systems 
of the High Contracting Parties. In particular, Article 24 of the 
Terrorism Convention stated as follows: 
Ratification of, or accession to, the present Convention by 
any High Contracting Party implies an assurance by him that 
his legislation and his administrative organisation enable him 
to give effect to the provisions of the present Convention. 
Nevertheless, each High Contracting Party was able, first, to interpret 
what types of offense fell within the ambit of the treaty. (44) Second, 
each determined what actions were to be taken regarding extradition 
provisions. (45) Third, each decided what course a particular domestic 
prosecution should follow. (46) 
It is clear that states were to retain domestic control over the 
prosecution of offenses enumerated in the Terrorism Convention, while 
the processes were to result in the same, or similar, substantive 
outcome. The retention of individual state domestic control over the 
processes of criminal justice meant the standardization, not the 
unification, of criminal law and procedure. 
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The coming into force of the I. C. C. Convention was made 
contingent on the coming into force of the Terrorism Convention. This 
linking device made the two Conventions supportive of the notion that 
the propriety of prosecution was to be determined more by its 
substantive outcome than by its formal conduct (47), which in effect 
could have been made impracticable by disputes, as to procedure. This 
point is of particular relevance to matters of extradition, state 
sympathy for political offenses, and asylum requests. 
5.1.2.1. Pertinent Provisions 
A High Contracting Party to the Terrorism Convention could commit 
an accused to the I. C. C. for trial. There was, however, no obligation 
to do so. Article 2 of the I. C. C. Convention provides as follows: 
1. In the cases referred to in Articles 2,3,9 and 10 
of the Convention for the Prevention and Punishment of 
Terrorism, each High Contracting Party to the present 
Convention shall be entitled, instead of prosecuting 
before his own courts, to commit the accused for trial 
to the Court. 
2. A High Contracting Party shall further, in cases where 
he is able to grant extradition in accordance with 
Article 8 of the said Convention, be entitled to commit 
the accused for trial to the Court if the State demand- 
ing extradition is also a Party to the present Convention. 
3. The High Contracting Parties recognise that other Parties 
discharge their obligations towards them under the 
Convention for the Prevention and Punishment of Terrorism 
by making use of the right given them by the present 
article. 
As for providing a choice in prosecuting authority, the I. C. C. 
Convention, in Article 25(3), states as follows: 
The State which committed the accused person to the Court 
shall conduct the prosecution unless the State against 
which the offence was directed or, failing that State, 
the State on whose territory the offence was committed 
expresses a wish to prosecute. 
-187- 
Should an accused be committed for trial to the I. C. C., the law 
applicable to such trial was provided for in Article 21, as follows: 
1. The substantive criminal law to be applied by the Court 
shall be that which is the least severe. In determining 
what that law is, the Court shall take into consideration 
the law of the territory on which the offence was 
committed and the law of the country which committed the 
accused to it for trial. 
2. Any dispute as to what substantive criminal law is appli- 
cable shall be decided by the Court. 
Whether the prosecution was conducted by the committing state or the 
injured state, the potential existed for a directly injured person to 
participate as a partie civile before the Court (48), which potential is 
of particular interest in the contexts of terrorist offenses directed 
against innocent third parties (49), and of the participation of 
individuals before international tribunals, generally. 
Provisions relating to the execution of sentences are contained 
in Articles 40 and 41, which are as follows: 
40.1. Sentences involving loss of liberty shall be 
executed by a High Contracting Party chosen with 
his consent by the Court. Such consent may not be 
refused by the State which committed the convicted 
person to the Court for trial. The sentence shall 
always be executed by the State which committed the 
convicted person to the Court if this State expresses 
the wish to do so. 
2. The Court shall determine the way in which any 
fines shall be dealt with. 
41. If sentence of death has been pronounced, the State 
designated by the Court to execute the sentence shall 
be entitled to substitute therefore the most severe 
penalty provided by its national law which involves 
loss of liberty. 
Article 42 permits a High Contracting Party to pardon an accused, 
which article allows states additional discretion to disregard the 
agreed standardization of criminal offenses involving acts of political 
-188- 
violence. Article 42 provides as follows: "(t)he right of pardon shall 
be exercised by. the State which has to enforce the penalty. It shall 
first consult the President of the Court". 
States having committed an accused to the Court for trial were 
prevented from withdrawing the case from the jurisdiction of the Court 
by Article 56 which provides that "(a) case brought before the Court 
before the denunciation of the present Convention, or the making of a 
declaration as provided in Article 52, paragraph 3, shall nevertheless 
continue to be heard and judgment be given by the Court". 
5.1.2.2. Discussion 
In view of the choices of prosecuting authority and in provisions 
regarding the execution of sentences and powers of pardon, the I. C. C. 
Convention was deemed "innovative" in that it "relieve(d) states of 
embarressing burdens cast upon them more or less accidentally 
... 
". (50) 
Yet, given the discretion provided to states, as outlined, it is 
of little surprise that the Court, had it ever been established, would 
have faced difficulties with choice of law issues. Its creation was 
made contingent upon the standardization of domestic criminal laws of 
states parties, albeit the minimal number of three states required to 
bring the Terrorism Convention into force. One ratification or 
accession of these three was all that was needed to bring the I. C. C. 
Convention into force. Thus, the modern difficulty with choice of law 
issues was foreshadowed by the Terrorism Convention. Not only was 
domestic law the backbone of any prosecutorial discretion, but 
extradition or prosecution procedures were left to be determined on a 
case-by-case basis by individual states interpreting for themselves, 
individually, the nature and content of any alleged offense to be 
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prosecuted. 
The unification 
- 
and not the standardization 
- of international 
law regarding the enumerated categories of offenses, was at the time 
felt to be too ambitious a project on the basis of legal system 
plurality and expense. Unification, nevertheless, would have resulted 
in a predictability of desired result regarding the procedural aspects 
of criminal prosecutions for offenses either committed abroad, or having 
foreign and international effect. If enunciated in terms of a codified 
agreement, such predictability of result through unified procedures 
would have given greater credence to interstate efforts to deter the 
phenomenon of terrorism within state-centric frameworks. In particular, 
the extradition and/or prosecution of offenders charged with an offense 
of a terrorist nature were then, and still remain, hampered by sovereign 
state assessments of both the propriety of sister state criminal justice 
procedures, and the political considerations involved in characterizing 
a particular use of violence as politically motivated. Thus, any chance 
to unify state attitudes towards the phenomenon of terrorism, for 
purposes of true reciprocity in policy, was lost. Instead, 
standardization alone was striven for, which standardization sought to 
emphasize the importance of prosecution through substantive outcome, 
rather than through formal agreement as to approach and procedure. 
Neither Convention came into force. Had they done so, it is 
speculated that each would have foundered in a fashion similar to modern 
codifications. These early Conventions would have failed in cases where 
state authoritative interpretation retained the scope to characterize 
particular violent offenses differently, and where state responsibility 
for terrorist acts might be in issue. More importantly, these 
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Conventions would have failed where sovereign state criminal procedural 
considerations, albeit delimited through mutual obligation and 
assistance, could prevent the extradition of a particular offender on 
the basis of national sympathy and/or political ideology. 
The present failure of the world community to define terrorism, 
and to standardize or unify attitudes regarding the phenomenon of 
international terrorism through separate, offense-specific codification 
efforts is foreshadowed by these post-World War I objections to the 
innovative yet minimal delimitations of state sovereignty contemplated 
in the 1937 Conventions. With particular relevance to the extradition 
of nationals, it would appear clear that modern attempts to co-operate 
actively in detering terrorism are made more difficult by national and 
ethnic sympathies regarding the post-1945 issue of the self- 
determination of "Peoples", and the use of armed force, to achieve their 
rights. (51) 
These issues, coupled with colonialism, racism, alien occupation 
and the self-defense of "Peoples" against state terrorism, cannot be 
dealt with squarely within the confines of state-centric anti-terrorist 
codification efforts, which efforts often serve to re-inforce national 
sympathies, ideological unity, and economic solidarity. It is thus 
concluded that IHL is the only treaty regime in existence capable of 
providing the necessary procedures and mechanisms to deter, apprehend, 
and prosecute perpetrators of political violence during system 
transformation struggles, whether they are individuals, groups, or 
states. Reprehensible acts of violence are clearly regulated by 
humanitarian law from the first outbreak of armed hostilities. (52) 
Such regulation applies to states in their use of the military to 
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control political processes. Prohibitions against the use of violent 
means and methods of warfare apply to all parties involved in 
classification struggles by auto-determined "Peoples". Thus, it is 
clear that IHL can be readily utilized to distinguish and prosecute acts 
of political violence perpetrated in armed struggles for self- 
determination should the international community wish to do so. ' 
5.2. The Current Legal System. with Particular Regard to Extradition 
Arrangements 
As is common to all domestic legal systems, a criminal offense 
must be defined by the state in order that the elements which constitute 
it may then be specified. (53) Procedures of state sanction must be 
devised and invoked. With regard to the criminal offense of 
international terrorism, Murphy notes that "109 different definitions of 
the term were advanced between 1936 and 1981, and more have appeared 
since". (54) None of these definitions have ever been adopted by the 
world community. For this reason, there is still no international crime 
of "terrorism", subject to universal jurisdiction (55). Instead, there 
are individual criminal offenses which are recognized in state 
codifications as acts of international terrorism, which fact renders 
dubious any satisfactory standardization or unification of state 
attitude towards the exercise of universal jurisdiction over 
reprehensible acts committed by, in particular, liberation fighters. As 
a result, none of the major global conventions attempting to create an 
absolute obligation to extradite or prosecute terrorists has been 
entirely successful in achieving reliable observance in the post-1945 
era. (56) 
Modern codification efforts frequently outline, in general terms, 
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the constitutive elements of acts of political violence and/or list such 
specific acts. Guidance to the international community for sovereign 
interpretations regarding acts of terrorism may be found in U. N. 
Resolutions which alternately condemn particular terrorist acts, and 
encourage Member states to engage in constructive dialogue with auto- 
determined "Peoples". (57) 
As was noted in the discussion of the 1937 codifications, 
attempts to criminalize acts of international terrorism founder in the 
main on variations in legal system classifications of criminal activity. 
Beyond this issue, another difficulty in the post-1945 era has been the 
separation of the right to use armed force in struggles for self- 
determination from the regulation of tactics of terror-violence deployed 
by liberation fighters utilizing "direct action" as a "just" mode of 
conflict resolution. (58) In other words, the "mischievous hypothesis 
that wars of national liberation are essentially acts of terrorism" (59) 
has served to cloud both the legality of a "just" use of force, and the 
regulation of violence. When individual state sovereign authority must 
grapple with what is considered to be mere political violence, the 
result is the use of the armed forces, and the adoption of the means of 
state terrorism in the form of direct or surrogate aggression. (60) 
The current legal system is inadequate when the twin issues of 
the prosecution and'punishment of acts of international terrorism are 
raised. In view of this, states refusing to extradite or prosecute 
individual terrorists must be confronted with the alternative forum 
presented by the IHL treaty regime, which body of law makes the 
deliberate targeting of the civilian population by any entity involved 
in an armed conflict a war crime. (61) 
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In order to illustrate the inadequacies of the existing state- 
centered approach to terrorism, pertinent provisions of the 
International Convention Against the Taking of Hostages (Hostages 
Convention), 1979 will first be examined in this Part. Pertinent 
provisions of the Supplementary Treaty Concerning the Extradition Treaty 
between the Government of the United States of America and the 
Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland 
(U. S. 
-U. K. Supplementary Extradition Treaty), 1985, the European 
Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism (European Convention), 1977, 
and the European Agreement Concerning the Application of the European 
Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism among the Member States 
(Dublin Agreement), 1979 will then be discussed and compared. (62) 
5.2.1. The Hostages Convention Land the Geneva Conventions. 
as Applicable to a Particular Act of Hostage-Taking 
The Hostages Convention provides for the criminal prosecution, or 
extradition, of persons committing the offense of hostage-taking 
regardless of motive or the identity of the victim. (63) The obligation 
to prosecute or extradite offenders, as worded, resulted from a "package 
deal" between Western and non-aligned states which had to reconcile the 
position of national liberation movements, and the legitimacy of the 
struggle for self-determination, with the prohibition against the taking 
of hostages. (64) 
5.2.1.1. Pertinent Provisions 
The Preamble to the Hostages Convention states that the taking of 
hostages "is an offense of grave concern to the international 
community". Even so, states parties to the. Convention re-affirm 
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... 
(T)he principle of equal rights and self-determination of 
peoples as enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations 
and the Declaration on Principles of International Law 
concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation among States 
in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, as 
well as in other relevant Resolutions of the General 
Assembly. 
A reservation to an absolute approach to the offense of hostage- 
taking is included and explained in Article 12, which states as follows: 
In so far as the Geneva Conventions of 1949 for the protection 
of war victims or the Additional Protocols to those Conventions 
are applicable to a particular act of hostage-taking, and in so 
far as States Parties to this Convention are bound under those 
Conventions to prosecute or hand over the hostage-taker, 
the present Convention shall not apply to an act of hostage- 
taking committed in the course of armed conflicts as defined 
in the Geneva Conventions of 1949 and the Protocols thereto, 
including armed conflicts mentioned in article 1, paragraph 
4, of Additional Protocol I of 1977, in which peoples are 
fighting against colonial domination and alien occupation 
and against racist regimes in the exercise of their right 
of self-determination, as enshrined in the Charter of the 
United Nations and the Declaration on Principles of 
International Law concerning Friendly Relations and 
Co-operation among States in accordance with the Charter 
of the United Nations. 
. 
(Emphasis added. ) 
In addition, Article 13 provides as follows: 
This Convention shall not apply where the offence is committed 
within a single State, the hostage and the alleged offender 
are nationals of that State and the alleged offender is found 
in the territory of that State. 
Of interest to the present discussion, a dispute as to the applicability 
of Article 12 or 13 could result. The implementation of the Geneva 
treaty regime during a domestic national uprising is frequently a 
political decision, the result of which affects interpretations of the 
level of due process protections to be afforded to a "domestic" hostage 
taker. In other words, a decision to invoke either Article 12 or 
Article 13 may be necessary to determine the treatment of an accused 
under either an international or domestic standard. 
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Otherwise, procedures for the prosecution and punishment of 
hostage-takers follow a similar format to the 1937 Terrorism Convention. 
Article 2 provides that "(e)ach State Party shall make the offences set 
forth in Article 1 punishable by appropriate penalties which take into 
account the grave nature of those offences". Article 5 provides, in 
pertinent part, as follows: 
2. Each State Party shall likewise take such measures as 
may be necessary to establish its jurisdiction over the 
offenses set forth in Article 1 in cases where the 
alleged offender is present in its territory and it does 
not extradite him 
... 
3. This Convention does not exclude any criminal juris- 
diction exercised in accordance with internal law. 
Article 8 provides, in pertinent part, as follows: 
1. The State Party in the territory of which the alleged 
offender is found shall, if it does not extradite him, 
be obliged, without exception whatsoever and whether 
or not the offence was committed in its territory, to 
submit the case to its competent authorities for the 
purpose of prosecution, through proceedings in 
accordance with the laws of that State. Those 
authorities shall take their decision in the same 
manner as in the case of any ordinary offence of a 
grave nature under the law of that State. 
The major compromise article, which arguably reconciles potential 
interpretational conflicts, is found in Article 9, which Article 
provides for a political and humanitarian exception to extradition. 
Article 9, in pertinent part, provides as follows: 
1. A request for the extradition of an alleged offender, 
pursuant to this Convention, shall not be granted if 
the requested State Party has substantial grounds for 
believing: 
a. that the request for extradition for an offence set 
forth in Article 1 has been made for the purpose of 
prosecuting or punishing a person on account of his race, 
religion, nationality, ethnic origin or political 
opinion; or 
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b. that the person's position may be prejudiced: 
i. for any of the reasons mentioned in subparagraph 
a. of this paragraph, 
... 
Finally, the offenses enumerated in Article 1 are preceded by a 
definition of a hostage-taker: "(a)ny person who seizes or detains and 
threatens to kill, to injure or to continue to detain another person". 
Article 1 broadly defines the persons who commit the offense of hostage- 
taking, as follows: 
2. Any person who: 
a. attempts to commit an act of hostage-taking, or 
b. participates as an accomplice of anyone who commits 
or attempts to commit an act of hostage-taking 
... 
Article 1 indicates that the motive underlying the offense of hostage- 
taking must be committed: 
Mn order to compel a third party, namely, a State, an 
international intergovernmental organization, a natural or 
juridical person, or a group of persons, to do or abstain 
from doing any act as an explicit or implicit condition 
for the release of the hostage 
... 
5.2.1.2. Discussion 
Given the above-outlined articles concerning potential 
applicability of the Geneva treaty regime, extradition, and use of 
domestic penal codes for purposes of prosecution, it is clear that the 
Hostages Convention attempts to reconcile the prohibition against 
hostage-taking as an act of international terrorism, with the legitimacy 
of the struggle for self-determination. In particular, the Convention 
was intended to apply to all cases of hostage-taking which are not 
perpetrated in the course of an armed conflict regulated by humanitarian 
law and/or the effects of which are not confined to a single state. 
Thus, in the context of the offense of hostage-taking as an act 
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of international terrorism, responsibility for such an offense is dealt 
with at all possible levels. State responsibility is dealt with through 
Article 12, which article leaves open the possibility that hostage- 
taking may occur in the separate legal area governing armed conflicts. 
Domestic-effect hostage-taking, as dealt with in Article 13, is not the 
subject of the Convention, and presumably is to be dealt with through 
appropriate domestic penal mechanisms. 
Nevertheless, and as noted by the I. L. A. Committee on 
International Terrorism in 1982, Article 12 "both eliminates an anomaly 
and reveals one". (65) In other words, doubt remains as to which armed 
struggles qualify for the protections afforded through Article 1(4) of 
Protocol 1. If a domestic armed conflict is not considered to qualify 
for IHL protections, a perpetrator may be stripped of the protections of 
international law. A state may indulge in hostage-taking as one tactic 
in an overall strategy of surrogate aggression. States parties to the 
Hostages Convention are allowed to indulge in national sympathies, to 
characterize associated struggles as "international", and to afford 
combatant soldiers' privileges to hostage-takers involved in such 
conflicts. While such sympathetic states are still obliged either to 
prosecute or extradite an offender, the possibility of a friendly 
prosecution exists. 
The I. L. A. notes as follows: 
(T)hose states using the legal power of autointerpretation 
to deny combatant status to the hostage-takers would find it 
difficult to achieve their extradition except from those 
states adopting a similar autointerpretation and qualification 
and permitting extradition of politically motivated offenders. 
Without Article 12 it would be possible that a politically 
motivated hostage-taker, violating the municipal law 
forbidding kidnapping or extortion or assault in the place 
of his act, would find asylum in a third state and go 
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unpunished because politically inspired. At the same time, 
the same actor doing the same thing to a person protected 
under the Fourth Geneva Convention of 1949 and fleeing to 
a state which considers him a soldier in an armed conflict 
to which the 1949 Geneva Conventions or Protocol 1 applied, 
would, if he were sought by any state concerned making the 
same autointerpretation, appear to be liable to criminal 
process, or even possibly extradition. 
... . 
The possibility exists that a hostage-taker might be able 
to escape both trial and extradition because of doubts as 
to which of two treaty regimes, or even which of two 
articles in a single treaty, applied when both lead to the 
same result and are intended to mesh with each other 
precisely (66). 
Verwey notes further that the Hostages Convention attempts to 
balance different state interests. Such interests involve legal, 
humanitarian and political considerations involved in a system of 
priority of jurisdiction, in addition to the role that domestic penal 
systems play with regard to state sovereignty, as previously discussed. 
(67) Concerns regarding regional conceptions of fairness of trial were 
further voiced, reminiscent of the objections to the unification or 
standardardization voiced prior to the 1937 codifications. 
For these reasons, it would appear that the Hostages Convention 
has come as close as possible on a multi-lateral basis to provide 
procedures and mechanisms with which to prosecute and punish acts of 
hostage-taking at all levels of responsibility. Nevertheless, it would 
seem that the effort to reconcile the political considerations involved 
in struggles for self-determination with the individualization of 
hostage-taking as an offense fails to contemplate the phenomenon of 
state-motivated or instigated terrorism, which species of terrorism is 
frequently perpetrated for purposes of covert aggression in armed arenas 
not characterized as regulated by international law. It also fails to 
take into account the variations in domestic treatment of criminal 
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offenders, which variations frequently fall far short of protections 
provided in international law. 
In this latter regard, Article 13 is of concern. The potential 
contradictions inherent in this article can be imagined. This is of 
particular concern in classification struggles where acts of a terror 
nature are used to draw media and government attention to the failure of 
state legal and constitutional processes to adequately provide for 
system transformation. For instance, should a target government not 
interpret a domestic national situation of unrest as coming under the 
coverage of Protocol 1, Protocol 2, or as a minimum, Common Article 3, 
there is no protection afforded to an accused other than domestic 
implementation of various human rights provisions. In such a situation, 
any evidence of political purpose or motivation underlying a particular 
group use of violence is frequently disregarded, as individualized 
criminalization takes hold. 
In that a particular hostage-taker may be able to escape sanction 
due to confusion over which treaty regime to apply, it is concluded that 
the loopholes afforded by the Hostages Convention present a problem 
which the international community has yet to confront 
- 
that of the 
political assessment of an armed conflict. Further, in that states have 
yet to target each other's use of terrorist tactics for potential 
sanction in issue-specific anti-terrorist conventions as the one under 
discussion, it can be argued that the IHL treaty regime is the sole 
forum available which can deal comprehensively with such acts of 
politically motivated violence as hostage-taking. 
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5.2.2. The U. S. 
-U. K. Extradition Treaty. European Convention 
and Dublin Agreement - Attempts at Unification 
Current arrangements regarding extradition, jurisdiction and 
mutual criminal assistance are largely bi-lateral rather than 
multilateral. Nevertheless, such arrangements are frequently "hindered 
in their operational effectiveness by the concept of the sovereignty of 
states and by outmoded concepts of national jurisdiction". (68) 
As discussed in the context of the 1937 codification efforts, the 
plurality of domestic criminal justice systems in the international 
community, the divergencies of their juridical sources, and the 
variations in the enumerated elements of particular offenses frequently 
lead to objections to unifying procedure for the purpose of 
standardizing substantive outcomes. This point is re-affirmed by 
Murphy, who notes the following: 
If the prosecuting state's criminal justice system lacks 
integrity, the risk of political intervention in the 
prosecution or at trial exists. Such intervention may 
prevent the trial or conviction of the accused, or act 
as a mitigating influence at the sentencing stage. (69) 
Such objections were noted early, and commented on in 1933 in the 
context of the dialogue concerning the unification/standardization of 
criminal law, in order that the I. C. C. could work in tandem with the 
Permanent Court of International Justice. In particular, the U. K. felt 
that "the criminal law is rooted too deeply in the history and customs 
of peoples to submit to unification except among certain nations". (70) 
Three modern attempts to come to a common agreement are the U. S. - 
U. K. Supplementary Extradition Treaty, the European Convention and the 
Dublin Agreement. These agreements have been selected from a multitude 
of possible documents on the same or similar subject matter in that a 
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degree of standardized procedure appears to have been reached regarding 
state obligations to either extradite or prosecute the suspected 
perpetrators of particular terrorist offenses. Furthermore, they have 
been selected as their lowest common denominator appears to be the 
deterrence of the civil armed unrest occurring in Northern Ireland, a 
situation which the U. K. prefers not to regard as one to which the 
Geneva treaty regime applies. 
This part will outline provisions of each document which are 
relevant to this discussion. In particular, arrangements as regards the 
extradition of offenders, and similarities and differences in approach 
to the phenomenon of international terrorism, will be discussed. 
5.2.2.1. The U. S. 
-U. K. Supplementary Extradition Treaty 
The U. S. 
-U. K. Supplementary Extradition Treaty of 1985 is a 
recent initiative by the U. S., and is intended to supplement and amend 
the Extradition Treaty between the U. S. and the U. K., signed at London 
on June 8,1972. As stated in the report of the Department of State, 
the supplement is intended to "exclude specified crimes of violence, 
typically committed by terrorists, from the scope of the political 
offense exception to extradition". (71) 
The supplement was prompted by recent U. S. Jurisprudence 
regarding alleged I. R. A. terrorists detained in the U. S., whose 
extradition was sought by the British Government. 
- 
In each case, the 
court of first instance denied extradition on the ground that the 
offenses charged constituted political offenses. (72) As a result, the 
U. S. Administration reacted strongly. In this regard, Murphy notes as 
I 
follows: 
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Having failed to convince the courts that the current law 
reserved the decision on the political offense exception 
to the Executive Branch, the (U. S. ) Government sought to 
accomplish such a reservation by including in newly concluded 
bilateral extradition treaties specific provisions reserving to 
the '(e)xecutive authority of the requested party' the power 
to determine whether an offense for which extradition is 
requested falls within the political offense exception. (73) 
There was substantial opposition in the U. S. to transferring this 
decision-making authority from the courts to the Secretary of State. 
(74) Nevertheless, the U. S. 
-U. K. Extradition Treaty was revised while 
it was pending before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations and the 
Senate gave its advice and consent to the revised form of the treaty. 
(75) 
5.2.2.2. Pertinent Provisions 
Article 1 of the 1985 Supplementary Extradition Treaty 
effectively limits the scope of the political offense exception 
previously found in Article 5(l)(c)(i) of the 1972 Treaty by listing the 
crimes which are no longer to be regarded as offenses of a political 
nature. Article 1 provides as follows: 
For the purposes of the Extradition Treaty, none of the 
following offenses shall be regarded as an offense of a 
political character: 
a. an offense within the scope of the Convention for 
the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft, 
opened for signature at the Hague on 16 December 
1970; 
b. an offense within the scope of the Convention for the 
Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of 
Civil Aviation, opened for signature at Montreal on 
23 September 1971; 
c. an offense within the scope of the Convention on the 
Prevention and Punishment of Crimes against Inter- 
nationally Protected Persons, including Diplomatic 
Agents, opened for signature at New York on 14 
December 1973; 
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d. an offense within the scope of the International 
Convention against the Taking of Hostages, 
opened for signature at New York on 18 December 
1979; 
e. murder; 
f. manslaughter; 
g. maliciously wounding or inflicting grievous 
bodily harm; 
h. kidnapping, abduction, false imprisonment or 
unlawful detention, including the taking of a 
host age; 
i. the following offenses relating to explosives: 
1. the causing of an explosion likely to endanger 
life or cause serious damage to property; or 
2. conspiracy to cause such an explosion; or 
3. the making or possession of an explosive 
substance by a person who intends either himself 
or through another person to endanger life or 
cause serious damage to property; 
J. the following offenses relating to firearms or 
ammunition: 
1. the possession of a firearm or ammunition by 
a person who intends either himself or through 
another person to endanger life; or 
2. the use of a firearm by a person with intent 
to resist or prevent the arrest or detention of 
himself or another person; 
k. damaging property with intent to endanger life or 
with reckless disregard as to whether the life of 
another would thereby be endangered; 
1. an attempt to commit any of the foregoing offenses. 
Article 4 provides that its provisions shall apply to any offense 
committed before or after the entry into force of the 1985 Supplement, 
unless an offense "was not an offense under the laws of both Contracting 
Parties at the time of its commission". 
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5.2.2.3. The European Convention 
The European Convention was signed under the auspices of the 
Council of Europe by seventeen Member States on 27 January 1977, and 
entered into force in 1978. Of particular interest to the present 
discussion, the Convention does not provide a definition of terrorism, 
but instead, provides that certain terrorist acts shall not be regarded 
as political offenses for the purposes of extradition. Nevertheless, 
and in common with Article 9 of the Hostages Convention, a requested 
state may refuse either to extradite or to afford mutual assistance if 
it believes that an accused is to be prosecuted with regard to his race, 
religion, nationality or political opinion. Otherwise, the political 
offense exception is excluded. 
5.2.2.4. Pertinent Provisions 
The European Convention follows a similar approach to the U. S. - 
U. K. Supplementary Extradition Treaty with regard to the modification of 
the political offense exception. Article 1 provides as follows: 
... 
(N)one of the following offences shall be regarded as 
a political offense or as an offence connected with a 
political offence or as an offence inspired by political 
motives: 
a. an offence within the scope of the Convention for the 
Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft, 
... 
; 
b. an offence within the scope of the Convention for the 
Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Civil 
Aviation, 
... 
; 
c. a serious offence involving an attack against the life, 
physical integrity or liberty of internationally 
protected persons, including diplomatic agents; 
d. an offence involving kidnapping, the taking of a hostage 
or serious unlawful detention; 
e, an offence involving the use of a bomb, grenade, rocket, 
automatic firearm or letter or parcel bomb if this use 
endangers persons; 
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f. an attempt to commit any of the foregoing offences or 
participation as an accomplice of a person who commits 
or attempts to commit such an offence. 
Article 2 provides that the offenses enumerated in Article 1 could be 
expanded upon for purposes of extradition. Article 3 modifies all 
extradition treaties and arrangements between Contracting States "to the 
extent that they are incompatible with this Convention". Article 4 
modifies any extradition convention or treaty existing between 
Contracting States to include "any offence mentioned in Article 1 or 2". 
Article 5, like Article 9 of the Hostages Convention, provides as 
follows: 
Nothing in this Convention shall be interpreted as imposing 
an obligation to extradite if the requested State has substan- 
tial grounds for believing that the request for extradition 
for an offence mentioned in Article 1 or 2 has been made for 
the purpose of prosecuting or punishing a person on account 
of his race, religion, nationality or political opinion, 
or that that person's position may be prejudiced for any of 
these reasons. 
Article 6 provides for the standardization of jurisdictional 
arrangements in each of the Contracting States in order to establish 
jurisdiction over an offense if a state does not extradite the suspected 
offender. (76) Article 7 makes obligatory the duty to extradite-or 
prosecute, "without exception whatsoever". Domestic procedure is to 
apply to prosecution, and "authorities shall take their decision in the 
same manner as in the case of any offence of a serious nature under the 
law of the State". Wide mutual assistance in criminal matters is 
provided for in Article 8, of which paragraph 2 narrows this obligation 
for the reasons given in Article S. (77) Article 8(3) modifies all 
treaties and arrangements concerning mutual assistance applicable 
between Contracting States wherever incompatible with this Convention. 
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Article 13 allows a Contracting State to declare, at the time of 
signature or "when depositing its instrument of ratification, acceptance 
or approval", 'that it reserves the right to refuse extradition for any 
Article 1 offense it considers a "political offence, an offence 
connected with a political offence or an offence inspired by political 
motives". Contracting States are urged, nevertheless, to take the 
seriousness of an offense into account when evaluating its nature for 
such purposes. (78) 
5.2.2.5. The Dublin Agreement 
The Dublin Agreement, signed by the Ministers of Justice of the 
nine EC Member States on 4 December 1979, attempts to make applicable 
the "extradite or prosecute" obligation to terrorist acts. It makes the 
European Convention applicable in extradition proceedings between Member 
states even if one or both states have not ratified the latter 
instrument, and reduces the effects of Article 13. States parties to 
the Dublin Agreement which are not party to the European Convention must 
declare their desire to retain the political offense exception in 
extradition proceedings. The Dublin Agreement is not yet in force. 
5.2.2.6. Pertinent Provisions 
The Preamble to the Dublin Agreement states that the concern of 
the Member States is "to strengthen judicial cooperation among these 
States in the fight against acts of violence; 
... 
". The scope of the 
Agreement is given in Article 1, which provides that it "shall apply in 
relations between two Member States of which one at least is not a party 
to the European Convention or is a party to that Convention, but with a 
reservation". This was intended to make the extradition arrangements 
contained in the European Convention applicable to France, which had 
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failed to ratify the latter instrument. (79) 
Article 2 provides that parties making a reservation to the 
European Convention are to be subject to the provisions of this 
Agreement. More specifically, Article 2(2) provides that "(i)n the 
relations between two Member States of which one at least is not a party 
to the European Convention, Articles 1 to 8 and 13 of that Convention 
shall apply subject to the provisions of this Agreement". 
Article 3 obliges states making a reservation under Article 13 of 
the European Convention to declare "whether, for the application of this 
Agreement, it intends to make use of this reservation", and to declare, 
if not a party, "whether, for the application of this Agreement, it 
intends to make the reservation permitted". Article 3(3) makes 
obligatory the prosecution of political offenses, "without exception 
whatsoever". 
Article 6(2) provides for the Agreement to come into force, as 
follows: 
The Agreement shall enter into force three months after 
the deposit of the instruments of ratification, 
acceptance or approval by all States which are members 
of the European Communities on the day on which this 
Agreement is opened for signature. 
5.2.2.7. Discussion 
For present purposes, it is clear that the principle, of extradite 
or prosecute governs these three arrangements. The U. S. 
-U. K. 
Supplementary Extradition Treaty and the European Convention each list 
specific offenses to be excluded from the political offense exception 
for purposes of extradition and the two lists are similar. In addition, 
the Dublin Agreement specifically provides in Article 8 as follows: 
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This Agreement shall cease to have effect on the date 
when all Member States become parties without reservation 
to the European Convention. 
Nevertheless, there are variations in approach to the extradition of 
political offenders, as is now discussed. 
5.2.2.7(1). The Scope for Political Offenses 
The main difference between the U. S. 
-U. K. Supplementary 
Extradition Treaty and the European Convention/Dublin Agreement would 
appear to be the scope afforded for discretion in determining what may 
or may not be a political offense. While Section 3a of the first of 
these prevents extradition if it can be shown the individual would 
suffer religious, political or racial discrimination upon return, the 
U. S. requires an accused to carry a heavy burden of proof for such 
purposes. Recognition is nevertheless given to potential jurisdictional 
problems which could arise should perpetrators of certain acts, having 
mixed elements of political and common crimes, assert a political 
defense. 
In what Murphy refers to as "political incidence theory", as 
developed in British and U. S. case law, certain offenses may occur in 
the course of a political disturbance, and are "incidental to and part 
of the political disturbance". (80) Such offenses might contain mixed 
elements of domestic and international crime. Thus, it would appear 
that states remain hesitant to waive completely the right to evaluate 
the political content, if any, of a particular offense. 
5.2.2.7(2). The Issue of Inquiry 
The principle of extradite or prosecute involves choosing a legal 
system for the prosecution of an offense. This choice comes into play 
particularly when an alleged offender asserts the political nature of 
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his offense. His fears regarding the fairness of trial, possible 
prejudice and miscarriages of justice are additional concerns. (81) 
Nevertheless, as was noted previously regarding the U. S. 
-U. K. 
Supplementary Extradition Treaty, recent jurisprudence in the U. S. 
prompted the additional exclusion of specifically terrorist acts from 
the political offense exception to extradition between those two 
countries. (82) 
A choice of forum for prosecution further involves a requested 
state assessing the motives for extradition of the requesting forum, and 
the basic fairness of its judicial processes. The automatic operation 
of such an assessment implies a rebuttable presumption that injustice 
will be the result of extradition. Such an evaluation "could be 
interpreted as an intervention in the internal affairs of the requesting 
state". (83) Conversely, and as noted by Sofaer, it is felt in many 
quarters that "(w)ith respect to violent crimes, the political offense 
exception has no place in extradition treaties between stable 
democracies". (84) 
States continue to retain levels of autointerpretation as to 
whether a political offense has been committed, for example through 
mechanisms such as Articles 1 to 
.8 
and 13 of the European Convention. 
On the other hand, the recent Supplement to the U. S. -U. K. Extradition 
Treaty was prompted in order to exclude most political considerations 
from extradition requests for the perpetrators of certain violent 
crimes, in particular, those with links to Northern Ireland. 
5.2.2.7(3). Stete Mutual Interest 
The world community has a legal interest in maintaining 
international peace and security. This, then, implies that states have 
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a mutual interest in the suppression of acts of international terrorism. 
Nevertheless, in that such acts frequently have a mixed "criminal" and 
"political" character, states retain a degree of discretion when 
deciding to extradite or prosecute particular alleged offenders. 
Should a situation be more complex, and an armed conflict 
purportedly exist in the territory of a requesting state, questions 
regarding the appropriate jurisdictional level to invoke can be the 
result. For example, disagreement exists as to the true political 
nature of situations like that existing in Northern Ireland. (85) In a 
manner similar to that discussed in the context of the Hostages 
Convention, should an actor from a domestic armed arena flee to a state 
which auto-identifies him as a soldier in an armed conflict to which the 
Geneva treaty regime applies, he could be afforded the legal defenses of 
a combatant. Conversely, he might be subject to criminal process, 
extradition, or asylum considerations. 
Mutuality of state interest in the suppression of international 
terrorism is necessary before assistance and co-operation arrangements 
can be made workable. The scope afforded to make inquiry into the 
viability of sister state legal criminal justice systems would appear to 
undercut this mutuality, particularly where political crimes are in 
issue. It would further seem that efforts to reconcile the-sovereignty 
considerations involved in mutual assistance in criminal matters fail to 
contemplate the possibility of state-motivated or 
-instigated terrorism. 
5.2.2.8. Conclusions 
The three arrangements previously discussed have come as close as 
is politically possible to providing reciprocal procedures and 
mechanisms with which to prosecute and punish acts of international 
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terrorism, In view of the twin elements of categorization 
- 
legal 
tradition and political considerations, a degree of ideological 
solidarity has resulted in a standardized approach to agreed offenses. 
Whether self-identification as a "stable democracy" or retention 
of the right of reservation to deny requests for extradition on the 
basis of the political context of a particular act of terrorism 
satisfactorily avoids the issue of state terrorism is a separate issue. 
In other words, the states involved in the above-outlined agreements 
have come to a high level of political accommodation with regard to the 
standardization of their respective penal codes, to the detriment of 
inquiry into many reasons which underly the perpetration of acts of 
terrorism. 
The accommodations reached between and among the indicated states 
disregard any approach to the enumerated acts other than the 
individualized criminalization contemplated by these arrangements. (86) 
The effort to standardize the relevant penal codes succeed, on a 
preliminary examination, in that the possibility of same or similar 
substantive outcomes exists regarding prosecution of the listed 
offenses. Nevertheless, these arrangements only "succeed" in that their 
underlying formulae omit the factor of potential state responsibility 
for the incidence of terrorism in concerned jurisdictions. 'In 
particular, the lowest common denominator, the situation in Northern 
Ireland, serves as an example of this point. The frequently violent 
quest in that area for system transformation and/or the right of self- 
determination is disregarded for purposes of IHL treatment, presumably 
on the basis that the U. K. is a stable democracy, already in possession 
of satisfactory legal and constitutional arrangements. As noted by 
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Murphy, "application of an automatic presumption of justice to 
situations like that existing in Northern Ireland 
... 
may itself be an 
injustice". (87) 
It would appear nevertheless that the continued individualization 
of criminality ascribed to the listed offenses in these arrangements 
makes the "prosecute or extradite" formula a manifestation of 
ideological solidarity on the part of some Western states. Armed 
conflicts regulated by humanitarian law are not contemplated as 
relevant, nor is any mention of the recognition of the rights of self- 
determination of "Peoples" made in the texts (88), which latter issue 
was the point of compromise between Western and non-aligned states in 
the Preamble to the Hostages Convention. Instead, the sole legal 
obligation required of states parties is to ensure the prosecution of 
the listed offenses. 
The agreements outlined are examples of the general language used 
in anti-terrorist codification efforts, It must nevertheless be 
concluded that states have yet to target themselves for potential 
sanction on the basis of responsibility for acts of terrorism, whether 
such acts are state-sponsored, state-supported, or state-conducted. 
This omission is particularly egregious when viewed in the light of the 
many state acts which may provoke civil acts of political violence. (89) 
The disregard of at least one-half of the equation required to solve the 
problem of political violence makes it highly possible that any so- 
called answers or solutions arrived at are in error in both approach and 
effect. 
The issue of state terrorism or aggression makes it clear that 
the IHL treaty regime is the only forum presently available to the world 
- 
213 
- 
community to deal comprehensively with the problem of organized acts of 
armed violence perpetrated by "Peoples" in self-determination struggles, 
should it truly wish to do so. This is particularly so when organized, 
group uses of force, to date characterized simply as random, individual 
and criminal for all purposes, are in issue. 
5.3. The Failure of State-Centered Codifications to Comprehensively 
Address the Extradite or Prosecute Obligation of States 
As previously discussed, the effectiveness of state-centered 
codifications to deter terrorism is questionable. Not only have many 
agreements failed to come into force but further, the solutions offered 
are offense-specific and piecemeal. For example, such agreements take a 
territorial approach and require a state party to extradite an alleged 
offender apprehended in its territory. By requiring alternatively that 
a state prosecute such an offender should extradition be refused, these 
agreements contain an inducement to extradite. 
This inducement to extradite is frequently counterbalanced by 
humanitarian considerations underlying the availability of political 
considerations for use by an accused. In particular, and as was noted 
in 1933 in the context of criminal jurisdiction, it is arguable that the 
confines of the political offense exception "... become broader in an 
era of exacerbated nationalism like the present 
... 
". (90) 
It is further argued that the non-separation of acts of terrorism 
committed during liberation struggles from regulation by the Geneva 
treaty regime dooms such state-centered codification efforts to ultimate 
failure. The difficulties encountered by similarly-minded states 
participating in anti-terrorist conventions are evidence that the 
piecemeal solutions on offer do not deal appropriately with the problem 
- 
214 
- 
of political violence. To address the "extradite or prosecute" 
obligation of states, whether with or without regard to reprehensible 
acts perpetrated in times of armed conflict, all levels of 
responsibility for the perpetration of such acts must be analysed. It 
is concluded that only the IHL treaty regime provides for such an 
exhaustive analysis. 
Recent efforts by the I. L. A. Committee on International Terrorism 
to propose a comprehensive approach to combatting terrorism by reference 
to the laws of armed conflict will be reviewed first in this Part. The 
prohibition of terrorist acts in international humanitarian law will 
then be discussed. It is concluded that only the IHL treaty regime is 
available to states for purposes of responsibility for terrorism at all 
levels. In that states in the post-1945 era remain unwilling to invoke 
IHL and target themselves for assessments of responsibility, it is 
further concluded that state-centered codification efforts to deal with 
the phenomenon of international terrorism through the extradite or 
prosecute formula can never be truly effective. 
5.3.1. The I. L. A. Committee on International Terrorism 
By way of preliminary discussion, the I. L. A. Committee on 
International Terrorism worked for a number of years to propose a 
comprehensive approach to combatting international terrorism. For 
present purposes, the Fourth Interim Report of the Committee, issued in 
1982, is of interest. (91) This Report suggested that "settled norms of 
the law of armed conflict be adopted as limits on a government's 
discretion to exclude political offenders from the extradition process". 
(92) As the customary character of the laws of armed conflict means 
that such laws are already applicable to all states, its norms should be 
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adopted for use in situations of political violence. (93) In 
particular, such laws require without exception that soldiers or 
combatants be extradited or prosecuted for atrocities committed in the 
course of armed conflicts. 
5.3.1.1. Use of the IHL Treat Regime 
It was the Committee's view that, should a terrorist offense not 
come clearly within the rules of IHL, this treaty regime ought at least 
to be used by states by way of analogy to what otherwise might be 
characterized as private, or random, acts of international terrorism. 
(94) The settled norms of the laws of armed conflict forbid the 
perpetration of reprehensible acts, irregardless of the identity of the 
perpetrator, and thus there is no political defense to prosecution. 
Under this approach, the characterization of acts of terrorism is 
left to the concerned states, as it is under issue-specific 
codifications. State sovereign authoritative interpretation is not 
infringed. The legal obligation to extradite or prosecute, then, is 
sufficiently extensive to cover all such acts, thereby reducing the 
possibility that persons not granted combatant privileges by 
participating states receive a greater leeway to use violence than that 
accorded to combatants. In other words, asylum in the territory of a 
state sympathetic with the political motives of the terrorist would be 
foreclosed. 
Unfortunately, Committee debate regarding the use of the laws of 
armed conflict, if only by analogy, to deal with international 
terrorism, foundered in disagreement regarding struggles for self- 
determination and the question whether its final conclusions should deal 
with the issues of state-directed and 
-supported terrorism. (95) 
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5.3.1.2. Draft Articles on Extradition 
The Committee's work was completed in 1984 with the adoption of 
its Report at the 61st (Paris) Conference of the International Law 
Association. The Committee was then reconstituted to report on legal 
problems of extradition in relation to terrorist offences. In 1988, the 
new Committee issued Draft Articles on Extradition in Relation to 
Terrorist Offences. The Report of the Committee was adopted at the 
working session on 27 August 1988 by a majority of its members, and 
includes a draft treaty, an explanatory commentary on that treaty, 
comments, and texts of partial dissents. 
The Draft Articles, while often employing language common to the 
European Convention, contains in the Preamble a reference to "state 
terrorism", which is phrased as follows: 
The States Parties to this Convention, 
... 
Recalling that acts of terrorism perpetrated by governments 
of States are already prohibited by a number of interna- 
tional conventions such as the Genocide Convention; 
... 
The Committee noted that many members felt such a direct reference to be 
out of place. Further, some members of the Committee feared that the 
sole reference to the Genocide Convention was "confusing, and might 
imply that other conventions did not forbid 'State terrorism"'. (96) 
Nevertheless, the Committee chose not to attempt an inclusive list but 
left the existing reference as being beyond dispute. 
Otherwise, for purposes of the present discussion, it is of 
interest that the Draft Articles provide that none of the terrorist 
offences described in Article 3 are to be regarded as a political 
offense. (97) One comment submitted for formal inclusion in the Report 
to the American Branch of the Committee's accomplishments noted, in 
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pertinent part, as follows: 
The most significant contribution to the substance of the 
law was probably the realization in the Committee that it 
was not necessary to define 'political offense' in a treaty 
providing that the 'political offense' exception to extra- 
dition arrangements is not applicable. Whatever any party 
to any treaty interprets it to mean becomes irrelevant if 
it is not applicable to the extradition obligation. (98) 
Article 4(B) provides that "(t)he official position of a person accused 
or convicted of any of the offences described in Article 3, or the fact 
that the person acted under superior orders, shall be no bar to 
extradition". 
Nevertheless, Article 5 of the Draft Articles allows a state to 
refuse extradition. Article 5 provides in pertinent part as follows: 
A. Extradition may be refused when: 
1. The requested State is not satisfied that the 
requesting State is able and willing to apply, or, 
in the case of a convicted person, has applied, before, 
during and after the trial the fair trial standards 
required by applicable rules of international law, and 
to refrain from subjecting the accused or convicted 
person to torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading 
treatment or punishment. 
2. The requested State has reasonable and substantial 
grounds to believe that the requested person, if 
extradited, would be persecuted on account of his race, 
religion, nationality, membership of a particular social 
group or political opinion. 
In other words, Article 5 continues to reserve to states the right to 
refuse extradition of an accused for political reasons, e. g.. 
, 
should 
there be any doubts regarding fair trial standards, and/or should the 
requested state feel that overriding humanitarian concerns and 
considerations of justice discourage the grant of extradition. 
5.3.1.3. Discussion 
The Committee notes that in general it is expected that states 
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most directly injured by an offense will prosecute regardless of any 
international obligation. Further, extradition to a state most directly 
affected by an offense is the rule, and prosecution by a less affected 
state, the exception. (99) 
Nevertheless, extradition treaties and arrangements frequently 
provide for a humanitarian or political offense exception. Even when 
this is not the case, political considerations regarding the content of 
an offense afford the potential to conduct a "friendly prosecution" as a 
substitute for refusing extradition. In this way, it remains clear that 
the lack of clear guidelines for state-centered efforts to deal with the 
problem of political violence perpetrated in times of "peace", and not 
"war", fail to deal with issues of responsibility, and politico- 
ideological sympathies. (100) 
There is neither a duty to extradite nor a duty not to extradite 
imposed absolutely upon states. Thus, extradition is a matter of 
imperfect obligation. (101) Further, international law may come into 
conflict with municipal law should a request for the extradition of a 
national be made under a treaty, but which request cannot be complied 
with according to the municipal law, in which circumstances the 
requested state may risk a breach of its international obligations. The 
rule of double criminality creates an additional difficulty. In that no 
person is to be extradited whose act is not a crime in the penal system 
of both the requested and requesting state, problems' involving double 
criminality are presumably removed by the obligation to incorporate 
Article 3 offenses into municipal law. Nevertheless, the problems 
inherent in competing interpretations of international obligations for 
purposes of domestic enactment may mean that the potential for a 
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"friendly prosecution" survives. (102) 
The fact that the I. L. A. Committee on International Terrorism 
attempted to discuss the issue of state terrorism, only to be 
reconstituted into a state-centered committee dealing with the 
extradition of perpetrators of particular acts of a terrorist nature 
represents another side-step of the basic issues. The original remit of 
the Committee on Terrorism was to attempt to use established norms of 
the laws of armed conflict, if only by way of analogy, for purposes of a 
legal framework within which to punish, in particular, terrorist acts 
perpetrated in arenas of low-intensity armed conflict. The final 
outcome was yet another attempt to characterize terrorist acts 
possessing a transnational character as individual acts of criminal 
violence, to be dealt with by states, through ordinary laws relating to 
extradition. 
Dissent was expressed by Committee members throughout the I. L. A. 
initiative, which dissent fully established that the issues of terrorism 
and extradition remain "problematical for reasons relating more to 
political judgments than lack of clarity in the legal order 
... 
". (103) 
As such, it was acknowledged that times of "peace" as opposed to "war", 
and state characterizations of domestic acts of armed insurgency, remain 
problematical in the post-1945 era. This situation, of course, is made 
worse by the issue of the self-determination of "Peoples", which issue 
has never been dealt with satisfactorily by a state-centered world 
community for purposes of prospective guidance. 
For these reasons, it is clear that the efforts of the I. L. A. 
Committee on International Terrorism to apply the laws of armed 
conflict, if only by way of analogy, to organized acts of political 
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violence rising to the level of terrorism was well-conceived. The set 
of established IHL norms already available and recognized as custom in 
the international community deal with responsibility for the use of 
force at all levels, and thus provide a framework which is adequate to 
deal with both state and group violence. It is thus to be regretted 
that the Committee's efforts in this regard proved divisive. 
5.3.2. The Prohibition of Terrorist Acts in International 
Humanitarian Law 
As previously discussed, should extradition to an affected state 
be refused, the continuing obligation to prosecute a terrorist offender 
is substantially undercut by the possibility of political intervention 
to prevent conviction at trial, or to mitigate the sentencing stage. 
The possibility of a "friendly prosecution", or the absence of double 
criminality for purposes of conducting a prosecution, has particular 
importance in the present discussion. In other words, where acts of 
terror-violence are perpetrated by a "People" in pursuit of its rights 
to self-determination, a violent political actor could escape punishment 
altogether. 
It is clear that the inclusion of Article 1(4) in Protocol 1 is 
evidence that self-determination forms an established rule of 
international custom. (104) It is further clear that the use of armed 
force by liberation movements is recognized in Protocol 1 for purposes 
of regulation by international law. (105) Nevertheless, state-centric 
codification efforts to punish terrorist violence frequently ignore the 
issue of self-determination in order to disregard the motives which 
often propel the perpetration of terror-violence. In other words, it 
would appear that etatas employ issue-epecific codification efforts to 
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undercut the content of classification struggles. This is also evident 
among so-called stable democracies. (106) 
States in the post-1945 era are highly reluctant to recognize 
levels of domestic armed conflict as having crossed thresholds of 
intensity sufficient to be regulated under IHL. (107) It is therefore 
argued that, within the confines of a domestic classification struggle 
which has "mixed" elements of war and peace, states which do not make 
applicable the Geneva treaty regime shift responsibility onto themselves 
for the continued perpetration of violent terrorist tactics. Acts of 
state-instigated and -provoked terrorism frequently open the door to the 
use of the armed forces to control political processes. The well- 
publicized use of various secret services to both train and assist in 
de-stabilization campaigns makes further mockery of state rhetoric 
regarding the "war against terrorism", particularly in that such state 
assistance may constitute aggression and interference in the internal 
affairs of other states. 
These issues are both legal and political, in that any use of a 
state's armed forces must be analysed to assess what state interests are 
implicated, the most important of which should be the maintainance of 
international peace and security. The issue of state responsibility, in 
efforts to achieve justice through violence, would appear to be 
preliminary to any discussion of extradition, mutual assistance in 
criminal matters, humanitarianism, and/or the laws of armed conflicts. 
Interpretational confusion between times of "peace" and "war" 
makes the blanket characterization of terrorist activity as a form of 
domestic criminal behavior a nonsense. Further, in that the issue of 
state responsibility for the proliferation of international terrorism is 
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not sanctionable under bi-lateral, multi-lateral or regional agreements, 
such inter-state arrangements may be seen to ignore this problem. 
The law of armed conflicts provides guidance for a legal 
approach. For these reasons, and for purposes of the present 
discussion, the prohibitions of terrorist acts in international 
humanitarian law are now reviewed. 
5.3.2.1. The Law of, Armed Conflicts and the Special 
Status of Wars of National Liberation 
The legal status of wars of national liberation is, for those 
states which have ratified Protocol 1, that of international armed 
conflicts. As has been already been discussed at length, states are 
hesitant to recognize as legitimate uses of force no more than a small 
number of on-going national liberation wars. (108) In other words, 
although there are numerous auto-defined "Peoples" presently struggling 
in classification disputes to achieve rights of self-determination, 
authoritative interpretations as to their true nature remain state- 
centric. Codification efforts to criminalize terrorism and to 
standardize extradition arrangements, through the elimination of the 
political offense exception for political violence, in effect disregard 
the use of "direct action" by liberation fighters faced with stalled 
legal and constitutional arrangements. 
What is relevant for present purposes are the legal consequences 
of such conflicts when the issue of terror violence is discussed. In 
other words, should a "People" be involved in an armed classification 
struggle to achieve system transformation, the IHL treaty regime becomes 
relevant. Should such a conflict qualify as an "approved cause" (109), 
the set of prohibitions of terrorist acts found in IHL is directly 
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applicable. 
Anyone entitled to engage in combat must abide by the laws of 
armed conflict, including the ban on terrorism. (110) Any recourse to 
terrorist methods of warfare is absolutely prohibited. While in 
practice it is not always easy to make a clear distinction between 
terrorist violence and legitimate acts of war, all combatants are faced 
with the same consequences should they violate the rules of armed 
conflict. Therefore, "guerilla fighters committing a terrorist act 
against civilians also have to face criminal proceedings". (111) 
Acts of terrorism committed during recognized hostilities are 
grave breaches, or war crimes, and suspected war criminals must be 
prosecuted. What is more important, jurisdiction over war crimes is 
universal, and the extradite or prosecute formula is absolute. A 
suspected war criminal may be brought to trial by a party to the 
conflict or by any state party to the IHL treaty regime. 
In that the laws of international armed conflict have been 
designed to apply between states, and in that the laws have a well- 
developed set of prohibitions of acts of terrorism, the special status 
of wars of national liberation makes it clear that, with the adoption of 
Article 1(4) of Protocol 1, the legal instruments for the fight against 
terrorism have become stronger. It is only to be regretted-that the 
conclusions in this regard of the I. L. A. Committee on International 
Terrorism, previously discussed, failed to achieve unanimous support. 
5.3.2.2. The Law of Armed Conflicts as Guidance to a 
Legal ApRroach to Terrorism is Peacetime 
The law of armed conflicts is a well-developed area of 
international law. As such, should it not be made directly applicable 
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to an armed insurgency in which methods of terror-violence are employed, 
it can provide guidance for a legal and political approach to terrorism. 
IHL is an area of law which specifically deals with the protection of 
the individual in all circumstances, sufficient for it to be useful in 
"mixed" periods of peace and war, or in situations characterized by 
target states as "peacetime". 
The true value of the use of IHL as guidance to a legal approach 
to terrorism is threefold. First, IHL provides mechanisms to assess and 
sanction state participation in war crimes. Second, IHL contains 
prohibitions with regard to illegal means and methods of warfare. 
Third, IHL contains rules for the protection of civilians against 
arbitrary acts of violence. While these three points have been dealt 
with elsewhere at length, it is important to recall for present purposes 
that the subjective element characteristic of acts of terror-violence is 
to spread fear. The value of IHL as guidance to a legal approach to 
terrorism is the prohibition of means and methods of warfare which are 
intended to spread terror. 
While terror is a weapon (112), common methods of which involve 
psychological means, IHL prohibits unlimited methods and means of 
warfare, and the infliction of superfluous injury or unnecessary 
suffering. Thus, there are levels of violence beyond which. an 
individual may not legally go, regardless of his status. 
Furthermore, modern armed classification struggles make the 
distinction between civilians and combatants increasingly difficult, 
particularly in situations where political processes are controlled 
through use of the armed forces. The IHL treaty regime is useful as 
guidance in such situations, in that no latitude is afforded to states 
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to perpetrate terrorist acts against a populace involved in a struggle 
for self-determination. 
While it is true that methods of warfare may be permissible which 
in peacetime would amount to terrorist acts, legal guidance is provided 
by humanitarian law to states in that terrorist acts are subject to 
criminal prosecution by competent state authorities in accordance with 
customary principles of international law. Furthermore, the Geneva 
Conventions, and the 1977 Additional Protocols bind states to refrain 
from resorting to terrorism. This puts a direct obligation on the 
persons who act on behalf of the State, including members of the armed 
forces, and/or of the police. (113) 
For these reasons, it is clear that state-centered codification 
efforts to deal with the phenomenon of international terrorism will 
continue to encounter difficulties in implementation. Until state 
obligation is both recognized, and made operational through a 
sanctioning process, too much is omitted from any cause-and-effect 
equation. It is further clear that IHL offers well-established 
procedures and mechanisms for use by states as guidance in their efforts 
to prohibit acts of terrorism, and in particular, acts of terrorism 
perpetrated during classification struggles by "Peoples" to achieve 
system transformation and/or their rights of self-determination. 
5.4. Conclusions 
Given the breadth of Charter provisions regarding the right of 
"Peoples" to attain independence from state institutionalization, and 
given the separate and distinct status of such "Peoples" discussed 
earlier (114), it is clear that all acts perpetrated in liberation wars 
should be regulated by international law. While isolated acts of 
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international terrorism or political violence are rarely viewed as 
sufficiently intensive in scope to cross thresholds of armed conflict 
regulated by the laws of armed conflict,, state efforts to criminalize 
political violence in multi- and bi-lateral arrangements, and to isolate 
such acts within structural confines of individual responsibility 
disregard the political contexts through which such forms of violence 
must be assessed. 
It is clear that terrorism cannot be defined, ultimately, as a 
distinct form of criminal activity. The world community has yet to come 
to agreement with regard to a definition of the phenomenon sufficient to 
satisfactorily implement the "extradite or prosecute" formula. State- 
centric codifications involving both political and legal labeling 
processes result in elements of imperfect obligation. Such state- 
centric efforts rarely, if ever, contemplate the possibility of state- 
instigated, 
-supported, or -conducted terrorism, or the possibility of a 
struggle for self-determination occurring within a stable democracy. 
It is concluded that the only forum available to deal with the 
problem of acts of political violence perpetrated in struggles for self- 
determination is that offered by IHL. Whether this treaty regime is 
made directly applicable to situations of international armed conflict, 
as provided for in Article 1(4) of Protocol 1, or is used as guidance in 
a state-centric legal approach to terrorism, it is clear that the 
procedures and mechanisms in IHL have already been accepted by a 
majority of the world community, and as such, constitute binding legal 
obligations which require only a good faith implementation by states. 
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We have decided to apply these measures within the 
framework of international law and in our own jurisdictions 
in respect of any state which is clearly involved in 
sponsoring or supporting international terrorism and in 
particular of Libya, until such time as the state concerned 
abandons its complicity in, or support for, such terrorism. 
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6. Protocol y Methods of Terror-Violence, and the Scope of the 
Potential Applicability of IHL 
International law presently recognizes several types of armed 
conflict, to which different principles and instruments of IHL apply. 
These are as follows: 
International armed conflicts between states 
to which the Hague Conventions, the four Geneva 
Conventions of 1949, and other legal principles of 
general international law apply; 
2. International armed conflicts between states which 
have ratified Geneva Protocol 1 additional to the 
1949 Geneva Conventions, and to which the Hague 
Conventions, the four Geneva Conventions of 1949, 
and other legal principles of general international 
law also apply; 
3. Wars of liberation or self-determination, as 
defined by and made subject to Geneva Protocol 1, 
which are recognized as such by the parties to 
the armed conflict, and by interested third states 
through ratification of Geneva Protocol 1. The Hague 
Conventions, the four Geneva Conventions of 1949, and 
other legal principles of general international law also 
apply to such conflicts; 
4. Non-international armed conflicts which are subject 
to concerned state self-regulation in compliance with 
Common Article 3 of the 1949 Conventions, and some 
customary norms; and 
5. Non-international armed conflicts which are 
narrowly defined and regulated by Geneva Protocol 2, 
and which are recognized as such through concerned 
state self-regulation subsequent to ratification-of 
Geneva Protocol 2. (1) 
It is generally asserted that the essence of an act of 
international terrorism is its occurrence during peacetime. Thus, a 
basic problem in applying IHL to methods of terror-violence is the 
delineation between states of "war" and "peace". (2) In other words, 
acts of international terrorism are rarely considered to be acts of 
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warfare, as committed by a recognized belligerant. This basic problem 
of legal qualification is particularly evident when terrorist acts are 
perpetrated by auto-determined liberation movements as part of an 
overall political strategy. (3) Where such a group employs armed force 
to achieve its goals in the face of government opposition, the sovereign 
function of state authoritative interpretation allows states to 
interpret such uses of force restrictively, prosecuting such actions 
within the confines of domestic criminal jurisdiction and state penal 
law. (4) 
It is argued in this Chapter that where force is used by a 
"People" to achieve goals of self-determination, humanitarian law should 
be made applicable, automatically. (5) As such, the use in war of 
methods of terror-violence as one tactical option should be prosecuted 
under humanitarian law, as a separable and "different" phenomenon from 
ordinary international terrorism. (6) Conversely, should politically 
motivated acts of terrorism be approached as peacetime behavior 
equivalent to atrocities under the law of war, an analysis of the 
context and motivations underlying the separable acts is required in 
order properly to place the relevant issues within the appropriate 
juridical frameworks, and to simplify the legal contradictions inherent 
in situations where political activity is under domestic military 
control. (7) 
By way of preliminary discussion, the inclusion of wars-of self- 
determination in the Geneva treaty regime, in Protocol 1 Article 1(4), 
reflects the reality of modern armed conflict. (8) A "People" is often 
a transboundary concept (9), as ethnical and/or cultural groupings can 
be found sharing state borders, e. g. the Palestinians. Also, the 
- 
244 
- 
existence of "salt water" colonialism denotes a territory which is 
separate geographically, and distinct ethnically and/or culturally from 
the country administering it, e. g. 
. 
Algeria. Thus, armed conflicts for 
rights of self-determination by particular groups are often 
"international" from the start. (10) 
However, wars of self-determination are rarely recognized as such 
by a threatened state. (11) The class of groups which fall squarely 
within Protocol 1 Article 1(4) appears at first sight to be rather 
restricted. Not every auto-determined group which calls itself a 
liberation movement will be considered "entitled" to that status for 
purposes of international recognition of the applicability of Protocol 
1. Thus, the scope of potential applicability of Protocol 1 to a wider 
range of "Peoples" than those living under colonial domination, alien 
occupation or a racist regime is highly controversial. For example, 
many states consider that the legitimacy of the right to wage a war of 
national liberation does not extend to struggles in post-colonial, or 
independent states. Nevertheless, the rhetoric of self-determination is 
used in many non-colonial situations of armed violence, e. g. 
.. 
the 
"Peoples" of the former U. S. S. R., and a degree of foreign aid and 
assistance afforded to independence movements may strengthen the claims 
of a particular group. Thus, it is argued that Protocol-1 is 
potentially applicable to a very wide range of "civil war" situations. 
Should this not be the case, it must be noted that international' 
law does not forbid civil war (12), and when a situation of domestic 
armed conflict occurs, the lack of international regulation other than 
that contained in Common Article 3 or Protocol 2 is not calculated to 
strengthen the primacy of law. (13) A government may rely on the police 
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and locally-recruited paramilitary forces to quell a domestic uprising, 
or may call for outside assistance from third states. Such use of the 
military signals to the public and to the world community that acts of 
political violence are to be characterized as criminal in nature, and 
without legitimacy. (14) Thus, recognition of the applicability of IHL 
in full, in Protocol 1, to some struggles for self-determination was a 
political victory for third world states (15), and armed conflicts waged 
by "Peoples" in support of their right to self-determination remain a 
politically sensitive area of international relations. (16) States 
remain unwilling to implement IHL during such conflicts for fear of 
politically recognizing a liberation group by virtue of humanitarian 
treatment. (17) U. N. practice to date in encouraging the expansion and 
development of the undefined rights of self-determination (18), and in 
supporting the use of force by liberation movements to achieve these 
rights (19), is not reflective of state practice which remains ambiguous 
regarding both the claimed rights entitlements and the legitimacy of the 
use of force to achieve system transformation. (20) 
The deployment by threatened governments of, military and/or 
police forces in areas experiencing a pattern of violent acts 
perpetrated by a liberation movement illustrates the capacity for 
violence as a means and tool of persuasion by all parties to an 
ideological or political dispute. The use of government agents for such 
purposes departs from the traditional role of the armed forces - to meet 
an external threat. (21) The analogy to confronting an external threat 
is nevertheless reinforced through third state aid and assistance to 
rebel groups, often a key element of destabilization campaigns, and a 
major factor in the ultimate success of a struggling group. (22) The 
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delineation between "war" and "peace", for purposes of the legal 
qualification to be attributed to terrorist acts perpetrated during a 
struggle for self-determination, is therefore false. (23) Given the 
capacity for violence during the U. N., era for effecting social and 
political change, it could be said that there has never been any real 
peace; there has only been war and waiting for war. (24) Further, given 
the shift to majority vote, the U. N. system is dependent upon consensual 
reciprocity, which limits the prescriptive range of international law 
when faced with sovereign power (25). 
Whether or not the IHL treaty regime is actively implemented or 
merely made applicable as a code of conduct remains largely a function 
of state authoritative interpretation regarding the nature and scope of 
a particular armed conflict. (26) So long as state legal frameworks 
remain operative, the effective use of sovereign power within particular 
issue areas is scarcely restrained. (27) Thus, states prefer to legally 
characterize terrorist acts as criminal and to ignore the applicability 
of the IHL regime to situations of domestic violence. A further 
objection to such applicability is more jurisprudential, in that 
"(u)ndue conceptual and legal confusion is likely to result if terrorist 
acts are construed as in any way related to, or to be measured against, 
the law of armed conflict". (28) 
It is nevertheless argued in this Chapter that where terrorism is 
utilized in the context of a struggle by a "People" for its right to 
self-determination, as limited by Protocol 1 Article 1(4) (29), the 
implementation and/or application of IHL gives rise to no conceptual or 
legal confusion. Instead, responsibility for armed aggression may more 
easily be apportioned, and grave breaches prosecuted, than if dealt with 
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across domestic political or legal fictions. Existing enforcement 
mechanisms contained in the different branches of IHL are sufficiently 
integrated by means of Protocol 1 to result in the same or similar 
substantive outcomes as those desired within purely domestic contexts. 
(30) "Peoples" is in reality a wide term, and the scope of the 
potential applicability of IHL to liberation wars is as wide. The ready 
applicability of IHL to a wide range of liberation wars would be 
calculated to strengthen the rule of law in such conflicts, and to 
encourage levels of humanitarian restraint. 
This argument is structured as follows. Methods of terror- 
violence are frequently perpetrated by a liberation movement as part of 
its political and ideological strategy 
. 
Thus, the scope of the 
applicability of the IHL regime to such methods is discussed in Part 
One. In that there are conditions precedent to the applicability of the 
law of war, the use of terror-violence to provoke these conditions is 
discussed in Part Two. It is suggested in the Third Part that where IHL 
is made applicable to a situation of domestic armed conflict, acts of 
terrorism may be approached as impermissible, non-proportional, and 
indiscriminate means or method of warfare. This latter point is 
developed in the Fourth Part, and it is argued that methods of terror- 
violence utilized in a struggle for self-determination to which the IHL 
regime applies constitute "grave breaches" or war crimes, and are 
prosecutable as such. 
Where "crimes" of political violence are perpetrated under the 
aegis of struggles for self-determination, the application of IHL to 
them may be viewed as appropriate on two levels. First, the resulting 
issue structure allows for no political offense exception for acts of 
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political violence. (31) Second, the separability of acts of terror- 
violence as grave breaches and/or war crimes preserves within existing 
parameters of international law both the overall political strategy of 
struggling "Peoples" claiming the right to use armed force to achieve 
system transformation, and potential frameworks of continuing 
negotiation and inquiry into the relevant goal values or contexts of 
terrorist acts. (32) It is concluded that the problems of domestic 
legal certainty cannot negate state obligations under international law. 
Thus, proof of governmental good faith in ratification of the IHL treaty 
instruments depends upon a consistent broadening of the categories of 
"Peoples" entitled to struggle for the right to self-determination, and 
a consistent broadening of the applicability of IHL provisions through 
recognition of the benefits of humanitarian law in situations of 
domestic armed conflict. (33) If such proof is forthcoming, IHL may 
more easily be seen to be applicable if only as a frame of reference to 
prosecute acts of terror-violence perpetrated during struggles for self- 
determination. (34) 
6.1. Terrorist Violence as a Political and Ideological Strategy 
The use of terror-violence to promote a particular political or 
ideological strategy is perceived by many groups as either a means of 
last resort (35), or as the most efficient method in terms of time and 
available resources to create the necessary conditions for effective 
political interaction with an incumbent government or dominant political 
group. (36) In particular, liberation movements attempt to locate their 
actions within some strategic framework. (37) Where acts of terrorism 
occur in the context of struggles for self-determination, they can be 
distinguished from criminal acts for mere personal gain through 
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perspectives of political motive or goals, utilized as one tactic in an 
overall strategy. (38) Where system transformation is sought through 
methods of violence designed to result in political discourse, any 
resulting frameworks which display legal relationships further reflect 
the presence of competing claims to interpret domestic legal discourse 
regarding national classifications, assertions of jurisdiction, and 
sovereign exercises of power. (39) 
This Part discusses the use of violence in struggles for self- 
determination to achieve political and ideological interaction, which 
use of force may effectively remove a conflict from the confines of 
domestic jurisdiction. (40) Given that state entities are juridically 
stronger in the international community than "national" ones (41), 
normative choice is frequently masked by the ready use of force by 
states to quell domestic unrest. Thus, military or police control of 
political activity may transform missions to restore public order into 
low-intensity warfare more congenial to army doctrine than to civil 
control. (42) As such, state rejection of the applicability of IHL 
limitations risks the reversal in direction of humanitarian law, and 
places in question the primacy of law in situations of domestic armed 
conflict. 
6.1.1. The Use of Violence to Achieve Political Interaction. 
The use of violence by a group struggling for its right to self- 
determination may effectively remove any resulting political dialogue 
from the domestic sphere. When used to achieve a political impact, as a 
competing interpretation of domestic political interactions, such a use 
of force may invoke the law of war and thus result in international 
ramifications. In other words, where autonomous state competence to 
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interpret authoritatively the nature of organized domestic violence is 
in question, the legal expression of the continuing fact of sovereignty 
is placed in doubt. (43) 
Effective power sharing achieved through the use of force or 
violence in struggles for self-determination reinforces the rationale 
for the original use of force. If force is used successfully to create 
political interactions, and the structures of the issues involved in the 
conflict are thereby conditioned, a degree of power sharing has been 
achieved (44) and the existence of competing legal relationships is 
communicated. Such a result anticipates system change or 
transformation. (45) Assuming this result, the use of methods of 
violence by groups struggling for rights of self-determination makes the 
violent acts a highly relevant, if dangerous, issue for interpretation. 
The process of political change involved in struggles for self- 
determination frequently places the legal expression of the continuing 
fact of sovereignty in doubt. (46) Un-defined issues such as self- 
determination, the nature of the rights contained in the claimed 
entitlements to it, the "Peoples" entitled to struggle to attain it, and 
the legitimacy of their use of force against threatened governments must 
`thus be interpreted accurately in order to condition the legal 
structures surrounding subsequent attempts at power sharing.. (47) 
The use of force to achieve effective power sharing forms part of 
the overall political strategy of a struggling group employing terror 
methods in an armed conflict. The issue structure contained in the IHL 
regime, through recognition of the fact of the organized use of force 
(48), provides an ideal framework in which to separate legal from 
illegal function in the use of violence. (49) In particular, the use of 
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force in liberation struggles regulated by IHL must only be exercised 
within humanitarian guidelines of restraint, as affected by military 
necessity and proportionality. If this does not occur, IHL provisions 
allow for the prosecution of particular offenses, and IHL procedures for 
such prosecutions result in the same or similar substantive outcome as 
might occur in other legal regimes, e. g.. 
, 
under domestic penal codes. 
(50) It would thus appear that the use of terror-violence in a struggle 
for self-determination, standing alone, neither de-legitimizes the 
underlying process of political change involved in such struggles, nor 
prevents the penal separability of "grave breaches", where individual 
responsibility is assessed without the benefit of a humanitarian or 
political offense exception. (51) 
In this vein, Paust notes as follows: 
(A) claim that an otherwise permissible process 
of political change should not itself (as a 
whole) be banned because of its terror impact 
is far different from a claim that any means 
utilized during such a process should be 
legitimate when they are analyzed as different 
strategies. It seems quite likely that most 
states that mention self-determination or 
national liberation movements wish to claim 
only that the overall process should not be 
impermissible because of some terror impact. 
... 
(T)he mere accumulation of terror-producing 
strategies that are separately impermissible 
into a movement should not result in a conclu- 
sion of permissibility. 
... 
(S)elf-determina- 
tion processes 
... 
should not be impermissible 
per se because of some terror impact. (52) 
Another motive underlying the use of violence to achieve 
political interaction is to shift the international allocation of 
competences between the U. N. structure and individual states for 
purposes of power sharing with non-state entities. (53) Assuming such a 
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result, the use of violence can transform the legal expression of 
domestic jurisdiction 
-a facit of sovereignty - into a political matter 
of international "concern". (54) Such "concern" is expressed in terms 
of the maintainance of international peace and security, for example, 
and any perceptual distortion and manipulation occurring through state 
attempts to over-extend authoritative interpretations may be curtailed, 
(55) 
Political violence utilized to promote political interaction and 
power sharing means that acts of politically-motivated terrorism 
perpetrated by liberation groups are locatable in contexts which are in 
competition with those legal contexts preferred by threatened states. 
(56) Where violence crosses state boundaries, the perpetration of 
terrorist acts by liberation movements can transform the legal 
expression of domestic jurisdiction into a matter of international 
concern. Where IHL is utilized to both condition and interpret the 
nature and content of such acts, an additional basis of jurisdiction is 
provided in order to prosecute them, one in which High Contracting 
Parties may "search for persons alleged to have committed, or to have 
ordered to be committed, 
... 
grave breaches". (57) 'As such, it is clear 
that the issue structure provided by IHL not only permits the 
construction of the desired political dialogue but further, 
-provides an 
ideal framework in which to separate illegal from legal function in 
particular uses of violent force. 
6.1.2. Terrorist Verbal Strategy to Indicate a Legal Relationship 
The use of terror-violence to create frameworks for political 
interaction with a threatened government is intended also to create the 
appearance of a legal relationship. Should any legal relationship 
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beyond the confines of penal law appear, it is taken as evidence of a 
degree of power sharing between competing entities. (58) Should a 
threatened government chose instead to punish freedom fighters as 
"terrorists", little evidence of political interaction, legal 
relationship, or power sharing is apparent. Thus, groups struggling for 
self-determination frequently employ acts of terrorism sparingly, in 
order not to provoke any overwhelming counter-response. In this way, 
terrorism as one tactic in an overall political strategy aims 
preliminarily at the creation of dialogue. Verbal strategies to explain 
the purpose and function of organized acts of terrorism are thus 
employed to attribute social meaning to a group's violent acts, and to 
place such acts in contexts of goal interpretation which compete with 
those of the threatened state. (59) In order to justify the use of 
violence for purposes of continuing constituency support, verbal 
strategies also are effective as a proportional limitation on state 
interpretation of the allocation of legal competences. In other words, 
should there be no reference by a "People" to its legal competence or 
relationship vis-a-vis the state, there is nothing to interpret. Thus, 
verbal strategies are employed by states to undermine a competing goal 
structure, and verbal strategies are employed by liberation groups to 
undercut existing sovereign state language paradigms which adversely 
interpret a group's political aims, and to offer competing 
interpretations of existing belief systems in order to restructure 
social cohesion. (60) 
Verbal strategies used by liberation movements employing terror 
methods as part of their overall political strategies must therefore be 
aimed not only at justifying such acts within contexts of social 
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meaning, but also at exposing the legal contradictions inherent in 
situations where political activity is circumscribed through domestic 
military activity. In that two rules of the same content may be subject 
to separate treatment as regards the organs competent to verify their 
implementation, the additional goal of legally qualifying terror acts 
perpetrated by liberation movements as acts of war rather than merely 
criminal forms part of the goal of creating the appearance of a legal 
relationship with an incumbent government. (61) 
State verbal distortions of the legal capacity of a struggling 
"People" within its territorial borders may delay the loss or 
transformation of the established goal system. (62) The continued use 
of terror-violence by liberation movements, and the continued 
communication of verbal signals regarding the existence of competing 
goal systems, may even prevent the establishment of the desired dialogue 
for purposes of creating a legal relationship in which to negotiate 
effectively. Where successful, the use of terrorism may effectively 
"obliterate the distinctions" between U. N. Charter Chapters VI and VII 
situations, particularly where violence has a transboundary aspect. (63) 
In other words, many more matters may be of international concern than 
are of international jurisdiction, particularly where the maintainance 
of international peace and security is concerned. When such "concern" 
is acted upon, and the issue is tabled for U. N. discussion, the domestic 
jurisdiction clause contained in Article 2(7) of the U. N. Charter is 
effectively eroded. The substitution of "concern" for "jurisdiction" 
may then be merely a step away, 
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We the complement to domestic jurisdiction 
effectively removes from the domestic sphere 
such matters, by means of shifting from a legal 
analysis of 'international jurisdiction', as 
opposed to 'domestic jurisdiction', to a poli- 
tical analysis of 'international concern', as 
opposed to 'domestic concern'. (64) 
When a liberation struggle erupts, and the threatened state is 
seen no longer to be master of its own house, there is a limit to the 
volume of dissonant information which can officially be rationalized 
before international intervention in a domestic disorder, if only 
through expressions and discussions of "concern", is likely to occur. 
(65) There is a limit to the action a state may legitimately take to 
restore domestic public order, and in a U. N. system which presupposes a 
high degree of democratic ideals, the maintenance of domestic order 
should rest on societal consensus. (66) The receipt of verbal signals 
indicating the existence of competing legal relationships within single 
state territorial confines thus implies the potential for a 
destabilizing conflict. In this context, a political response by the 
target state is required to preserve sovereignty, to prevent the loss of 
the previously established goal system, and/or to prevent international 
friction as a result of such loss. (67) 
Assuming that there are no clearcut distinctions between domestic 
and international politics in such a politically sensitive area as the 
self-determination of "Peoples", autonomous state approaches to custom 
which are based on the political fact of sovereignty and which utilize 
"language of the national interest" (68) distort domestic and 
international perceptions of both the nature of the armed conflict and 
the legal relationships involved in the domestic use of force. 
Concurrent use by target states of language which denies a degree of 
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political interaction fails to conceal the legal contradictions inherent 
in situations involving organized uses of force domestically, which uses 
of force further indicate the true nature of the competing legal 
relationships contemplated by opposing factions. (69) 
Thus, the tactical use of terrorism by liberation movements 
involved in armed struggles for self-determination is in large part 
designed to communicate ideological and political strategies. Such 
strategies are further aimed at indicating a legal relationship with the 
target government, for purposes of negotiating a degree of power sharing 
and/or independence. The armed struggle mandates the application of IHL 
(70) in order to place acts of terrorism properly in context. The 
treaty regime does not affect the legal status of either party to an 
armed conflict, but evidence of a minimal relationship between opposing 
Powers is needed for purposes of regulation of the conflict. Further, 
given the-availability of foreign state aid and assistance to rebel 
factions (71), if only as evidence of "international concern", a 
fictional delineation between war and peace for purposes of prosecuting 
acts of terrorism during such struggles is untenable. Acts of a 
terrorist nature perpetrated during an armed conflict are separable, as 
breaches of humanitarian and war law. Conversely, the complete denial 
that the IHL regime is applicable to situations of domestic armed 
conflict which claim to be for the right of "self-determination" (72) 
would appear to be a complete denial of this treaty form, and to 
indicate a bad faith disregard of the second most important treaty 
regime in international law. (73) Any allegedly neutral jurisdictional 
discourse preventing such application is thus false in content, and 
helps to create a target for terrorist verbal strategy. 
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6.1.3. The Use of IHL to Deter Political or Ideological Terror-Violence 
The domestic legal and political insulation of liberation 
movements on the basis of their competing political ideals often 
prevents such groups from full participation in the domestic political, 
process. Similarly, increasing international support for the U. N. 
principle of equal rights and self-determination may exacerbate the 
domestic political situation of "Peoples" having a claim to assert their 
right to self-determination. Thus, freedom fighters are frequently 
characterized domestically as terrorists, and are prosecuted under 
individually focused domestic criminal law. A corresponding absence of 
individual responsibility to which officials or soldiers are made 
subject for atrocities committed during "peacetime" public order 
maintainance missions (74) exacerbates inter-state lack of consensus 
regarding any satisfactory definition of terrorism, or the creation of 
stable mechanisms for the extradition or prosecution of international 
terrorists. (75) 
As previously discussed, states frequently differ over the legal 
qualification of "Peoples" struggling for rights of self-determination 
through the use of force or violence. Those states which utilize their 
sovereign powers of authoritative interpretation to deny combatant 
status to participants in such struggles may prosecute acts. of terror- 
violence by turning from a legal to a political analysis, at which point 
a request for asylum by a perpetrator of violence to a third state 
becomes a real possibility. (76) Even where combatant status is made 
applicable, the potential absence of reciprocity in fact of treatment 
and restraint in method between opposing factions may reduce the law of 
war to a matter of convenience. 
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In particular, individual international responsibility for 
breaches of the provisions of the IHL regime is provided in the 1949 
Geneva codifications, which burdens each party involved in an 
international armed conflict under customary international law whether 
or not all sides have agreed to apply humanitarian law, (77) However, 
state ratification of Protocol 1, which "literally internationalizes" 
some former "domestic" conflicts, implies agreement with the right of 
liberation movements to accept unilaterally the duties and obligations 
of humanitarian law (78). This is so whether or not both sides to the 
conflict are party to the same instruments, and even though there may be 
a higher standard of care and duty imposed on the party to IHL having 
access to more sophisticated means of observing the requisite 
provisions. Thus, state refusal to recognize the legitimacy of an 
authority representing an auto-determined liberation movement for 
purposes of the application of IHL in struggles for self-determination 
implies a shirking of the required standards of care. ' Such a refusal 
further constitutes official denial of the movement's right to use force 
against the target government (79), and denial of a degree of parity for 
purposes of combatant status or negotiations to settle the underlying 
disputes. As such, it would appear that political considerations 
outweigh the legal obligation to invoke the law of war from-the first 
acts of hostilities. 
As previously mentioned, the evolving use of the military to 
quell domestic disorder frequently transforms peace-keeping missions 
into low-intensity warfare more congenial to army doctrine. (80) Where 
the military is employed without the safeguards of the IHL regime, the 
tendency to over-react may lead to greater international awareness of 
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the civil strife and raise questions as to the propriety of government 
perspectives. Minimal or non-reaction by a threatened government to the 
goals of liberation movements delays effective analysis of the potential 
legitimacy of motivations underlying acts of violence. (81) It further 
deters implementation of humanitarian law, if only through non- 
recognition of the minimal right to receive humanitarian relief'and 
medical care. (82) Conversely, such state non-reaction to legitimate 
liberation goals puts into question a government's fitness to rule. 
In that acts of a terrorist nature perpetrated during an armed 
conflict remain separable as breaches of humanitarian law, sovereign 
state interpretations of the use of force in liberation conflicts as 
criminal reflect the political considerations which give rise to legal 
contradictions inherent in situations of military control over political 
activity. Viewed as a trap of overly-complicated provisions and 
prohibitions (83) which force additional responsibilities onto 
government bodies possessing the more sophisticated means of victory, 
states remain unwilling to invoke IHL. Denial of the applicability of 
IHL from the first acts of hostilities further threatens the erosion of 
state sovereignty through heightened levels of "international interest" 
in particular liberation struggles, and in the question of which 
"Peoples" are entitled to assert their right to self-determinaton, 
generally. Minimal domestic response to civil disturbance through the 
use of police or para-military units risks the loss of a degree of 
public and international psychological commitment to the existing legal 
order, as civilians, foreigners, and their objects are targeted without 
restraint, and assessments of responsibility for damage are not 
forthcoming. 
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Given the capacity for violence in the post-1945 era as a means 
of social and political control, it is clear that the denial of the 
applicability of IHL to situations of domestic armed conflict which 
claim to self-nominate as struggles for self-determination represents 
denial of the treaty form itself. "Peoples" is a term which is 
expanding, as non- and post-colonial demands for independence utilize 
the rhetoric of self-determination. As the term expands, the potential 
for the use of violence to test the substance of rights assertions also 
expands, as its corollary. The separability of terrorist acts from the 
overall political strategies of liberation movements makes the 
application of IHL tenable, if primarily for purposes of damage 
containment and assessments of responsibility for the violation of legal 
norms. Conversely, liberation groups participated in the 1974 - 77 
Diplomatic Conference, and several have made the discretionary 
declaration under Protocol 1 Article 96(3) to show their readiness to 
accept the duties and obligations which IHL requires. Such expressions 
of willingness are encouraging but the barrier of state resistance to an 
expanding notion of "Peoples", and the non-recognition of liberation 
wars as such, must be overcome before the rule of law during such 
conflicts can become a reality. States thus throw away a major tool 
with which to encourage liberation groups not to resort to terrorist 
tactics. State denial of the treaty regime's applicability and 
potential contribution to such situations implies that target 
governments prefer to mask normative choice by controlling political 
processes with military action, to approach the primacy of law in armed 
conflict as a matter of convenience, and to avoid what are viewed as 
inconvenient, overly complicated international legal obligations. 
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6.2. The Use of Terror-Violence to Provoke the Application of IHL 
Minimal or non-recognition of the goals of liberation movements 
frequently induces continued resort to terrorist tactics. (84) The 
verbal signals used subsequently (85) by such groups to explain the 
motives underlying terrorist acts are a means of publicizing their goals 
regardless of a particular governmental stance, or authoritative 
interpretation regarding the criminal content inherent in what otherwise 
appear to be random, indiscriminate acts of violence. Use of terrorist- 
violence thus may reflect group desires to publicize or dissiminate the 
anticipated fact of a loss of psychological commitment to governmental 
goal systems, or to create the appearance of political frameworks 
sufficient to construct a legal relationship for international 
consumption. Verbal signals used to inform public perspectives that a 
serious degree of societal goal displacement is present within a single 
state may follow acts which are in basic value conflict with domestic 
and international norms. The use of such tactical options may, through 
the presence and viability of competing interpretations, result in a 
degree of public and international support for the struggling group. 
Thus, acts of terror-violence perpetrated by liberation movements become 
capable of interpretation in language other than that used domestically 
to describe law and order. (86) 
The use of terror-violence to provoke the requisite conditions 
for the application of the law of war is now discussed. As public 
perceptions of the rights claims asserted by a "People" influence 
continuing support afforded to the status quo, it is concluded that the 
rules contained in the IHL regime are better suited to stabilize 
realistic aspects of the continuing fact of sovereignty (87), as limited 
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by international normative orders, than are strict domestic confines of 
interpretation. 
6.2.1. Group Terrorism as Evidence of Commonly-Shared Grievances 
Tension between the state-centered U. N. system, with its 
inviolability of territorial boundaries and political independence of 
states, and the principle of equal rights and self-determination of 
"Peoples" often occurs at points when acts of civil disobedience occur. 
(88) Where domestic unrest is ignored or repressed, an escalation in 
the intensity of violence may result, and ultimately lead to the use of 
the military, and a threat to international peace and security. (89) As 
a preliminary point, the weakness of domestic schemes in controlling 
violence, by attempting to treat social relationships without reference 
to their content has already been discussed, and reflects the non- 
success of a law enforcement approach to deter terrorism. (90) By 
preferring to view members of national groupings as individual juridical 
subjects, who each carry individual responsibility as defined by the 
concerned state, governments seek to deprive liberation fighters of the 
benefits of their group membership with its justifications for the use 
of violence. (91) The erasing of group membership through individual- 
oriented legal process thus is an attempt by states to insulate against 
counter-accusations of, e. g . human rights violations, and to undermine 
the legitimacy of group-based claims to rights entitlements. Such an 
erasure further obscures much of the rationale underlying the choice of 
particular methods of violent force. 
As a second point, domestic unrest is frequently evidence of 
commonly-shared grievances, and may present a danger to international 
peace and security. Armed conflicts for rights of self-determination 
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are often factually "international" from the start, as "Peoples" is an 
expanding and frequently transboundary concept. Direct aid and 
assistance from sympathetic third states to liberation groups both 
condition and help to define the "self" to be determined, and is a 
further aspect of the de-stabilizing effect of politically-motivated 
domestic unrest. 
States rarely recognize the "self-determination" potential of 
"Peoples" living within their own territorial boundaries. (92) 
Competing interpretations of, and contradictions in, legal content 
domestically attributed to politically-motivated, and frequently 
transboundary, violence perpetrated by such groups will thus reflect the 
fundamental tension between state and human rights in the U. N. system. 
(93) The weakness of domestic schemes in de-contextualizing the 
political content of terrorist acts through an individual and judicial 
isolation of juridical political persons (94) further illustrates the 
difficulties encountered in international criminal co-operation to 
outlaw transboundary acts of terrorism, including those terrorist acts 
perpetrated during armed struggles for self-determination. (95) The 
heart of the problem would appear to be state intransigence in the face 
of U. N. and humanitarian normative structures. 
States rather than "Peoples" are viewed as political-units in the 
U. N. system. (96) Domestic armed violence perpetrated by national 
groups claiming international rights entitlements of individual freedoms 
beyond those allowed by threatened single-state regimes challenges pre- 
existing societal consensus, as authoritatively interpreted through 
language of the national interest. In-other words, the problem of 
definition in the international community of particular rights 
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entitlements, as interpreted through individual-focused jurisdictional 
language within particular territorial units, is symptomatic of the 
political contradictions presently underpinning the tension between 
state sovereignty and assertions of rights of self-determination. (97) 
Thus, the use by national groupings of methods of terror-violence 
to communicate rights grievances publicizes the consolidation of a 
group's self-awareness, and seeks to achieve an adversarial structure 
within state boundaries for purposes of making the application of IHL 
appropriate. Given the weakness of domestic schemes of criminal 
jurisdiction to interpret organized, group violence appropriately, 
application of the IHL regime, if only as a code of conduct between 
opposing parties to an armed confrontation, is mandated to stabilize the 
situation and prevent the disruption of international peace and 
security. 
6.2.2. The Use of Terrorism to Preserve the Legitimacy of Group Identity 
State control over individual life within a society is made 
possible by the allocation of legal competences in the U. N. system. (98) 
Through rights of sovereignty and mechanisms of political unity, 
relevant principles of international rights entitlements are re- 
interpreted in language of the national interest, allowing scope for 
group relationships to be de-contextualized from more traditional 
formats of identification. (99) State powers to censure, to restrict 
movement or employment, to circumscribe the practice of religion, to 
control voting rights and to re-locate entire sectors of the population 
are just a few examples of the techniques used to break the connections 
by which individual human life within a society is organized. The 
isolation of the individual through legal process, as previously 
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discussed, further clouds the issues involved in formats of 
identification. 
The construction of juridico-political relations between a state 
and its citizens is premised on state sovereign rights to authoritively 
determine and interpret the given set of U. N. presuppositions. Any 
masking of normative choice thus becomes a function of law, and a facet 
of state administration. (100) An individual within society must first 
accept the state's right to determine the set of presuppositions, and 
second, must rely on the state's masking of normative choice 
characteristic of the re-interpretation of international presuppositions 
in order to challenge state control over his individual life. (101) 
Such an approach implies successive re-interpretations, An individual 
confronted with an isolating, individual-focused state administration 
must rely on state presuppositions in stating a case for change. 
Attempting to re-interpret, alone, state interpretations of, e. g 
 
international rights entitlements, the individual is faced with the 
efficiency of state mechanisms of authority. (102) 
Whether or not the contemporary emphasis in international human 
rights law on the individual rather than on minority or ethnic groupings 
is a mechanism in the post-1945 era to minimize the potential for group 
disruption in international affairs (103) is beyond the scope of'the 
present discussion. Nevertheless, what is clear is that state power to 
control individual and group life through authoritative re- 
interpretations of international rights entitlements often leads to 
abuse. Such an allocation of competences in the U. N. system does not 
reflect aspects of sovereignty as realistic aggregations of group-wills, 
and it is thus particularly in the context of terror-violence 
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perpetrated by national groupings organized into liberation movements 
that the neutral rules of the IHL regime could best be employed. (104) 
The efficiency of the issue structure employed by states to 
interpret the content of a violent domestic incident (105) is gauged by 
state success in appropriately placing the context of both the causes 
and effects of particular illegal acts, and in deterring future such 
acts. Where a national group uses methods of terror as one tactic in an 
overall political strategy to effect system change or transformation, to 
achieve political dialogue, and to create the impression of a legal 
relationship, individual isolation within the legal processes of 
domestic penal jurisdiction is manifestly inappropriate. (106) The use 
of methods of terror-violence to preserve the political legitimacy of 
group identity before the law is characteristic of the contradictions 
inherent between competing interpretations of state and human rights. A 
"People's" group allegiance, as evidenced through the use of violence, 
further strengthens the depth of perception within relevant communities 
of the meaning of international rights entitlements, which perception of 
normative choice is often directly masked by overly-broad state 
jurisdictional assertions of competence to control group life through an 
approach based on the language of the national interest and the 
isolation of the individual before the law. Such use of force mandates 
application of the IHL regime in order to reflect the organized aspect 
of opposing parties to an armed conflict, and to appropriately place the 
context of both the causes and effects of particular uses of violence 
within appropriate frameworks of inquiry and negotiation. 
6.3. Threshhold Problems in Prosecuting Acts of Terrorism under IHL 
There are no clear guidelines or procedures by which to verify 
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the appropriateness of an auto-determined "Peoples"' entitlement to 
rights of self-determination other than out-dated contexts of 
colonialism. These are out-dated in that additional contexts have been 
added to the strict confines regarding the right to self-determination 
delineated after World Wars 1 and 2, e. g . "Peoples" who struggle in 
post-colonial contexts, "Peoples" who utilize the rhetoric of self- 
determination to right historic grievances, "Peoples" whose human rights 
have been seriously infringed by administering states, and "Peoples" who 
have emerged as free and independent states with the end of the Cold 
War. Not to be forgotten is the view that the procedures outlined in 
U. N. Charter Chapter XII are capable of extension to include such other 
non-self-governing territories, or ethnically and/or culturally distinct 
"Peoples" as might wish to utilize them. 
Nor are there clear guidelines regarding the scope of the rights 
entitlements which comprise the right to self-determination. (107) 
Thus, in practice, struggles to achieve the right to self-determination 
may range from political attempts aimed at system change or 
transformation, to territorial secession. (108) There is only the 
consensual exhortation that states have "the duty to promote through 
joint and separate action universal respect for the observance of human 
rights and fundamental freedoms in accordance with the Charter" (109) 
pursuant to which 
(A)ll peoples have the right freely to determine, 
without external interference, their political 
status and to pursue their economic, 'social and 
cultural development. (110) 
I It is argued in this Part that the lack of clear guidelines or 
procedures with which to identify the "Peoples" entitled to self- 
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determination leads to threshhold problems in invoking IHL in situations 
of domestic violence. If viewed in the context of an armed liberation 
struggle, the use of terrorism as a method of warfare is forbidden, and 
such acts may be prosecuted as a separate, distinct phenomenon to 
international terrorism. If not viewed as occurring within a time of 
"war", a law enforcement approach to deter and prosecute acts of 
terrorism has been shown to be unsatisfactory, and subject to 
inconsistent state practice. Given this situation, it is clear that the 
use of IHL if only as a code of conduct to deter and prosecute acts of 
terrorism perpetrated by auto-defined "Peoples" struggling by means of 
the use of force for the right to self-determination causes no legal or 
conceptual confusion in assessments of responsibility for the violation 
of legal norms. 
6.3.1. Terrorism . Concern fQL tg Victims 2L Violence 
The political fictions devised by states to delineate between 
times of "war" and "peace", for purposes of legally qualifying acts of 
violence (111), ignore the fact of the organized use of force 
characteristic of struggles for self-determination in preference for 
political considerations of state authority and control. Of particular 
concern where such fictions are devised is the degree of civilian 
involvement in modern struggles for the right to self-determination. 
Liberation groups both gain support from the populace, and intimidate it 
in order to present themselves to the international community as the 
authority representing the whole "People". Thus, civilian involvement 
in liberation struggles is one result of state refusal both to recognize 
the strength of a liberation group within its particular community, and 
to prosecute violations of legal norms in other than an individual, 
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socially-isolated domestic criminal context. 
As a consequence of the increasing involvement of civilian 
populations in contemporary armed conflicts (112), the modern law of war 
has become a matter of general international concern. (113) The 
proliferation of liberation groups utilizing the rhetoric of self- 
determination has led to a diminution in state competence to 
authoritatively interpret the nature and content of a liberation 
struggle occurring within territorial borders. Thus, as a minimum, 
innocent members of a civilian population who are harmed by acts of 
violence perpetrated in liberation conflicts are increasingly viewed as 
having a right to receive humanitarian relief and medical care. (114) 
Further, the weakness of domestic schemes to control the uses of force 
by auto-determined liberation groups mandate the application of the law 
of war from the first acts of hostilities. (115) 
6.3.1.1. I Application Qj Common Article 
Fundamental general principles of humanitarian law are set forth 
in the rules contained in Common Article 3 to the 1949 Geneva 
Conventions, which article provides a regulatory approach to domestic 
armed conflicts. (116) Common Article 3 applies to cases of "armed 
conflict not of an international character occurring in the territory of 
one of the High Contracting Parties". It provides for minimum 
protections to persons taking no active part in such hostilities, 
including members of armed forces who have been placed hors de combat 
for any reason. Such persons are to be treated humanely, and if 
prosecuted for any offense connected with the armed conflict, are to be 
afforded "all the judicial guarantees which are recognized as 
indispensable by civilized peoples". The difference between the 
- 
270 
- 
fundamental, or minimal, rules of Common Article 3 and the other 
provisions of the four Geneva Conventions of 1949 lies only in the 
respective degree of specificity, as based on the nature and scale of 
the hostilities. (117) Therefore, where an armed conflict for self- 
determination is not recognized as such (118), the organized use of 
armed force or acts of violence make Common Article 3 applicable. (119) 
According to the International Court of Justice, in Nicaragua v. 
United States of America (Merits) (120), "these rules constitute a 
minimum, applicable in all circumstances, including international armed 
conflicts". In other words, the more specific rules and provisions 
applicable to international armed conflict incorporate and include these 
minimum rules of Common Article 3. (121) The Court further concluded 
that fundamental general principles of humanitarian law belong to the 
body of general international law, whether or not a conflict is 
international, for the better protection of victims. (122) 
6.3.1.2. Difficulties in Applying Common Article 3 to Terrorism 
It is perhaps now obvious to see that the issues underlying 
struggles for self-determination make international agreement regarding 
correct approaches to terrorism impossible. (123) Thus, it is argued 
that the suggested separability of acts of terrorism utilized in 
struggles for self-determination demands an ad hoc examination of the 
relevant goals pursued, and of the actual context of the violence, in 
order to nominate the legal qualification defining such acts as 
prohibited acts of war within the neutral confines of IHL. 
. 
The non-applicability in practice of Common Article 3 by 
governments threatened by internal disorder may arguably be perceived as 
part of a general stand regarding the non-applicability of the law of 
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war to matters of domestic jurisdiction. Such non-applicability is 
premised on a number of political considerations. Dinstein (124), 
writing prior to the signing of Protocols 1 and 2, noted the following 
difficulties of applying Geneva law to a civil war: 
1. psychological Article 3 fetters the freedom of 
action of a government in pursuing 
persons it regards not as plain 
offenders, but as traitors 
... . 
2. practical Whereas government forces are 
capable of taking care of the 
wounded and sick in an orderly 
fashion, conducting fair judicial 
proceedings, and so on, rebels 
... 
are not always able to observe 
the provisions of Article 3 
... . 
3. practical There is no room here for the 
operation (as in an inter-State 
war) of a Protecting Power 
... 
supervising the implementation 
of the Article 
... . 
4. legal How can an obligation devolve on 
the rebels? 
... . 
Who is to bear 
international responsibility if 
obligations binding the rebels 
by virtue of Article 3 are 
violated (individually, or as a 
group)? 
5. legal Upon whom are the corresponding 
rights of Article 3 conferred 
(individually, or as a group)? (125) 
Additional political difficulties are posed in that Common 
Article 3 does not provide a definition of "armed conflict" (126), 
leaving this decision to state authoritative interpretation. It does 
not require that dissident armed forces be under responsible command, 
nor that these latter exercise control of territory. Conversely, Common 
Article 3 makes no mention of its non-applicability to "internal 
disturbances and tensions, such as riots, isolated and sporadic acts of 
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appear that target state non-application of IHL rules "in all 
circumstances" is in violation of the international legal obligation to 
respect and ensure respect for IHL. (128) Discussions of advantages or 
disadvantages to states of invoking IHL are not the concern of that 
treaty regime. Discussions of a contractual balance in the means and 
methods of warfare utilized between opposing parties to an armed 
conflict (129) are not relevant to the application of minimal 
humanitarian rules in all circumstances, nor is the reciprocity in fact 
of humanitarian treatment. The appearance of any legal relationship 
between the parties is not an issue dealt with through humanitarian law, 
other than in the context of the recognition of the status of each 
side's combatants. (130) 
In short, and as a matter of political if not legal strategy, 
there seems to be no reason why IHL should not be made applicable to 
prosecute acts of terror-violence perpetrated within the context of 
struggles by "Peoples" for rights to self-determination. The 
prohibitions as to allowable means and methods of warfare would act to 
restrain the use by liberation groups of readily available terrorist 
weaponry and tactics, and would offer both sides a better opportunity to 
negotiate an end to the struggle. Once implemented, if only as a code 
of conduct, the potential of humanitarian law would perhaps be made more 
realistic, and allow for better care and protection of the innocent 
victims of such conflicts. 
6.3.2. Terrorism and Fundamental Humanitarian Concern 
The use of violence by liberation groups to effect political 
change or system transformation is not intended to target innocent third 
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parties solely for the purpose of inflicting injury on them or on their 
possessions. (131) Instead, the motive behind indiscriminate targeting 
is usually to publicize a group's aims, or to wreak damage on a 
threatened government in such a way as to threaten that state's 
sovereignty in the eyes of the international community. Once this 
occurs, there is a potential threat to the maintainance of international 
peace and security, and third states, perhaps prematurely, place 
themselves in a negotiation stance with the rebels if only to protect 
their own nationals and investment interests present in the country. 
Given the ready use of diplomatic and investment relations both 
to encourage and restrain liberation groups, it is clear that a law 
enforcement approach to acts of violence by liberation groups will 
rarely succeed. This fact in addition to the use of the political 
offense or humanitarian exception in extradition arrangements readily 
show the weakness of domestic schemes to deter acts of violence 
perpetrated during armed struggles for self-determination. 
Consequently, IHL should be made applicable from the first outbreak of 
organized hostilities. Humanitarian law is applicable to liberation 
conflicts through Protocol 1, Protocol 2 or, as a minimum, Common 
Article 3 to the four Geneva Conventions of 1949. The right to self- 
determination, and the legitimacy of the struggle to achieve it are 
fundamental principles of general international law, and form rules of 
customary international law. The extension of IHL to a wide range of 
such struggles would thus appear "solidly rooted in the logic and 
dynamics of international law" (132), as giving expression to these 
1 
fundamental principles of general international law. The obligation of 
state parties to observe and respect the minimum standards of humanity, 
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regardless of the level of their participation in the treaty regime, 
further allows the conclusion that the implementation of humanitarian 
law in the context of armed conflicts for self-determination has a 
customary character. 
Such a conclusion not only requires state parties to factor-in 
such considerations as an integral part of their sovereign interpretive 
function but also affords better protection for the victims of such 
conflicts. (133) Abi-Saab (134), in her discussion of humanitarian law 
as interpreted by the I. C. J. in Nicaragua (Merits), points out that the 
Court affirmed what experts in the field of humanitarian law have long 
hesitated to assert: that the Geneva Conventions merely give specific 
expression to the general principles of humanitarian law, and that as 
such, and given their virtually universal participation by the world 
community, the Geneva regime is raised to the status of general 
international law much as the Nuremburg Tribunal declared the Hague 
Conventions and Regulations of 1907 to be part of customary law. She 
further asserts that 
... 
(T>he obligation in Article 1, common 
to the four Geneva Conventions, to 'ensure 
respect' for humanitarian law 
... 
was held 
by the Court to be inseparable from the 
basic obligations and was consequently 
recognized as a general principle. This 
is especially important in the context of 
the responsibilities of third parties and 
the international community in general in the 
face of violations of the Conventions. (135) 
Thus, the Court's holding in the case implies that, though gaps 
between general international law and the codification of its principles 
have obvious consequences for the content of the law applicable to a 
particular dispute, such codification does not erase the independent 
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existence of such principles as principles of customary law. In this 
way, the obligations contained as part of general international law 
continue to have existence and binding character independent of 
political and contractual quid-pro-quo considerations. (136) 
This latter point refers to fundamental, or minimal, guarantees 
of humanitarian concern and consideration. As such, minimal observance 
of humanitarian law will be of use to protect the victims of violence. 
The Court's stance is of particular interest when analyzed for purposes 
of the application of IHL to prosecute acts of terrorist-violence 
perpetrated during liberation conflicts. (137) Given that struggles for 
self-determination are by lack of definition open to competing 
interpretations as to their identity, their legitimacy and their legal 
contexts (138), the mere presence of an armed conflict implies that not 
only are state juridical assertions of a time of "peace" unsafe, but 
further, that any non-applicability of IHL to such situations flies in 
the face of state obligations to ensure respect for the common interest 
represented in the minimal agreements achieved in IHL. As such, target 
state refusal to invoke IHL in situations of domestic armed conflict 
implicates state responsibility for violations of the treaty regime. 
6.4. Terrorism as a Grave Breach of Geneva Law, Where Applicable 
A consistent pattern of acts of terrorism perpetrated by 
identifiable, organized national groupings (139) is clearly a situation 
of armed conflict contemplated by IHL coverage. The parties to such an 
armed conflict may however disagree regarding the nature and scope of 
the hostilities, and the legal qualifications attributable to particular 
acts so as to make appropriate assessments of responsibility for damage 
caused during it. In that application or implementation of IHL to a 
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particular conflict in no way affects the legal status of the parties, 
it is perhaps more useful to focus on the nature of the acts prohibited 
by humanitarian law than to determine their illegality according to the 
level of legal relationship in existence between the parties. 
It is argued in this part that there are uses of force which are 
always unlawful. It thus may safely be assumed that international 
individual rights and duties impose on every subject of international 
law identical limits on the legitimate use of force. As such, military 
acts the sole purpose of which is to spread terror are forbidden (140), 
and are capable of prosecution under IHL as a separate, distinct 
phenomenon to acts of international terrorism. 
6.4.1. Grave Breaches/War Crimes as Greater-Statements of Principle 
As previously discussed, the provisions of Common Article 3 are 
intended to shape the international human duties which are directly 
imposed upon states and individuals alike. They are not contingent on 
reciprocity, and are binding unconditionally. The more specific 
provisions of the Geneva treaty regime condemn certain acts of violence 
directed against certain targets under certain circumstances, however 
"just" the underlying cause. Assuming further that the obligations of 
humanitarian law may be reduced to a number of general principles, it is 
easier to evaluate whether essentials have been violated regardless of 
legal qualification regarding the nature or scope of the armed conflict. 
Put another way, fundamental principles of humanitarian law have an 
existence independent of their codification, and constitute a minimum 
"in all circumstances". (141) Thus, grave breaches of the Conventions, 
e. g. 
, 
serious offenses perpetrated against-persons and/or extensive 
destruction of their property or cultural objects, are completely 
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prohibited. 
The use of terrorism as part of the overall political strategy of 
a "People" struggling for the right of self-determination clearly 
mandates the application of IHL, and preferably through mechanisms 
provided in Protocol 1. Protocol 1 makes acts of terrorism, which rise 
to the level of grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions, war crimes. 
Should a "People" not be considered an "approved cause" by the 
international community for purposes of the applicability of Protocol 1, 
their armed struggle still mandates the implementation of IHL if only on 
a minimal Common Article 3 basis. Whether a liberation group can bind 
itself to the four Geneva Conventions of 1949 as a "Power" is 
controversial, and is felt to be beyond the scope of the present 
discussion. However, once IHL is invoked on a Common Article 3 or a 
Protocol 1 basis, the parties to the conflict are free to come to 
special agreements regarding the provisions of the treaty body, so long 
as such agreements increase the levels of humanitarian treatment 
provided. (142) 
The High Contracting Parties are obligated to "undertake to enact 
any legislation necessary to provide effective penal sanctions for 
persons committing, or ordering to be committed" grave breaches or war 
crimes (143). The codification of prohibited acts such as wilfully 
causing death or serious injury to persons, often involve broader 
statements of principle than are contained in domestic or military law. 
This is in view of factors such as the insulating role of military law, 
the often non-voluntary nature of military service, and state powers 
during times of "peace" to maintain public order through mechanisms of 
human rights derogation, and military control over political activity 
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during emergency situations. (144) The real parties in interest 
- 
the 
victims - must thus frequently rely on a threatened government's respect 
of IHL rather than directly upon the actual terms of its provisions. In 
this way, the legal contradictions and distortions which must be 
maintained to avoid invoking IHL in a domestic armed conflict may serve 
to negate the individual interests protected by international law. 
The rights and duties contained in Common Article 3, as a 
minimum, must be provided and protected domestically. In the event of a 
breach of such rights, the national remedy should not negate the 
substance of the international right. Domestic problems of legal 
certainty both as to the terminology used and the national remedy to be 
provided for breaches of IHL provisions, such as the infliction of death 
or injury, can thus be gauged through state willingness to invoke and 
consistently broaden the application of IHL by widely interpreting its 
potential scope. Conversely, heavy dependence on state authoritative 
interpretation and administration, low levels of scrutiny of 
implementation, and piecemeal approaches to remedial measures indicate 
the degree of variance in state approaches to the applicability of IHL. 
In that the broad statements of principle contained throughout 
the different levels of humanitarian law represent a minimal consensus 
among states in the world community (145), they should be made 
applicable in struggles for self-determination regardless of the legal 
qualification of the conflict, if only as a code of conduct and a means 
of restraint. To do so makes the prosecution of grave breaches a 
universal duty, i. e., one which need make no or little reference to 
state authoritative interpretation regarding the political nature of the 
act. To make acts of terrorism perpetrated during armed struggles for 
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self-determination war crimes further imposes a level of international 
restraint. Acts of terrorism perpetrated during such conflicts would 
thus be separately identifiable and universally capable of prosecution, 
and would in no way need to be confused with efforts to deter acts of 
international terrorism. 
6.4.2. Grave Breaches and International Individual Responsibility 
Where IHL is made applicable to any situation of armed conflict, 
grave breaches (or war crimes) may be viewed as exceptions to 
exceptions. Certain impermissible acts, such as killing in peacetime, 
are made permissible in wartime. Yet, if such acts are directed against 
protected persons or objects in an indiscriminate or non-proportional 
manner, they remain impermissible. They are exceptions to exceptions. 
This point is of interest in the context of the increasing overlap 
between states of "war" and "peace". (146) As a result of this overlap, 
acts of terrorism perpetrated as part of a liberation struggle, and 
which thus cause legal confusion during "peacetime", could be viewed as 
such exceptions to exceptions, and could be kept separate from other 
uses of force. Assuming this point, increased state willingness to 
invoke IHL would certainly remove the phenomenon of terrorism 
perpetrated during liberation struggles from the ambit of efforts to 
deter international terrorism. 
The terms "grave breach" and "war crime" are not easily 
translatable into domestic criminal codes. (147) Where terrorist acts 
are perpetrated as a means or method of warfare, there is a problem of 
defining the offense within its context, prior to choosing the legal 
regime to make operable for assessments of responsibility where damage 
is caused by such acts. Assuming then that international individual 
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rights and duties impose on every subject of international law identical 
limits on the legitimate use of force, it becomes easier to evaluate the 
violation of essentials. In that application or implementation of IHL 
in a particular conflict in no way affects the legal status of the 
parties involved, national group efforts to achieve system 
transformation and to preserve identity through the use of terrorism in 
no way diminish the content of individual international obligations. 
(148) Instead, responsibility is raised. The Geneva regime provides 
for individual and state responsibility when humanitarian provisions are 
violated. "Superior orders" are not a defense, military evaluations of 
military necessity and proportionality must be justifiable, and 
humanitarian treatment is to be afforded in all circumstances. A claim 
to. combatant status does not immunize indiscriminate or morally 
outrageous acts. (149) 
These international individual rights and duties have little 
practical meaning unless viewed as superior in content to domestic 
interpretations of ordinary human rights or of the criminality of 
particular acts. Further, in that acts of terrorism breach fundamental 
provisions of IHL which are to be respected in all circumstances, such 
acts may be viewed as prohibited by general international law. Each 
party to IHL is burdened with the duty to exercise its jurisdiction and 
either prosecute or extradite individuals perpetrating grave breaches or 
war crimes, even its own nationals. (150) It is thus clear that proof 
of governmental good faith is required, and is dependent upon a system 
of state self-regulation which seeks a constant broadening of the 
applicability of the IHL treaty form. 
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7. Political Aspects of the Applicability of IHL to Liberation 
Struggles 
As previously discussed, the legal qualification given to 
violations of legal norms determines subsequent assessments of 
responsibility for such violations. (1) This is particularly true where 
domestic legal norms regulate the use of violence in a society. It is 
also true when domestic political process is hindered by the ready use 
of force, e. g . when public order is maintained by the police or 
government-controlled paramilitary units during civil unrest. (2) 
Within the context of struggles for self-determination, sovereign 
authoritative interpretations as to the merits of claimed entitlements 
by liberation groups employing violent force are conditioned by 
competing legally protected interests. Assessments of responsibility 
for damage caused by terrorist acts are determined by the legal 
qualifications given by both a threatened government, and third states. 
(3) As such, assessments of responsibility for damage to life or 
property interests resulting from the use of terrorism by liberation 
groups have political consequences. (4) Political considerations 
regarding assessments of responsibility for damage caused during 
liberation struggles have thus created a climate of ambiguous state 
practice regarding the applicability of the IHL regime to modern armed 
conflicts. In turn, the lack of a common understanding of "war" in 
terms of parties, methods and consequences has been a characteristic of 
the post-1945 era. (5) 
It is argued in this Chapter that the political effects of 
liberation wars deter states from invoking the IHL legal regime from the 
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first organized acts of hostilities or unresisted occupation. Political 
effects of liberation armed conflicts include the potential alteration 
of the juridical status of a troubled state in the world community, a 
legitimation of the use of violent force to achieve self-determination, 
and the normative development of terrorism as a "justifiable" method of 
warfare. It is clear that such political considerations are not 
calculated to strengthen the primacy of law in situations of armed 
conflict, but it is further clear that implementation of IHL legally 
alters the duties and obligations owed to an opponent during an armed 
struggle at the same time IHL purports not to affect the legal status of 
either party to it. (6) Nevertheless, a desire for the legitimizing 
effects of IHL treatment may be one of the reasons behind the modern 
proliferation of low-intensity, surrogate armed violence which has led 
to normative confusion and legal evasion regarding the true nature of 
such conflicts. 
By way of preliminary discussion, the traditional practice of 
declaring or recognizing a state of war has become too dangerous in an 
international legal system which outlaws wars of aggression as an 
instrument of foreign policy. (7) For example, the semantic extension 
of Common Article 2 to all forms of international armed conflict has 
been unfounded in state practice (8), and efforts to nominate liberation 
groups as "Powers" which can bind themselves to the four Geneva 
Conventions of 1949 are highly controversial. The non-applicability-in- 
fact of Common Article 3 does not reflect the right to receive 
humanitarian relief and medical care. State recognition of the legal 
grounds for intervention without state consent, if only by sending 
medical teams to make use of the potential of humanitarian law, remains 
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questionable, (9) Common Article 3 does not define "armed conflict", 
thereby preserving strong notions of sovereign authoritative 
interpretation as to the true nature of a given disturbance. As for the 
1977 Protocols, the ratification process has been characterized by the 
hostility of certain influential states to which the new provisions 
might particularly apply. (10) Thus, political considerations regarding 
assessments of responsibility and the legitimizing effects of 
humanitarian treatment render the non-partisan stance of IHL untenable, 
in practical terms, 
Demarcations between states of "war" and "peace" determine the 
legal qualification of subsequent assessments or levels of culpability. 
(11) This fact makes states doubly hesitant to recognize an armed 
conflict. Once a state of war is recognized through humanitarian 
treatment (12), certain acts committed in peacetime, such as killing, 
become permissible. A claim of combatant status may remove from a 
public order police exercise what would otherwise be the protection of 
the law, (13) "Superior orders" may be used in mitigation, if not in 
defense, against punishment for grave breaches of the Geneva 
Conventions, or war crimes, or for acts perpetrated by overzealous armed 
forces. (14) Acceptance of the applicability of military law provides 
an insulating factor against particular forms of responsibility. The 
nature of the command structure in military service (15) is an 
additional consideration which may work against a liberation group when 
it claims that an armed struggle against a threatened government is in 
fact a war to which IHL applies. 
More importantly, a recognition of the applicability of the IHL 
regime to a situation of domestic violence involving issues of self- 
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determination propels third states to put their relations with a 
challenging group on a regular basis, if only to increase levels of 
protection for foreign property and persons situated in the troubled 
area. (16) Although diplomatic overtures to liberation groups are 
frequently premature, wider disruptive potential to foreign interests is 
thereby reduced or at least stabilized. The maintenance of contact 
between foreign states and liberation groups puts pressure on a 
threatened government to acknowledge a legal relationship with the 
rebeling group, if only for purposes of negotiating an end to the 
conflict, which pressure further burdens the incumbent with now 
uncertain assessments of responsibility for violations of legal norms 
regulating 
-the use of violence. (17) 
It is thus argued in this Chapter that implementation of IHL in 
liberation struggles has a legitimizing effect on the legal status of 
struggling "Peoples". For example, the various levels of humanitarian 
protections afford liberation movements their "window of opportunity" to 
demonstrate to the world community the substance of their rights claims, 
and their self-image as a protogovernment. Further, the application of 
IHL during a war of self-determination has probable normative effect on 
the use of terrorist methods as "justifiable" means and methods of 
warfare. (18) 
The structure of this argument is as follows. The political 
consequences of target government recognition of the applicability of 
IHL to a situation of domestic civil unrest are discussed in the First 
Part. In particular, such recognition implies that the juridical status 
of the target state has been altered or may be altered in the near 
future, and that the incumbent is no longer able to protect all sectors 
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of the population from violence, acting alone. As such, invoking IHL 
indicates the nature and form of the hostilities. The effect of the 
application of war law on international recognition of the legitimacy of 
an authority representing a "People" involved in a struggle for self- 
determination is discussed in the Second Part. As a threatened 
government can no longer provide protection to foreign persons and 
property, foreign states have a duty to define their attitudes to the 
liberation group and to acknowledge the alteration in juridical status 
of the target state, for purposes of the continuation of effective 
international relations. A degree of legitimacy is thus derived by the 
liberation authority. The effect, if any, on world opinion which 
results from the renunciation of terrorist methods by liberation 
movements in their struggle to achieve claimed rights entitlements is 
examined in the Third Part. The normative effect, if any, which results 
from the use of terrorist methods is discussed in the Fourth Part, as 
viewed within the context of legitimate means and methods of warfare in 
struggles for self-determination. 
It is concluded that the main political consequence of invoking 
IHL in wars of self-determination is the recognition of the legal status 
of a "People", whose legitimacy has been achieved through the use of 
violent force. As such a political result is not calculated to 
encourage states to regulate domestic armed conflicts through 
international law, states will remain unwilling to invoke IHL in modern 
armed conflicts. 
7.1. The Legitimacy of the Authority Representing A 
. 
"People" 
The political consequences of incumbent government recognition of 
the applicability of IHL to a situation of domestic civil unrest are 
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many. In particular, such recognition implies the target state's 
juridical status in inter-national relations has changed or may do so in 
the near future. (19) The application of the law of war in situations 
of civil unrest, and the erosion of the traditional system of 
neutrality, are discussed in this part. Terrorism, characterized as a 
peacetime phenomenon (20), will then be discussed to illustrate the role 
restraint plays in the IHL regime. Thus, the application of IHL in 
struggles for self-determination raises important questions regarding 
the legitimizing influence of IHL treatment on national liberation 
groups. 
7.1.1. Application of the Law of War and the Legal Status of the Parties 
Ia o Conflict 
The IHL regime, as codifed, applies between states which are 
parties to the same treaties. It also applies between states parties to 
a particular treaty, and states or other belligerant parties which 
accept that treaty and apply its provisions. (21) While special 
agreements on particular matters may be concluded, such agreements 
cannot lower the thresholds of protection contained in the pertinent 
treaty instruments. (22) The traditional distinction between the Hague 
and Geneva Conventions has been reduced in Protocol 1, remaining useful 
in modern times primarily for jurisdictional frameworks of enforcement 
(23), and for ascertaining what level of obligation is mutually 
agreeable among the parties to a conflict. IHL as codified merely gives 
expression to the general principles of humanitarian law, and the 
fundamental general principles set forth in the rules contained in 
Common Article 3 to the 1949 Geneva Conventions constitute a minimum, 
applicable in all circumstances of armed conflict. 
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The law of war should be utilized from the first acts of 
hostilities or unresisted occupation. To encourage the widespread use 
of IHL, it is categorically stated that the legal status of a party to a 
conflict is not to be affected by either the application of the law of 
war or the conclusion of special agreements. This latter point is 
designed to encourage the use of IHL, if only as a code of conduct, in 
non-international, or domestic armed conflicts. (24) 
7.1.1.1. Belligerency and Insurgency 
States remain under an international obligation to prevent an 
armed conflict from breaking out. They are under positive obligations 
to abstain from provocative actions, and from the threat or use of force 
in their international relations. (25) States are under an obligation 
to abstain from interference in the internal affairs of other states. 
(26) They are thus obligated either to prevent an armed conflict from 
breaking out, or to remain out of an armed conflict occurring between 
other states or within a single state. (27) 
Traditionally, the neutrality system encouraged the formation of 
diplomatic and military alliances, if only for purposes of defending 
against the use of aggressive armed force. To this end, the distinction 
between domestic situations of belligerancy and insurgency was all 
important for purposes of guidance regarding the appropriate action to 
take within existing prohibitions provided by the neutrality system. In 
the post-1945 era, on the other hand, the balance of carefully 
established fields of competence preserved in the U. N. system means that 
states may unilaterally take preparatory actions in view of a possible 
armed conflict in order to fulfill obligations under the law of war. 
(28) Such obligations are contemplated in the U. N. Charter in 
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provisions which deal with regional and international arrangements for 
the use of force. 
Where conflict occurs domestically, such preparatory action may 
take the form of provisions for emergency decrees and use of the police 
or military to maintain public order, particularly as civil unrest may 
range from street mobs to international war. (29) The existence of a 
civil war or unrest requires not only observance of the law of war, if 
only as a code of conduct, but also, "the practical necessity for third 
states to define their attitude" (30) to such domestic disturbance. The 
traditional recognition of a state of belligerency, either by word or 
deed, required that sister-states regulate their activities with both 
sides on the basis of neutrality, in that either side might emerge 
triumphant. An intermediate stage between civil disorder and all-out 
civil war was an insurgency, and did not call into play the neutrality 
system. Thus, alliance states could assist the target state in quelling 
the domestic unrest. A target state's response to such unrest, through 
its authoritative characterization of the situation, was indicative of 
the nature and form of the hostilities. 
The neutrality system was seriously eroded prior to World War 2, 
and has all but disappeared in the post-1945 era (31), primarily for 
political reasons as is discussed'below. Instead, third states may 
experience a change in relations with a threatened government as a 
result of domestic civil disorder, if only through sister-state 
heightened concern that the target government can no longer protect 
foreign property and foreign persons. As long as there is no clearly 
established armed conflict, the opposing parties and third states may 
disagree on the legal qualification of the conflict. (32) Premature 
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recognition of a state of belligerency by outside states may constitute 
"illicit interference in the affairs of the state affected by civil 
disorders". (33) On the other hand, the fact of insurgency has no 
effect on the juridical status of the state, and the threatened 
government may call on other states for aid and assistance. (34) 
7.1.1.2. International War and Internal War 
The fact of belligerency or insurgency had traditional importance 
in that it changed the obligations third states owed to the state in 
which civil strife occurred. Today, the fact of belligerency invokes 
one of the principle fields of competence preserved in the U. N. system, 
that of organizing a collective effort to enforce the prohibition 
against the spread of military operations beyond the confines of a 
single state. (35) The fact of insurgency remains within the domestic 
competence of a target state, the government of which may request 
outside aid and assistance in quelling the disturbance. U. N. hesistance 
to intervene in matters of domestic jurisdiction (36) has resulted 
somewhat in limitations to the prescriptive range of international law 
when faced with sovereign authoritative interpretation as to the nature 
of a domestic disorder. (37) While the issues underlying self- 
determination and the right to use force to achieve it have eroded 
traditional jurisdictional confines delimiting the areas between 
domestic and international concern, sovereign state interpretation of a 
domestic armed struggle delays the transition from international 
"concern" to international "jurisdiction". Ambiguous state practice has 
been the result of this dubious balance of competences. 
I Thus, it is perfectly possible for state parties to IHL to follow 
an approach to struggles for self-determination which is based solely on 
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the political fact of sovereignty, which approach often precludes an 
adequate analysis of the issues underlying a conflict. Such an approach 
further deters serious initiation of the necessary legal frameworks in 
which to peacefully settle disputes. The pursuit of change through 
political channels becomes stymied. Further, the fundamental purpose of 
IHL is that it should be made applicable as soon as possible, yet it is 
in effect rejected as a treaty form. (38) For example, as a minimum, an 
individual has the right to receive humanitarian relief and medical care 
from intervening medical teams making use of the potential of 
humanitarian law during an armed conflict. This implies a level of 
protection not afforded to common lawbreakers. On the other hand, IHL 
treatment implies that a struggling group has a claim to combatant 
status, and that the incumbent, by virtue of such treatment, agrees in 
theory that it may be attacked. (39) 
The different levels of political interaction contained within 
IHL are vital considerations when states are faced with civil dissent. 
(40) Target state recognition of the applicability of IHL to a 
situation of domestic civil unrest constitutes recognition that the 
juridical status of a state either has been altered or may be altered in 
the near future should public order not be restored. The inability of 
the U. N. system to prevent the spread of military operations within the 
territorial confines of a single state means that third states are 
forced to make their own accommodations with both sides to an armed 
conflict. This may consist of aid and assistance to either side, and 
thus involve the risk of interference in the domestic affairs of the 
target state. While fundamental humanitarian guarantees should be 
afforded to all involved in such conflicts, humanitarian treatment may 
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imply a "right" to shoot at target state police or military units 
empowered to conduct public order missions. 
These many factors make the application of IHL to internal 
conflicts so problematic. In particular, the inclusion of wars of self- 
determination in Protocol 1 met with heavy resistance from Western 
states and/or those states to which it might particularly apply, as what 
were previously considered internal disorders were literally taken out 
of domestic jurisdictional confines and internationalized. (41) An 
additional problem in invoking IHL is the collateral recognition of a 
group's legal personality and of the legitimacy of their armed struggle. 
This collateral effect directly delimits the scope of sovereign 
authoritative interpretation, and alters pre-existing frameworks for 
political interaction. Authoritative assessments of responsibility for 
violations of legal norms (42), and for damage caused, are further 
affected. 
Thus, many favorable considerations attach in favor of a 
struggling group if viewed as an "approved cause" by the international 
community. Should an auto-determined "People" claim these same 
advantages through a wide reading of the scope of the right of self- 
determination, the "status" of their struggle may be recognized as an 
"international" war, by virtue of humanitarian treatment. These are 
clearly the political concerns of a target government which must further 
anticipate a time when it will be required to treat a national 
liberation movement as an equal for purposes of negotiations. (43) 
Thus, threatened states are unwilling to invoke IHL in a situation of 
domestic violence, and are unlikely to afford humanitarian treatment to 
a struggling group. On the basis of the political considerations and 
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effects, the primacy of law during an armed conflict is rejected. 
7.1.2. Terrorism as a "Peacetime" Phenomenon 
The evolution of an armed conflict relates to the transition from 
"peace" to "war", with a possible escalation of parties, personnel and 
combat means employed. As previously discussed, the post-1945 era has 
experienced numerous examples of acts of terrorism as the means used to 
provoke the very escalation feared. (44) Terrorism employed during a 
time of "peace" can cause the conflict to evolve into "war", and thus 
has become a vital tactic to alter legal assumptions and to mandate the 
application of the law of war. (45) It has been seen that the law of 
war should be applicable, if only as a code of conduct, from the first 
acts of hostilities or unresisted occupation. On the other hand, such 
applicability is mandated once violence is characterized as an armed 
conflict rather than as a series of criminal acts, but the necessary 
alteration in characterization rarely occurs voluntarily. 
State parties to the IHL regime frequently follow an approach 
based solely on the political fact of sovereignty. (46) A change in 
legal qualification as to the true nature of a particular use of 
violence may thus be delayed. In particular, terms which cause 
conceptual and legal difficulty when identifying terrorism accurately 
include those which describe the participants in nearly the entire 
spectrum of armed conflicts. The most common difficulty is the 
delineation between "freedom fighters" and "terrorists". (47) Delay 
caused by states through fictitious authoritative interpretations of the 
nature of a domestic disorder and the identity of its participants may 
lead to unnecessary use of the police, and may add "an unlimited nature 
to 
... 
criminal activities and (open) the way to the use of armed 
- 
308 
- 
forces". (48) 
The identification of terrorist organizations is left to 
governments. (49) The appropriate legal qualification to be attributed 
to terrorist acts and their perpetrators has led to much debate. In 
particular, one simplistic delineation between illicit acts of warfare 
(as in "approved" struggles for self-determination) and prohibited acts 
of "peacetime" terrorism is whether or not innocent third parties 
damaged by such acts are the intended victims. (50) This distinction 
can be easily countered, if only through an examination of the 
indiscriminate effects of modern weaponry. Kuerbitz, in his discussion 
of the bombing of Harrods in 1983 by the I. R. A., begins on the following 
note: 
Recent trends in warfare, including the increased 
use of terror, 
... 
have raised concerns, at least 
in the context of unconventional warfare, that the 
norm against civilian targeting no longer exists. (51) 
This statement would imply that the norm against civilian targeting is 
not an appropriate point of departure in distinguishing between 
characterizations of particular uses of armed force. Nevertheless, 
given the codified prohibitions against terror methods of conflict 
contained in IHL (52) and in particular, the prohibitions against the 
wanton targeting of civilians and civilian objects (53), it is clear 
that methods of terrorism which are intended to cause indiscriminate 
damage, including damage which may seriously harm persons or their 
objects, have no place in the restraints contemplated by the law of war. 
7.1.3. Terrorism as a "Wartime" Phenomenon 
National liberation movements are by definition non-state 
entities, although they may be characterized as "nations" or "Powers". 
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The very point in their express acceptance of the law of war (54) is the 
acceptance of international legal obligations which afford an 
opportunity to show restraint, a level of control over their troops, and 
to act as a protogovernment for purposes of building diplomatic 
relations. On this basis, competing interpretations regarding the legal 
qualification given to the use of force or violence utilized by 
liberation movements may be resolved through observance of the maxim 
that "the right of the parties to a conflict to adopt means of injuring 
the enemy is not unlimited". (55) As such, the exchange of restraint in 
method for humanitarian treatment in all circumstances means that 
illicit methods of combat may not be used, even in a conflict "for a 
good cause". (56) When the time arrives to treat a liberation movement 
as an equal or valid counterpart to sovereign states for purposes of 
negotiation or to regulate the conduct of an armed conflict the use of 
methods of terrorism subverts the rules of the game and shatters 
acceptable patterns of behavior. (57) 
As previously discussed, methods of terror-violence perpetrated 
during an armed conflict may be characterized as grave breaches of the 
Geneva Conventions or as war crimes. (58) It should now be clear that 
so long as such methods are characterized as "terrorism" and prosecuted 
through domestic penal sanctions, threatened incumbents are neither 
willing to acknowledge exchanges of restraint, nor to view a struggling 
group with any degree of parity. Further, the tenacity of the semantic 
distinction in legal qualification between "war" and "peace" is evidence 
that terrorism as a method of warfare is not acceptable in the world 
community. Where it is utilized to provoke the'application of the law 
of war, an incumbent's juridical status is weakened. The application of 
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IHL under such circumstances is evidence that domestic schemes to 
control group terrorist activity have proven ineffective in providing 
protection to all sectors of the population. 
Once the legal qualifications underlying assessments of 
responsibility have been altered by incumbent recognition of the 
applicability of the IHL regime, the self-image of a liberation movement 
as a protogovernment requires restraint in method, in which context 
terrorism, as a "peacetime" phenomenon, does not form a part. (59) 
Therefore, humanitarian treatment afforded by a target state to a 
liberation group in a struggle for self-determination may appear as 
target state acceptance of the legitimacy of the representative 
authority, and of its "right" to use force against that state to. achieve 
its goals. 
7.2. Implementation of IHL Strengthens International Recognition of 
the Authority Representing § 
. 
"People" 
The issue of restraint in method is particularly important in an 
age of armed conflicts for self-determination where U. N. General 
Assembly Resolutions appear to support wars of national liberation as 
exceptions to Articles 2(3) and 2(4) of the U. N. Charter. (60) 
Nevertheless, such support cannot alter the limits the legal order 
places on combatants, even those fighting in a "just cause". The post- 
1945 international legal system has thus failed to distinguish between 
different legitimate uses of force, and to differentiate between those 
"Peoples" entitled to pursue claims for self-determination through the 
use of force, and acts of international terrorism which need to be 
detered. These failures have led to confusion regarding the use of 
force, generally. Given these omissions, third states auto-interpret 
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the factual and political significance of acceptance by a target 
government of the applicability of IHL to an armed struggle for self- 
determination. Proceeding under the duty to protect their own 
interests, such third states may prematurely re-align their diplomatic 
relations in anticipation of potential alterations to target state 
assessments of responsibility which result from the application of the 
law of war to a liberation conflict. (61) 
The effect of the application of the law of war in a struggle for 
self-determination on international opinion is discussed in this Part. 
In particular, the practical advantages to third states of recognizing 
the parties to such an armed conflict may affect the legal status of 
liberation fighters, and the normative development of terrorism as a 
justifiable means of waging a war of self-determination. 
7.2.1. Application of the Law of War and the Legal Status of Parties 
to a Conflict 
As previously noted, IHL categorically provides that the legal 
status of a party to a conflict is not affected by either the 
application of the law of war or the conclusion of special agreements. 
In particular, the status of a party to an armed conflict is not altered 
by the application of the law of war to it. Nevertheless, this position 
appears untenable in practice, as a degree of heightened status may be 
gained by means of humanitarian treatment. This is so particularly 
during a civil war, which occurrence is not treated as illegal in the 
international order. 
While certain conditions of fact may create a duty to recognize 
diplomatically that the juridical status of a state involved in a civil 
war has altered, or may soon alter, there is certainly no international 
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legal obligation to do so. For example, third states may experience a 
change in relations with a target government if only because that 
government can no longer protect foreign property and foreign persons. 
The continuation of effective international relations may require 
negotiations with a liberation group. Nevertheless, recognition of a 
"factual" situation may be premature, and thus constitute interference 
in the affairs of states affected by internal disorder. (62) Although 
it is the responsibility of the U. N. Security Council to organize 
collective efforts to prevent the spread of military operations beyond 
the confines of a single state (63), its frequent failure to do so has 
resulted in abuse of the state obligation to abstain from interference 
in the internal affairs of disrupted states. In the absence of 
effective Security Council measures, aid and assistance may be rendered 
to rebel factions fighting in a "just cause", as third states regularize 
their relations in anticipation of the success of a liberation movement 
such third states may in fact have helped. 
The legal contradictions between the U. N. principle of the equal 
rights and self-determination of "Peoples", and the rules providing for 
the inviolability of territorial integrity and political independence of 
states are brought into contact when the application of the law of war 
becomes an issue in a struggle by "Peoples" fighting for the right to 
self-determination. Where aid and assistance are rendered to a rebel 
faction (64), if only through the establishment of diplomatic links or 
the provision of humanitarian aid, the application of IHL carries 
considerable significance as an additional indication of both the 
underlying rationale and potential scope of the conflict. 
As previously discussed, a target government's inability to 
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protect sectors of its population, including foreign persons and 
property, is signaled through humanitarian treatment afforded a rebel 
group. (65) The existence of a factual situation is thus notified, and 
the factual situation, in turn, impliedly legitimizes the decision to 
invoke the law of war. Third states are under a duty to proceed in 
their own national interests, and to define their attitudes to the armed 
conflict. (66) Observance by all parties to the conflict of 
international legal wartime obligations will, in turn, determine the 
degree of protection of their interests third states may expect. (67) 
Jurisdictionally, assessments of responsibility for damage will be 
gauged by compliance with "wartime", rather than "peacetime", 
obligations, with obvious effects, e. g , on insurance cover. (68) On 
this basis, it is in the interests of third states to encourage 
liberation groups to show restraint, to seize the opportunity to act as 
protogovernments, and to show themselves willing to enter into 
negotiations with the target state to end the conflict. Thus, 
diplomatic relations with liberation groups may be contemplated 
prematurely, and humanitarian or military assistance may be afforded to 
them. In this way, the legal status of liberation groups may be 
established, and legitimated through the use of force. 
It is clear that implementation of IHL in a struggle. for self- 
determination affects international behavior towards the conflict. This 
in turn affects international recognition of the legitimacy of the 
authority representing a "People". Such recognition implies the 
acquisition of a legal status, and places the parties to a conflict in a 
position of parity. As compliance with the rules of IHL mandates 
restraint in method, evidence of such restraint on the part of a 
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liberation group will further legitimize their use of force in struggles 
to achieve self-determination. On the other hand, whether or not 
legitimated uses of force reinforce the traditional confines of IHL 
restraint is another question, as is now discussed. 
7.2.2. International Recognition of Terrorism as a Method of Warfare 
The international community in practice has yet to reach the 
point of prohibiting terrorism as either an instrument of foreign policy 
(69) or as a favored method of conflict resolution. (70) The capacity 
for violence as a tool of persuasion has been maintained in the U. N. era 
as a primary means of effecting political and social change. On this 
basis, it is clear that the use of terrorism as an instrument of policy 
or as a means of warfare opens the way to the use of the armed forces, 
whether those of a recognized "authority" or those of a state. (71) 
An international armed conflict, of which some struggles for self- 
determination now form a part pursuant to Protocol 1 Article 1(4), has 
no minimum requirements regarding intensity of violence, military 
organization, or control of territory. (72) The use of terrorism to 
open the way to the use of the armed forces is very likely the shortest 
method to aggression. As such, terrorism has been termed "... often 
... 
a deliberate preparation for an act of aggression". (73) 
The law of war is applicable from the first acts of hostilities 
or unresisted occupation, of which acts of terror-violence perpetrated 
for political purposes may form a part. This means that the legal 
qualification given to such acts must be influenced by political 
considerations of the legal consequences of recognition of an armed 
conflict. (74) As noted previously, the definition of a terrorist 
organization is left to a government. Thus, the generalized rhetoric 
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about terrorism and extradition strengthens state positions in refusing 
to recognize the underlying reasons for the first use of violence in the 
cause of self-determination. Such rhetoric permits an incumbent 
government to legitimate subsequent acts of state repression, and to 
prevent the appearance of a legal relationship with the struggling group 
for purposes of conflict resolution through political channels in an 
atmosphere of parity. (75) 
State unwillingness to invoke the IHL regime in struggles for 
self-determination, as that term is increasingly used (76), has led to a 
level of normative confusion and legal evasion which implies the 
rejection of the treaty regime in practice. (77) A primary loss 
resulting from such rejection is the exchange of restraint in method for 
humanitarian treatment in all circumstances. Rubin focuses on this 
latter point when noting as follows: 
As to U. N. General Assembly Resolutions supporting 
wars of national liberation, there seems to be some 
confusion between the Resolutions supporting the 
Justice of a particular fight as such, the jus 
ad bellum as an exception to Articles 2(3) and 
2(4) of the Charter, and 'terrorism', which 
... 
reflects either only the law of peace or, in the 
case of violence that some might want to regard as 
within the law of war, then the jus in bello, the 
limits the legal order places on soldiers even 
when fighting in a just cause. Surely it is not 
proposed that 
... 
'war crimes' in a just cause 
are not 'war crimes'. (78) 
Despite the fact that the law of war is applicable early in a 
conflict, Rubin further appears to agree with strict interpretations of 
the scope of domestic jurisdiction by asserting that although, perhaps, 
"the law of war should in fact apply to all political violence at all 
stages", the legal regime could be brought into play perhaps 
prematurely, through outside aid and assistance which constitutes 
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interference in the internal affairs of an affected state. Within the 
particular confines of struggles for self-determination, a conservative 
approach to the applicability of IHL is thus required. This appears to 
be the intent underlying the provision made in Protocol 1 for the 
authority in control of a liberation movement unilaterally to bring the 
law of war into play when it feels prepared to adequately carry out 
humanitarian provisions. (79) Such a conservative approach to the 
applicability of IHL in struggles for self-determination would appear to 
strengthen the role of sovereign authoritative interpretation in the 
U. N. era in that target states need not accept the validity of the 
liberation group's declaration, which non-acceptance weakens the 
importance of a show of restraint by liberation fighters. In view of 
the lack of concrete criteria regarding the "Peoples" entitled to self- 
determine, and procedures short of the use of force to achieve their 
auto-interpreted political goals, this appears to be a logical 
conclusion. Further, given the fact that the international community is 
largely unwilling to distinguish acts of terrorism perpetrated within 
the context of wars of self-determination as a separate phenomenon to 
that of international terrorism (80), it is perhaps clear that acts of 
terrorism, as opening the way to the use of the armed forces, will 
remain the most practical option to pressure an incumbent to implement 
IHL (81). 
Third states may be presumed to interpret correctly the factual 
and political significance of the implementation of IHL, and incumbent 
intent regarding the nature and scope of the hostilities. Terrorism as 
a method to provoke recognition of a state of war therefore is 
increasingly evident. (82) International and domestic recognition of a 
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liberation struggle will be affected by virtue of the use of violent 
force. It is thus to be wondered whether the outer boundaries of agreed 
limits on the use of force are being stretched beyond traditional 
confines of IHL restraint, to include an acceptance of terrorism as a 
legitimate or at least justifiable method of warfare against states 
which are unwilling to comply with their international legal obligations 
until forced to do so. If this should be the case, then acts of 
terrorism are to be anticipated during an armed conflict, and respect 
for IHL during armed conflict is made more problematic. 
7.3. Effects of_ Renouncing Terrorist Methods in Compliance with IHL 
Provisions 
Given U. N. inability to agree on the rules of self-determination, 
competing political interests frequently afford liberation movements 
sufficient media attention to attract outside support, and to encourage 
a positivie view of their struggle. A movement may thus gain 
international encouragement in its evolution as a viable proto- 
government for purposes of diplomatic relations. Further, practical 
advantages may pursuade many third states to recognize prematurely a 
liberation authority. Thus, restraint in an armed struggle for self- 
determination, as required by the provisions of IHL, is evidence of the 
rebeling group's intent to be responsible for the behavior of its 
subordinates and to exhibit internal discipline at all stages of its 
operations. (83) Nevertheless, such restraint is not positively 
encouraged by concerned states. 
The clear advantages to liberation movements-of the renunciation 
of certain tactical options such as the use of terrorism are discussed 
in this Part. In particular, while a show of responsibility and 
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restraint by liberation movements helps to legitimize the group's claims 
in world opinion (84), a further advantage of the renunciation of 
terrorism is the opportunity to gain sufficient outside support to 
influence the course of future such struggles by similarly situated 
groups. (85) Notwithstanding the foregoing, however, it is further 
argued that the continued use of methods of terror-violence by 
liberation groups does not make a movement or its aims less legitimate 
(86), particularly when terror methods by liberation movements form a 
pattern of self-defense against state terrorism. (87) Similarly, group 
use of terrorism in liberation wars has yet to be met with any unified 
condemnation by the international community. 
7.3.1. Application of the Law of War and the Credibility of Group Claims 
The law of war, by definition, aims at limiting and alleviating 
the effects of war. It thus makes distinctions between what is and what 
is not permitted, or legal. For example, in order to ensure the 
observance of such distinctions, armed forces must have a command 
responsible for the behavior of all subordinates. (88) Basic 
distinctions are clear-cut. Protected persons may not participate 
directly in hostilities, and may not be attacked. Protected objects 
should not become military objectives, be used for military purposes, or 
be attacked. (89) Combatants and military objectives may be attacked. 
(90) Persons and objects are granted protection due to their "function, 
value, danger factor or importance". (91) Protected status is lost 
through direct participation in hostilities (92), or as the result of 
extreme military necessity. (93) 
Civilian persons participating directly in hostilities lose their 
protection and may be attacked. Civilian objects which have become 
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military objectives may be attacked. Otherwise, the law of war grants 
fundamental protection to such persons and objects, among others, as are 
in the power of a belligerent party, neutral state, or own nationals. 
(94) Each party to an armed conflict is responsible for the treatment 
given to foreign persons under its control by its agents, in addition to 
any individual responsibility which may be incurred. (95) It is thus in 
the interests of foreign states that IHL provisions be made applicable, 
and be enforced within a state experiencing armed civil unrest. Once 
invoked, IHL mandates that humane treatment be given in all 
circumstances. (96) 
As such, military acts, the primary purpose of which is to spread 
terror, are prohibited. (97) Restraint in method is the trade-off for 
humanitarian treatment in all circumstances. Thus, a liberation 
movement's self-image as a protogovernment mandates that it refrain from 
perpetrating random acts of wanton violence while pursuing its political 
and military goals. In order to maintain a measure of legitimacy, 
behavior taken on behalf of the group must have a claim of legality. 
Nevertheless, and as previously discussed, terrorism as a method of 
conflict resolution or warfare has yet to be prohibited specifically, 
and in practice, in the international community. The U. N. has been a 
forum in which unsuccessful efforts have been made to distinguish 
terrorist tactics in the case of national liberation armed conflicts 
(98) from acts of international terrorism, er se. U. N. Resolutions and 
Declarations create exceptions to the prohibitions against the threat or 
use of force in the conduct of foreign policy, where such force is 
deemed "necessary" for the termination of colonialism, racist regimes, 
and gross oppression. (99) 
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As previously noted, the advantages of a show of restraint by a 
party involved in an armed conflict are many. Compliance with IHL 
prohibitions not only maintains sufficient credibility to prevent an 
overwhelming counter-response, or reprisals during armed conflict, but 
also forms the basis of demands for humane treatment in all 
circumstances. A show of responsibility, internal discipline, and 
restraint in method by a liberation group are indicative of its 
intentions and willingness to settle the dispute(s) provoking its use of 
force. (100) It also lends credibility to group claims that it is a 
viable protogovernment for purposes of diplomatic interaction, and the 
restoration of international peace and security. (101) 
7.3.2. The Use of Terrorism as "Justifiable" in Liberation Struggles 
As previously discussed, many members of the international 
community employ acts of terror-violence as an instrument of foreign 
policy, and/or as preparatory to otherwise prohibited acts of 
aggression. Of great concern to the maintenance of international peace 
and security is the utilization of state-instigated, -directed, or - 
conducted terrorist acts which "legitimate acts of repression and 
aggression as preventive counterterror measures". (102) Thus, pluralist 
and competing ideologies "which allow little room for 
... 
common 
understanding" (103) exacerbate the lack of clear delineation between 
states of "war" and "peace". With particular regard to the targeting of 
civilians, Kuerbitz notes as follows: 
Concurrent changes in modes of armed conflict have 
blurred the combatant/noncombatant distinction and 
further reduced the viability of the norm against 
civilian targeting. 
... 
(C)ivilians are alleged to be viable targets 
because every element of an opposing system shares 
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the guilt of that system. This characterization, 
above all, seems to justify and demand total war- 
fare in ideological conflicts 
... . 
(104) 
In similar vein, Bassouini remarks that 
(I)f the victim is an innocent person who has 
been harmed as a result of the randomness of 
the violence, then the rationalization is 
'political necessity' and the system is 
blamed for provoking the occurrence. On the 
other hand, where the victim has some repre- 
sentational capacity in the system under 
attack, the harm is 'justifiable' as 
'punishment' or 'self-defense'. (105) 
Kuerbitz takes this latter point a step further, noting that I. R. A. 
attacks on the British Cabinet, or other politicians, are characterized 
as military or political targeting, thus adding "a new dimension to the 
limitation of targets". (106) Ascertainable standards for use as 
guidelines to states are increasingly lacking, and the legal 
contradictions between sets of U. N. obligations have led to different 
national approaches to the law of war. (107) In particular, domestic 
armed violence provoked by state repression of rights entitlements has 
led to the characterization of acts of terrorism as "justifiable". 
State provocation has also resulted in the increasing involvement of 
civilian populations in armed conflicts, and the erosion of norms 
prohibiting their indiscriminate targeting. (108) 
Generalized rhetoric about terrorism and extradition. (109) by 
particular Western states, which contains broad levels of democratic 
presuppositions, at times forms a smoke screen obscuring equally viable 
arguments upon "rights" entitlements. "Peoples" struggling for self- 
determination often do so initially through political channels and too 
often, subsequently, through means which include armed force. (110) 
State authoritative interpretation as to the identification-of a 
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"terrorist" group and the legal qualifications to be attributed to its 
acts too often ignore the rights claims being made, and may thus add an 
unlimited nature to domestic penal codes circumscribing criminal 
activities. (111) This may open the way to the use of the armed forces 
without the minimal, mutual benefits of humanitarian law. Terrorist 
acts perpetrated in "self-defense" against repression can thus be 
justified. 
Modern liberation groups involved in armed conflicts also have 
access to technological developments in weaponry and sophisticated 
communications equipment, tools which may require the mobilization of 
noncombatants for the "war" effort. (112) Although unconventional 
armies are constrained in their use of weaponry and in their tactical 
options by their resources and by the need to maintain sufficient 
political legitimacy to prevent an overwhelming counter-response, their 
strategy, tactics, and access to weaponry reflect support by their 
constituency. (113) This is particularly so when the use of violence is 
in "self-defense". The ready proliferation of terrorism in struggles 
for self-determination thus tends further "to justify efficiency-based 
claims for the targeting of civilians". (114) 
For these reasons, foreign state diplomatic or financial 
recognition of the viability of a liberation movement's struggle for 
self-determination, even where premature in a strictly legal sense 
(115), may be practical both to help stabilize a domestic situation, and 
to ensure the protection of foreign persons and objects caught in the 
conflict. Foreign state pressure on a target government can help to 
motivate the requisite political will to negotiate an end to the 
hostilities. In that the international community is hesitant to 
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intervene in a domestic uprising, the use of terrorism by a liberation 
movement may well be the most important means of pressure upon an 
incumbent government to implement IHL provisions (116), and to approach 
the liberation group with a degree of parity for purposes of 
negotiations. Either way, while the eschewing of terrorist methods by 
liberation groups reinforces a self-image as a protogovernment for 
purposes of responsible international behavior and diplomatic 
interaction, the continued use of terror-violence remains viable in a 
post-1945 era which makes illegal the threat or use of force as an 
instrument of "foreign" policy. The continued use of terrorist methods 
by liberation groups to counter measures or mechanisms of state 
repression or counterterrorist activity also clouds the issues involved 
in the conflict, and prevents any real progress towards the point of 
negotiation between equals. (117) 
It has been noted that liberation movements which have had the 
opportunity to mature in terms of organization, and which are subject to 
internal discipline such as to ensure levels of acceptable behavior on 
the part of all subordinates, have renounced the use of terror-violence 
as a part of an overall political strategy. (118) Where terror tactics 
in support of a struggle continue after such a renunciation, the 
responsibility tends to be that of more extremist elements within the 
organization, a circumstance also suffered in state military 
hierarchies. 
The renunciation of terrorist methods means restraint in method, 
and care in the targeting of military objectives. It is in the 
interests of both parties to a conflict to invoke and observe IHL 
provisions. It is also in the interests of foreign states that IHL 
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govern the conduct of a "domestic" armed conflict and that the spread of 
military activites be confined to the target state's territorial 
boundaries. (119) The renunciation of methods of terror-violence by 
either party to an armed conflict provides the opportunity to gain 
foreign state support. Nevertheless, where continued in a sporadic 
fashion, the separability of such methods from the overall political 
strategies of either party to a conflict does not make less legitimate 
either's political objectives. In view of the widespread use of 
terrorism in the international community at large, what is clear is that 
its use is emerging as a ". justifiable" method of control, as well as the 
most "efficient" means to counter acts of gross repression. (120) 
7.4. Normative Effects of-the Use of Violent Force to Achieve the 
Goals of Self-Determination 
In view of state use of terrorism as an instrument of foreign and 
domestic policy, or as preparatory to otherwise prohibited acts of 
aggression, it is clear that a terror impact does not, alone, de- 
legitimize any political strategy in which it forms a tactic. Existing 
normative expectations which result from state practice reflect the 
degree of tolerance for certain levels of forcible action, if only of 
those levels characterized as "necessary" for the continued maintenance 
of international peace and security. (121) In that political inferences 
and normative expectations may be drawn by foreign policy decision 
makers from what states in fact do rather than from what states ought to 
do, evidence of state practice implies that "one ought to orient oneself 
in the international legal system by reference to 
... 
incidents rather 
than primarily by reference to statutes, treaties, venerable custom and 
judicial and arbitral opinions". (122) 
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This Part will discuss normative expectations regarding the use 
of terrorism in the context of armed struggles by "Peoples" for their 
rights to self-determination. In particular, it is argued that 
ambiguous state practice in the enforcement of IHL limitations on 
military strategies and activities means that the pursuit of-change 
through methods of terrorism rather than through political channels has 
resulted in the rejection in practice of the IHL treaty form, and in 
many examples of non-regulated low-intensity, surrogate armed conflicts. 
It is concluded that, while it is premature to attempt to distinguish 
what normative effect terrorism may have on the authority to use force 
to achieve self-determination (123), the use of terrorism as a method of 
conflict resolution in struggles for self-determination is a 
characteristic of the rejection in practice of the restraint mandated by 
the law of war. 
7.4.1. Application of the Law of War and Considerations of Efficiency 
While states may take preparatory actions in view of a possible 
armed conflict in order to fulfil their obligations under the law of 
war, they remain under an obligation to refrain from actions or behavior 
which might provoke an armed conflict to occur. (124) Further, matters 
within single state jurisdictional competence should remain so, unless 
"internationalized" sufficiently to require 'discussion and/or 
intervention by the world community. (125) Given the weakness of the 
U. N. collective security system, however, interference in the internal 
affairs of other states falling short of the direct use or threat of the 
use of force is increasingly the pattern of state practice. (126) 
Methods of terror-violence, as previously discussed, remain an 
efficient tactic to open the way to the use of the military, and to the 
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dangers of the spread of military operations beyond the territorial 
confines of a single state. The "internationalization" potential of 
many contemporary domestic rebellions is clear. (127) Thus, it has been 
observed that "(a)ny act of international terrorism practically results 
from a direct or indirect involvement of any state or an unlawful 
connivance therein". (128) Assuming that foreign state aid and 
assistance to liberation factions may be the shortest route to full- 
scale inter-state aggression, or may constitute deliberate preparation 
for such aggression, the problem of stopping the use of methods of 
terrorism is one of states meeting the international committments 
outlined in formal sources of law. (129) 
Nevertheless, acts of terrorism perpetrated by auto-determined 
"Peoples" struggling for their right to self-determination indicate that 
hostilities have begun, and that the law of war should attach to the 
situation. This is so in view of the widespread use of violence as a 
mode of international behavior, generally. Despite the political 
dangers to threatened governments of reclassifying the legal 
qualifications attributed to the domestic use of force, implementation 
of IHL should naturally result once hostilities begin on the basis of 
the common interests of all parties involved, including those of foreign 
states. (130) 
Given modern levels of violence, the eschewing of terrorist 
methods appears almost a self-imposed limitation of tactical options. 
Where public order and investment interests are threatened, tactics of 
counter-coercion are required. Expectations of authority and control 
frequently result in state terrorism and a general erosion of human 
rights. Terrorist acts in response to repression are indicative of 
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available resources. Subsequent terror methods of domestic control in 
response prevent real progress in the pursuit of a restoration of the 
peace and/or of system transformation through political channels. (131) 
For both parties to a liberation conflict, acts of terrorism are quick, 
efficient, and often highly effective. For either side to limit its 
tactical options in such a conflict, and no longer to use available 
means of violent action, would be to chance failure. It would thus be 
difficult to attempt to draw firm conclusions regarding the role 
restraint plays on the viability of IHL, when successful wars of self- 
determination have utilized acts of terrorism through necessity or in 
self-defense. 
7.4.2. Terrorism and Its Normative Development as a Method of Warfare 
As previously discussed, there is insufficient international 
consensus regarding acts of terrorism to result in common understandings 
of definitively prohibited acts. (132) On the other hand, it is 
commonly agreed that an invasion cannot be justified when made "under 
the pretext of combating terrorism or for giving up the fight against 
terrorism". (133) Acts of violence generally included under the aegis 
of "terrorism" are condemned on the basis of formal sources of law which 
prohibit the use of violent force, such as the U. N. Charter, the IHL 
treaty regime, the human rights treaty regime and the Convention on the 
Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, among others. 
Issue-specific treaties such as the Hostages Convention, those 
applicable to civil aviation and those concerning the safety of 
internationally protected persons such as diplomatic agents prohibit 
specific violent acts. Unfortunately, political power considerations 
affect the practice of states in their observance of the rules, and thus 
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should be taken into account when assessing the development of emerging 
norms in international law. (134) In particular, new uses of 
transboundary force and interference in the affairs of other states, 
e. a , humanitarian aid, or collective self-defense (135), illustrate the 
tension created in modern politics between a rule arising from the 
process of international custom, and one arising by virtue of its 
incorporation into a treaty form. (136) 
Terrorism as an emerging method of conflict resolution would thus 
appear to be a use of force readily apparent in state practice, and thus 
a symptom of the reality of modern power structures. A further 
complicating factor in accepting the "permissibility" of the use of 
terrorism in practice is the prohibition against the threat or use of 
force by states in their international relations against the territorial 
integrity or political independence of any other state. While the 
threat or use of force by states constitutes a violation of 
international law, and a war of aggression constitutes a crime against 
international peace (137), the incidence of state-directed, -controlled, 
or -instigated acts of terrorism is increasingly viewed as a fact of 
life in the international community. 
Any determination of international custom "as evidence of a 
general practice accepted as law" (138) must take into consideration 
compliance with and enforcement of the rules. The underlying rationale 
for the rules in existence must also remain relevant to support the 
perceived need for their continued existence, and to support state 
compliance with and enforcement of them. Given that state action 
designed to comply with and enforce multilateral treaty rules for the 
arrest, punishment and extradition of terrorist perpetrators has proven 
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inadequate, it must be wondered whether the rationale for the rules in 
place is entirely relevant to explain the continued use of terrorism. 
(139) 
One result of sovereignty is that the interests of all parties to 
an armed conflict will differ according to their respective needs when 
it comes time to implement IHL provisions, and to observe and enforce 
IHL rules. (140) Actual expectations-of and committment to these rules 
can then be tested through consistency of approach. Even where there is 
consistency in practice, however, there is a need to establish whether 
action taken in compliance with the law of war is believed to be legally 
binding, or merely voluntary, in order to provide criteria by which to 
test future expectations, gauge normative content, and develop existing 
provisions. (141) 
It is doubtful whether mere acceptance of the IHL regime is 
indicative of state approval of the provisions, or established state 
practice in the use of force during an armed conflict. Given the 
efficiency considerations involved in such asymmetric conflicts as 
struggles for self-determination, normative developments in this 
category of armed conflict appear to be emerging which support the 
violent use of force. The ready adoption of such methods of warfare 
effectively implies a rejection in practice of much of the treaty form, 
and is characteristic of the rejection of the prohibition against wars 
of aggression in modern politics. It thus must be wondered whether the 
rationale for the rules in place remains relevant to states involved in 
aggression, and whether further development of IHL must be considered in 
order to face the modern reality of the ready use of indiscriminate 
violence. 
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Widespread reliance is placed on the law of war by states in 
word, if not in practice. This fact, when coupled with contradictory 
claims regarding the propriety of war law during liberation conflicts 
has led to a blurring of state consensus and normativity regarding the 
permissibility of terror methods. Further, traditional rules are 
inadequate to politically prohibit some methods of modern warfare, e. g . 
nuclear weaponry. (142) A situation of normative blurring may lead to 
flexible standards of military necessity, but does nothing to control 
their evolution. Developments which involve permissibility in the use 
of terror methods of warfare appear, thus, to encourage the pre-eminance 
of state political considerations, to the detriment of state willingness 
to observe IHL obligations. 
A rule emerges when states are in compliance with it, and are 
willing to enforce it. In that states politically reject the 
applicability of IHL in struggles for self-determination to which IHL is 
relevant, it is, clear that the rationale underlying the law of war is 
not yet entirely considered relevant to struggles for self- 
determination. It is further clear that a customary use of terrorism by 
all parties to such conflicts risks the normative development of clear 
exceptions to U. N. prohibitions against the use or threat of aggressive 
armed force. State inability to distinguish between terrorist war 
tactics and acts of international terrorism is a factor in this 
development, and is not calculated to strengthen the observance of the 
second most important operable legal regime in the international 
community. 
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8. Legal Obstacles to Prosecution of Breaches of IHL 
The suppression and prevention of war crimes, and the securing of 
humane treatment, are primary purposes of IHL. Instruments which 
attempt to fulfill these purposes include the St. Petersburg Declaration 
of 1868, the Hague Conventions of 1907, the Geneva Conventions of 1929 
and 1949 and the supplementary Protocols of 1977. (1) Nevertheless, 
"grave breaches" and not "war crimes" are all that are described in the 
429 articles of the four Geneva Conventions of 1949 (2), and High 
Contracting Parties are obligated to enact legislation to punish "grave 
breaches" of the Conventions. Such legislation should implement the 
obligation contained in the Geneva Conventions to seek out and prosecute 
or extradite for trial all persons, whatever their nationality, who 
commit or order to be committed any of the grave breaches defined in the 
codifications. (3) This system establishes the principle of 
universality of jurisdiction with respect to grave breaches. (4) 
In 1977 the term "war crime" was expressly adopted in Article 
85(5) of Protocol 1, which states that "(w)ithout prejudice to the 
application of the Conventions and of this Protocol, grave breaches of 
these instruments shall be regarded as war crimes". This provision, 
read together with Article 75(7) of Protocol 1, suggests that High 
Contracting Parties should incorporate "grave breaches" into their 
domestic legislation as "war crimes", thereby reinforcing the 
universality of jurisdiction to suppress illicit acts of violence. (5) 
The suppression of acts of terrorist violence perpetrated during armed 
struggles for self-determination would come within such measures. 
Notwithstanding the foregoing, the hesitance of states to extend 
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the scope of their jurisdiction to pursue and prosecute "war criminals", 
either substantively or procedurally, is discussed in this Chapter, and 
it is argued that there are intrinsic obstacles to the full utilization 
of IHL quite apart from the diversity of individual, state criminal 
systems. In this regard, it would appear that states are unwilling to 
recognize the primacy of law over, or in, politics. Sovereign. or 
executive authoritative power is used to interpret and qualify violent 
acts of war as "terrorism". This, then, implies that the judiciary are 
politicized, as states show themselves unwilling to apply penal law to 
state affairs. As a result, judicial restraint is required when such 
matters as foreign policy, state security, and national defense are 
involved. 
By way of preliminary discussion, it is argued that state 
unwillingness to utilize IHL as the framework within which to prosecute 
war crimes represents a denial of the individual protections afforded by 
IHL against the power of states. The norm of individual international 
responsibility for war crimes and the punishment of persons convicted of 
their perpetration are main principles of IHL. However, the punishment 
of persons found guilty of war crimes does not absolve the state from 
responsibility. On the contrary, state responsibility for war crimes is 
even more serious, particularly where such acts assume a state-organized 
character. (6) This point was made apparent at Nuremburg in 1945. 
States may also bear subsidiary responsibility for failure to suppress 
such acts, as was seen during the War in Viet Nam. 
As previously discussed, many obstacles to prosecuting war crimes 
perpetrated during liberation wars appear to arise from the friction 
created between contexts of state sovereignty and state equality in the 
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U. N. system. Notions of military and police necessity have expanded in 
the face of the non-development of obsolete Hague rules, and the 
availability of human rights derogations during times of national 
emergency. States prefer to characterize non-state acts of violence as 
terrorism through politicized contexts of domestic criminal law, rather 
than to utilize IHL for purposes of guidance or analysis. States do not 
appear thus to consider a humanitarian issue structure sufficiently 
relevant to many wars of national liberation to distinguish and separate 
acts of international terrorism from illicit acts of war. (7) 
Of interest, while the criminality of certain acts is established 
in IHL (8), devising concrete sanctions for their perpetration is left 
to internal law, (9) In other words, the establishment of the principle 
of universality of suppression of war crimes in IHL still leaves the 
actual exercise of criminal jurisdiction to individual states. (10) 
Thus, in that the categorization of certain acts as criminal 
contemplates the possibility of punishment, two juridical categories 
emerge as equal: recognition of certain acts as criminal in 
international law, and provision for the exercise of criminal 
jurisdiction and punishment under internal law. These two categories 
arguably incur the same juridical consequences on the basis of 
responsibility for criminal acts. 
Nevertheless, this system would appear to involve some intrusion 
into individual state domestic penal and military codes - the very 
indicia of state sovereignty. In practical terms, states utilize 
executive or sovereign power to restrict control by the legal 
authorities over disputes which may involve sensitive political issues 
such as service-related offenses committed on behalf of the state, or 
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acts which may require the judiciary to pronounce on the very legality 
of a war. (11) There is also the desire to prevent disclosure of the 
origin of a war crime at too high a level. 
Further, the qualification of a grave breach is totally 
independent of municipal law, even where a state has no "war crime" 
offense in its national legislation. A grave breach is thus not 
dependent upon its characterization as a lawful or unlawful act under 
the law of the country where the act is done. The universality 
principle of the suppression of war crimes stretches beyond the 
territoriality principle of jurisdiction applicable in domestic criminal 
codes, to apply theoretically to the exercise of jurisdiction over 
aliens for acts committed abroad against other aliens which may not have 
affected the state required to exercise that jurisdiction. This 
universality of war crimes jurisdiction is exercised according to a two- 
pronged test: (a) the presence of an international rule which 
obligates the state to exercise jurisdiction over the person of any 
alleged war criminal, so as to establish in personam jurisdiction, and 
(b) the recognition that the act complained of is a crime under 
international law, which yields subject matter jursdiction. 
It is argued that the IHL system cannot but rest on an assumption 
of the supremacy of its principles and rules over municipal. law, 
especially with regard to grave breaches of its provisions, or war 
crimes. In the absence of a permanent international war crimes 
tribunal, established along the ad hoc lines of Nuremburg, it would 
appear appropriate to regard domestic courts as agents of the 
international system. Yet, considerations of state power and authority 
often prevail over the legislative implementation and prosecution of war 
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crimes, if only through a recharacterization of grossly illicit acts 
perpetrated during an actual armed conflict as offences subject to 
military disciplinary procedures. The ready identification of war 
crimes perpetrators has thus been hampered by the lack of attention paid 
to up-dating and developing Hague law (12), the hesitance in the 
international community regarding the recognition of a state of war 
(13), and the presence of state procedural and substantive obstacles. 
In particular, many states are unwilling to call for the implementation 
of IHL in wars of self-determination. 
The structure of this Chapter is as follows. Procedural and 
substantive difficulties encountered in the organization of the first 
major war crimes trials held at Nuremburg (IMT) in 1945 -6 are briefly 
outlined in the First Part. In particular, it has been posited that 
these trials took place only because the aggressor nations 
unconditionally surrendered, and were militarily occupied. This 
position is of particular interest in view of recent U. N. initiatives to 
establish an ad hoc war crimes tribunal to prosecute persons responsible 
for serious violations of IHL since 1991 in the territory of former 
Yugoslavia. (14) 
The atrocities perpetrated during the Viet Nam War are discussed 
in the Second Part, along with some of the difficulties encountered 
regarding the prosecution of their perpetrators. These difficulties 
were due in large part to the obsolescence of Hague law (15), and to the 
domestic confinement of IHL within U. S. military law. (16) In that the 
War in Viet Nam has been characterized as both a Geneva Conventions 
Common Article 2 and Common Article 3 situation (17), it is of 
particular interest that that war helped to prompt the 1977 Protocols to 
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the 1949 Geneva Conventions. 
Many general political and legal obstacles to the prosecution of 
breaches of IHL are discussed in the Third Part, not the least of which 
arises from modern notions of state sovereignty. The relevance of these 
obstacles to the issue of the separability of terrorist acts perpetrated 
in wars of self-determination is reviewed in the Fourth Part. 
It is concluded that state unwillingness to recognize situations 
of armed conflict and/or to characterize terrorist acts perpetrated 
during them as war crimes risks the viability of IHL as an area of 
international law, particularly as much of this legal regime relies 
heavily on state self-regulation. In particular, the lack of ready 
state adherence to IHL prohibitions and obligations implies that any 
international co-operative effort to deter and prosecute violent actors 
will not succeed. Thus, rather than the realities of modern wars for 
self-determination mandating an expansive approach to the development of 
an international penal law of armed conflicts, a restrictive approach 
may instead be the result. 
8.1. The Nuremburg International Military Tribunal and the Development 
of, the Notion of War Crimes Jurisdiction 
As previously discussed, IHL was formulated in the late 
Nineteenth and early Twentieth Centuries by states with mutual interests 
in limiting the strategic tactics employed in the event of an armed 
conflict. (18) In particular, the essential feature of the system 
established in the Hague Conventions of 1899 and 1907 on the Laws and 
Customs of War on Land required that High Contracting Parties undertook 
to instruct their armed forces in accordance with the Regulations 
annexed to the Convention, and to enforce the Regulations through their 
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own internal penal systems. (19) This use of domestic jurisdiction 
reinforced the notion that while international duties and liabilities 
could be imposed on individuals, their duty of allegiance was to the 
state. Thus, war crimes jurisdiction rested within the exclusive 
domestic province of each High Contracting Party, and the individual was 
not directly in contact with international law. 
This situation was to change after 1945, when the Nuremburg and 
Tokyo Tribunals (20) were convened to try individuals for the first time 
in accordance with international rules. A similar post-war prosecution 
had been attempted unsuccessfully after World War 1 (21), and the 
factors which combined after World War 2 to bring the Tribunals about 
are of interest. Thus, the role played by the unconditional surrender 
of Germany on the historic events in Nuremburg, Germany, is now 
discussed, in addition to the jurisdictional bases on which Nuremburg 
depended for its ultimate contribution to the development of an 
international penal law of armed conflicts. 
8.1.1. The Assumption of Supreme Authority, over Germany, by the Allies 
By means of the Berlin Declaration of the unconditional surrender 
of Germany, issued on 5 June 1945, the Governments of the U. S., the 
U. K., the U. S. S. R., and the Provisional Government of the French 
Republic assumed supreme authority with respect to a German. Government 
which had ceased to exist. The exercise of authority was devolved upon 
the Commanders-in-Chief severally, each in his zone, and jointly in the 
chief matters affecting Germany as a whole. This assumption of supreme 
authority over the German state was not intended to effect its 
annexation, but was founded in a form of completed conquest or 
subjugation. In other words, the Allied Control Commission was to act 
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as the agency through which the Government of Germany was carried on. 
The Commission's acts in law were to be attributable not to the Allied 
states but to the deliberately maintained state of Germany, in continued 
being as a legal entity. 
The Allied occupation of Germany was intended to be of a purely 
temporary nature which allowed for the continued existence of an old 
state, while a mechanism through which the Government of Germany could 
be carried on pending a final settlement was provided. (22) The 
Government of Germany was to be carried on in the name of the U. N. and, 
it was hoped, the ultimate responsibility of the Occupying Powers would 
also inhere in the U. N. In this way, control of a defeated Germany by 
four states was established. Through the assumption of supreme 
authority, including the authority of the central and local organs of 
government, military rule was imposed pending a peace settlement, de- 
Nazification programs, and a period of re-education in democratic 
responsibilities. (23) 
Under these circumstances, there could be no other courts in 
Germany than the investigatory and prosecutorial'organs of the four 
Powers. Further, the joint intention to detain and surrender war 
criminals was indicated in the Berlin Declaration, which detention and 
surrender were to be effected at any time. On 8 August 1945, the London 
Agreement between the Governments of the designated states was signed 
"(f)or the prosecution and punishment of the major war criminals of the 
European Axis", by which the IMT was instituted to try those criminals 
"whose offenses have no particular geographical location". (24) The 
Charter of the Tribunal was ratified simultaneously, the Preamble of 
which declared that the Allies were acting "in the interests of all the 
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United Nations". (25) Every participating government was invited to 
adhere to the Charter. The Charter represented the law by which the 
Tribunal judges were governed in their actions, even though the rules of 
procedure were decided by the judges themselves. Counsel were supplied 
to the defendants, but allegations of a de facto inequality between 
prosecution and defense plagued the entire proceedings. 
Widespread knowledge of German atrocities and the assumption of 
supreme authority over a defeated Germany created the conditions 
necessary for an international war crimes trial to occur. In that war 
criminals were traditionally tried either by national courts or by 
capturing forces, Nuremburg was a major departure. Prisoners of war 
detained by the four Allied Powers were surrendered for purposes of 
transport to Nuremburg, and trial and punishment by an international 
judicial body convened in accordance with international rules. The 
indictment-which expressed the common position of the four Powers was 
intended as a precedent for future use. Offenses against the law of war 
were carried over in 1949 into codified form in the four Geneva 
Conventions. "Grave breaches" thus may be considered paraphrases of the 
war crimes and crimes against humanity detailed in the Nuremburg 
Charter, albeit amended and expanded to include additional activities 
committed during World War 2. (26) 
The function of the assumption and exercise of sovereignty over 
German territory to provide a jurisdictional basis for the Charter and 
Tribunal however leaves at least one issue unresolved. The Nuremburg 
principles were applied to crimes committed on the territory of 
I 
sovereign states occupied by Germany during the war, and which never 
unconditionally surrendered to the allied Powers in 1945. The extension 
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of jurisdiction to "major war criminals of the European Axis countries" 
(27) is thus difficult to reconcile with the assertion of jurisdiction 
as a function of the assumption of control over Germany, unless it is 
argued that territorial occupation allowed sufficient control to impose 
this extension in the jurisdictional basis of the Tribunal, (28) 
Unfortunately, Nuremburg and Tokyo have proved to be a unique 
experience in the post-1945 era. This would appear to indicate that 
states are unwilling since 1945 to extend the scope of their 
jurisdiction or international co-operation to pursue and prosecute war 
criminals. This is despite recent U. N. initiatives to establish an 
international tribunal to prosecute atrocities perpetrated since 1991 in 
the territory of the former Yugoslavia. (29) Thus, in that states 
retain a discretionary power in the enforcement of international 
obligations which bear upon individuals, it would also appear that state 
unwillingness to utilize IHL could represent a denial of the individual 
protections afforded, and a preference to recognize the primacy of 
politics over law. 
8.1.2. The Jurisdictional Bases for the Trial and Punishment of the 
Major War Criminals of the European Axis Countries 
Throughout World War 2, various statements were made by the 
leaders of the United Nations regarding the fate of the Nazi war 
criminals. While it is beyond the scope of the present discussion to 
detail the source and content of the many ideas voiced, a brief review 
of the jurisdictional bases leading to the Nuremburg Judgment is of 
interest. 
8.1.2.1. Crimes of No Geographical Location 
As previously discussed, the Nuremburg trial was generally based 
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on the universality principle of jurisdiction. Nevertheless, the Moscow 
Declaration of 1 November 1943 (30), reiterated in the London Agreement 
of 8 August 1945, noted that only the major war criminals whose offenses 
were of no geographical location were to be tried. Other war criminals 
were "(to) be sent back to the countries in which their abominable deeds 
were done in order that they may be judged and punished according to the 
laws of these liberated countries and of the free Governments that will 
be created therein". 
Once agreement had been reached regarding the fact of a trial of 
the major war criminals (31), the jurisdictional basis of the IMT was 
indicated as follows: 
The making of the Charter was the exercise of the sovereign 
legislative power by the countries to which the German Reich 
unconditionally surrendered; and the undoubted right of 
these countries to legislate for the occupied territories 
had been recognized by the civilized world, The Charter is 
not an arbitrary exercise of power on the part of the 
victorious nations, 
... , 
it is the expression of interna- 
tional law existing at the time of its creation; and to that 
extent is itself a contribution to international law. 
The Signatory Powers created this Tribunal, defined the law it 
was to administer, and made regulations for the proper conduct 
of the Trial. In doing so, they have done together what as 
one of them might have done singly: for it is not to be doubted 
that any nation has the right thus to set up special courts to 
administer law. (Emphasis added. ) (32) 
It would appear that the primary concern in the quoted passage is 
jurisdiction. As previously discussed, traditional concepts of 
jurisdiction over perpetrators of war crimes were linked to territory, 
in that the character of an illicit act was determined by the law of the 
country where the act was done. Given the locus of many atrocities, a 
complete alteration of this principle was required in order to proceed 
with the war crimes trials. Thus, the remit of the Nuremburg Tribunal 
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to try war criminals of the European Axis nations whose crimes had no 
geographical location is of particular interest. 
The Nuremburg principles were applied to crimes committed after 
the actual outbreak of war in 1939. It was in relation to such crimes 
only that the principle of universality was fully implemeted. Crimes 
with a particular geographical location were to be tried and punished in 
accordance with the principle of territoriality. (33) 
8.1.2.2. Diversity of Legal Systems 
Similar to the problems encountered in 1937 with the Terrorist 
Convention (34), agreement among the four Powers regarding the procedure 
and substantive law with which to prosecute Nazi war criminals proved 
problematic. The U. S. and the U. K. both have common law systems. 
France has a civil code system, and the U. S. S. R., a socialist one, which 
at the time was considered close in many ways to the civil law. Despite 
the diversity of legal systems involved, consensus had to be reached for 
purposes of the London Charter, and the drafting of an indictment. 
Thus, there were problems involved both with the content of the crimes 
involved, and the rules of procedures with which to prosecute them. 
Nevertheless, agreement was reached, and Section 2, Article 6 
contained the three charges to be alleged. (35) The text of Article 6, 
as finally approved, contained no explicit charge of conspiracy to 
commit war crimes or other atrocities. Charge One regarded crimes 
against peace, Charge Two regarded war crimes, and Charge Three 
concerned crimes against humanity. However, at the end of Article 6, 
the following phrase appears: 
Leaders, organizers, instigators and accomplices participating 
in the formulation or execution of a common plan or conspiracy 
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to commit any of the foregoing crimes are responsible for all 
acts performed by any persons in execution of such plan. 
This phrase implies that the major war criminals were personally 
responsible for a common plan or conspiracy to commit all the horrors 
and atrocities which had occurred, and not just those contained in Count 
One. This implication would effectively reach pre-1939 atrocities 
against Germans - particularly Jews - which could not be independently 
treated as war crimes. This implication would further support a change 
in the notion of territoriality, in favor of universality of 
jurisdiction over perpetrators whose acts had no fixed geographical 
location, i. e, whose orders were executed within the states occupied by 
the Nazis. In part this assumption of universality allowed the trial of 
one defendant in absentia. However, Count One of the indictment, 
entitled "The Common Plan or Conspiracy", gave rise to the opinion that 
the three offenses were to be handled differently (36), and the Tribunal 
declined to support the contention that the conspiracy charge also 
related to war crimes or crimes against humanity. (37) This meant that 
Counts Three and Four, which accused the defendants of conspiracies, 
were effectively beyond the jurisdiction conferred on the Tribunal by 
the Charter. 
Additional difficulties arose over U. S. pressure to prosecute 
criminal organizations. (38) Not only did such organizations need to be 
designated, but further, protest was voiced that the consequences of a 
finding of organizational guilt would lead to a presumption of 
individual guilt on the mere basis of membership, and thus to a flood of 
defendants. Further, substantial procedural problems arose, not the 
least of which were the adversarial common law practices of cross- 
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examination and judicial neutrality. 
Compromise regarding procedure was reached far more easily. 
Rules for the content of the indictment, the role to be played by the 
judges, prosecutors, and defense attorneys, the admissibility of 
evidence, and voting procedures for the judges were agreed, but remained 
malleable in view of the uncertainties which were likely to arise during 
the course of the trial. 
8.1.2.3. Leszal Objections 
-to 
the Jurisdiction of Nuremburg 
In addition to jurisdictional difficulties, it is of interest 
that basic legal principles of fairness were allegedly sidestepped. The 
primary problem encountered was the allegation of ex post facto law 
regarding crimes against peace, and the demise of the defense of 
superior orders. 
Efforts after World War 1 to deter states from the ready use of 
armed force in their international relations were many. (39) When 
Charge One regarding crimes against peace was first formulated, however, 
sharp disagreement existed whether there was in fact such a crime under 
international law. Article 6 states in pertinent part as follows: 
The following acts, or any of them, are crimes coming 
within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal for which there 
shall be individual responsibility: 
(a) Crimes Against Peace: namely, planning, preparation, 
initiation or waging of a war of aggression, or a war in 
violation of international treaties, agreements or assur- 
ances, or participation in a common plan or conspiracy for 
the accomplishment of any of the foregoing; 
... 
Taylor notes that, in part, the charge met the prevailing wish for 
retribution. (40) Beyond this, though, many theories were aired which 
sought to justify recognition of an existing prohibition in 
international law against aggression. One commentator (41) urged that 
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the individual crime of aggression and the international delinquency of 
aggressive war were to be distinguished, in that a state was guilty 
should it allow hostilities to be conducted from its territory. This 
would remove the element of intent from the crime, even though it would 
be necessary to consider the intent of an accused by examining the 
significance and extent of his authority over the use of such force. 
Another objection relied on the Kellogg-Briand Pact of 1928 (42), which 
did not forbid the acts of private persons, nor had any state 
implemented its provisions domestically by 1939. A third argument was 
that pre-World War 2 inter-state agreements not having the status of 
customary law could not be relied on. 
Dissent was heard from the Russians and the French regarding the 
inclusion of aggressive war as an international crime. (43) After much 
discussion, however, the scope of the charge was confined by Article 1 
of the Charter, which provided "for the'just and prompt trial and 
punishment of the major war criminals of the European Axis". This was 
then repeated in the introductory paragraph of Article 6, which put the 
crime of aggressive war on the same plane of generality with the other 
defined crimes. In this way, crimes against peace gained a limited 
' acceptance as international crimes. 
As for the defense of superior orders, Article 8 of the Charter 
provides as follows: 
The fact that the Defendant acted pursuant to order of his 
Government or of a superior shall not free him from responsi- 
bility, but may be considered in mitigation of punishment if 
the Tribunal determines that justice so requires. 
I One basis for this shift was that the act in question ought not be 
deprived of its character as a war crime simply because it was 
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perpetrated under orders. Similarly, the perpetrator should not be 
immune from punishment. (44) While such a conclusion would appear 
logical, the removal of the defense represented to some yet another 
example of gx post facto law, particularly where a defendant might not 
know and/or have any basis for knowing that an order was unlawful. 
Nevertheless, Article 8 fully supported the imposition of individual, as 
well as state, responsibility for the perpetration of war crimes. (45) 
Thus, Nuremburg helped to establish the universality of war 
crimes jurisdiction, subsquently incorporated in the 1949 Geneva 
Conventions and extended in Protocol 1. It also recognized that 
responsibility for war crimes allowed the punishment of members of the 
armed forces for illicit acts perpetrated under orders, and that 
commanders and/or civilian policy makers who issue unlawful orders 
present the individual member of the forces with a choice in action. 
Thus, while commanders traditionally effected a shield against 
widespread liability for war crimes, the reverse has perhaps now become 
the case, in that individual responsibility frequently prevents 
disclosure of the origin of a war crime at too high a level. 
8.2. ºe Prosecution oL Viet Nam Atrocities 
As previously discussed, international law leaves the exercise of 
criminal jurisdiction to states, which then apply national law to war 
criminals. Nevertheless, state procedural and substantive obstacles 
result in hesitation to recognize a situation of armed conflict 
occurring within domestic territorial borders. Frequently, states do 
not have an offense of "war crime" implemented into domestic 
legislation. The ready identification of war crimes perpetrators has 
thus been hampered, the preference being either to prosecute violent 
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actors under penal codes, or to confine breaches of discipline to 
military law. Where this is the case, the accurate characterization of 
illicit acts is highly constricted. 
In that there is no permanent international war crimes tribunal, 
it would appear appropriate to regard domestic courts as agents of the 
international system. (46) Nevertheless, U. S. case law arising from the 
Viet Nam War illustrates two problems with this agency argument. The 
first is that breaches of the existing military code were dealt with 
under military law. This meant that many atrocities were either not 
punished, or were handled leniently, particularly in view of the 
obsolescence of Hague law. Of interest, the Viet- Nam War prompted the 
up-dating of the 1949 Geneva Conventions, by up-dating Hague and Geneva 
law in Protocol 1, in 1977. The second problem is that the prosecution 
of civilian policy makers for aggression was made impossible by the 
doctrine of judicial restraint, and the absence of express U. S. 
legislation for this purpose. 
The factors surrounding the non-development of Hague law after 
1945, and the effects of this on military attitudes during the Viet Nam 
confrontation are now outlined, after which U. S. domestic jurisdictional 
obstacles to prosecuting war crimes are discussed. 
8.2.1. The. Obsolescence Hague Law 
Hague law could not regulate methods of warfare unknown in 1899 
and 1907. Thus, a basic guideline propelling war law is the Martens 
Clause, contained in the Preamble of the 1899 and 1907 Conventions, and 
subsequently incorporated in Article 1 of Protocol 1. (47) The 
implication from the Martens Clause is that what is not expressly 
prohibited in warfare is not necessarily permitted. Instead, 
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technological and humanitarian concerns are to provide the standard by 
which to interpret the main text of the treaties and annexed 
Regulations. 
World War 1 showed the insufficiency of this premise and 
subsequent efforts to curb the use of force in international relations 
resulted in the neglect of war law. Instead, the only codification of 
note at the time was the 1925 Geneva Protocol for the Prohibition of the 
Use of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases and of Bacteriological 
Methods of Warfare, which entered into force on 8 February 1928. Other 
areas which needed attention were rules concerning hostages, reprisals, 
civilians, military necessity, air and sea warfare, and the 
participation clause. (48) 
The result of this neglect was the manner in which World War 2 
was fought. Mechanized weaponry, long-range artillery, submarines, 
aerial warfare, chemical warfare, and tanks made an organized appearance 
as part of the new doctrine of global or total war. This doctrine first 
appeared during World War 1, and asserts that the source of military 
conflicts and violations of the laws and customs of war lies in 
technological development. Economic competition for new markets and 
resources among capitalist states becomes thus a prime source of 
hostility. Nevertheless, so long as Western nations were at war with 
each other, efforts to humanize war were made. 
The result of such technological progress was a change in the 
manner of waging war. It no longer appeared to make sense to 
distinguish in practice between military and non-military objectives, to 
use measures of military constraint, or to avoid collateral damage to 
civilian areas. This led to alterations in understanding regarding the 
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content of the doctrine of military necessity (49) and war aims 
generally, as the weaker of two asymmetric forces uses any means to 
eliminate the danger. Such means include terrorist acts, in the form, 
e. g. of murder, collective reprisals, and psychological threats. The 
principle of tu quoque leads to escalation, and provided some 
justification for the many defendants at Nuremburg. (50) 
Unlimited war aims include economic targets. Factories become a 
prime source of hostilities as war munitions are produced next to 
civilian population centers. The consequence of this is that an entire 
population may be "mobilized", making the. worker a participant, and 
thus, a legitimate target of attack. Nevertheless, so long as Western 
nations were at war with each other, it was only exceptionally that the 
civilian population was expressly made a target. The industrial balance 
between them further ensured against the possibility of any real 
extermination. (51) 
With the development of new strategies and types of weaponry, the 
norms regarding restraint assume a higher profile. Yet, the Hague 
instruments were not developed until 1977. Further, the U. S. has either 
not ratified recent instruments which require special or particular 
restraint, or prefers to confine its view of the relevant norms to 
traditional frameworks of obsolete Hague and 1949 Geneva rules. (52) 
For this reason, it is clear that many activities engaged in by the U. S. 
during the Viet Nam War constituted war crimes. Yet, they were rarely 
officially identified and prosecuted, as such. 
8.2.2. Obstacles to the Prosecution of Viet Nam War Crimes 
At Geneva in 1954, North and South Vietnam became a Cold War 
divided country, with two zones created by a line drawn at the 17th 
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Parallel. The military demarcation line was intended to be provisional, 
and the basis for a cease-fire. The Geneva agreement further provided 
for nationwide elections to be held in 1956, with which the South Viet 
Namese refused to proceed. Subsequently, the two zones took on the 
attributes of independent states, with South Viet Nam supported by the 
U. S. (53) As a result, the Viet Nam War was characterized as both a 
Common Article 2 and a Common Article 3 situation for purposes of Geneva 
law, as the U. S. was viewed as aiding the Saigon Government in 
controlling civil strife and/or as engaging in collective self-defense 
with South Viet Nam. 
Briefly, three propositions justified U. S. involvement in the 
Viet Nam conflict: (a) North Viet Nam attacked South Viet Nam in 
violation of Article 2 of the U. N. Charter, (b) South Viet Nam was 
entitled to use force to repel the unlawful attack, and (c) the U. S. was 
justified in assisting South Vietnam under Article 51 of the U. N. 
Charter. (54) The ground fighting took place in South Viet Nam, as the 
North Viet Namese joined the Southern Vietcong to subvert the Government 
of South Viet Nam. The U. S. bombed North Viet Nam from the air. 
Taylor notes that "(a)n American court undertaking to pass 
judgment on the legality of our Vietnam actions would have to review 
these and numerous other questions 
... 
with little guidance from the 
Nuremburg and Tokyo Judgments". (55) Nevertheless, for those courts 
which found themselves in such a position, the normal course taken was 
to decline jurisdiction on the basis. of the non-justiciability of 
political or foreign policy questions. Further, in 1971, the U. S. 
declared that it would not prosecute ex-servicemen who had violated the 
international law of war in Viet Nam. (56) 1 
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8.2.2.1. The Legal Issues 
U. S. violations of the law of war involved inter alia the 
mistreatment of civilians, the bombing of nonmilitary targets, the use 
of prohibited weapons, and the destruction of Viet Namese villages. 
This led to accusations that the U. S. was engaged in massive and 
systematic violation of the most elementary humanitarian rules, by 
conducting the war in violation of minimal standards. Allegations of 
genocide were also made, flowing out of a barbaric U. S. counter-guerilla 
strategy. (57) The war appeared popularly-based in Viet Nam, and the 
N. L. F. engaged in widespread terrorist tactics. The isolated incumbent 
government found itself waging war against its own population, and it 
seemed that a total-war, scorched-earth atmosphere to forestall guerilla 
efforts was required in order to win. 
8.2.2.2. T, Nuremburg Argument s 
As previously discussed, the Nuremburg and Tokyo Tribunals were 
held to try government leaders of Germany and Japan. This gave rise to 
an international law of individual responsibility for waging aggressive 
war, which responsibility highlighted serious problems involving the 
"web of connection" joining individual responsibility, national 
citizenship, and responsibility regarding restraint on the use of force. 
(58) 
A general defense was heard that the use of force by the U. S. in 
Viet Nam was not directed against the territorial integrity or political 
independence of either the North or the South, and therefore was not 
unlawful. Three Nuremburg arguments though were posed. First, crimes 
against the peace involved the commission of aggression against North 
Viet Nam. Second, war crimes involved battlefield tactics, and in 
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particular, a pattern of unrestrained battlefield behavior which was 
attributable to both military and civilian leaders. Third, crimes 
against humanity perpetrated by the U. S. and South Viet Nam Governments 
involved the contention that the cumulative impact of specific 
violations of the law of war amounted to genocide. (59) 
Individuals whose consciences dictated they oppose the war on the 
above-indicated bases led to questions being raised in domestic U. S. 
courts regarding the legality of that country's role in the war. 
Nevertheless, there was a consistent judicial abstention from 
adjudication of the substantive issues posed by arguments of 
international law, as the legality of the war and its conduct were felt 
to be matters within the preserve of the executive branch. 
8.2.2.3. Judicial Restraint 
It has been argued that the reassertion of an active judiciary in 
the area of IHL would be a healthy development in the U. S. doctrine of 
the separation of powers. (60) The question remains, however, whether 
an active judicial role in such matters is possible. Massacres such as 
Son My and My Lai were investigated under military authority. Ex- 
servicemen civilians cannot be tried in military courts-martial for 
violations of war law, as this would have U. S. Constitutional 
dimensions. Civilians may be tried before military tribunals for purely 
military offenses. Conversely, civilians are not afforded a trial 
before a federal court, even though Article III courts have jurisdiction 
to hear all cases and controversies arising under the laws of the U. S., 
as well as original jurisdiction over all offenses against American law. 
Under Article 1, Section 8 of the U. S. Constitution, Congress has 
the power to define and punish offenses against the law of nations, even 
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though treaties are the supreme law of the land. Military law derives 
its Constitutional source from the enumerated power of Congress to-make 
rules for the regulation of the armed forces. The President, too, may 
hold a related power to punish violations of the law of war under the 
separate war power. Thus, the exercise of Congressional power may be 
coupled with Presidential power to execute this area of international 
law. (61) For example, the cases of Ex Parte Quirin (62) and Ii re 
Yamashita (63) appeared to create a domestic criminal law for the 
prosecution of violations of war law, in addition to rules enacted under 
the power to regulate the armed forces. This would imply a level of 
concurrent jurisdiction. 
Nevertheless, a long exercise of power by courts-martial has 
seemingly carved out an exclusive jurisdiction, even though the rule is 
that military fora possess no judicial power. Courts-martial do not 
have exclusive jurisdiction in cases also triable in the state or 
federal courts. The issue is thus of priority of jurisdiction, the 
preference being in favor of military jurisdiction. On this basis, it 
has been argued that an express legislative enactment providing for war 
crimes jurisdiction, as distinct from breaches of military law, is 
required in order to prosecute non-military personnel authorizing or 
instigating war crimes. This jurisdictional gap in practical terms thus 
goes to the heart of the Geneva enforcement system. (64) In the absence 
of such an enactment and of an activist judiciary willing to involve 
itself in the enforcement of international law, the pre-eminence of the 
executive and/or legislative branches is maintained. 
For these reasons, the judiciary is restrained, and restrains 
itself from adjudicating Constitutional issues which involve war, 
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foreign affairs, and the separation of powers for such purposes, as 
political questions. Thus, foreign relations and powers to wage war 
have long been regarded as non-justiciable. In particular, under the 
limitations of the supremacy clause contained in Article VI of the U. S. 
Constitution, the Supreme Court was not authorized to render judgment on 
the validity of U. S. participation in the Viet Nam War under the 
Nuremburg principles or international law in general. (65) The ripeness 
of the issues for adjudication was an additional obstacle. It was 
generally felt that the factual and/or legal basis for a challenge of 
alleged harm was not sufficiently developed to support an actual case or 
controversy. Thus, the sufficiency of the Constitutional authorization 
for American military activity in Viet Nam was not, or could not be 
reviewed. (66) Instead, the non-justiciability of such cases was 
assessed through policies of abstention as gauged by standing, ripeness, 
adversariness, and the political question doctrine. Other obstacles 
included procedural and evidentiary problems, the implementation of 
decisions such as an injunction against the U. S. Government, and the 
adequacy of remedies, generally. 
In this way it is clear that the exercise of power was insulated 
during the Viet Nam confrontation, and responsibility for war crimes 
never attributed accurately. The non-availability in fact of procedures 
to test the legality of governmental and military conduct thus flew in 
the face of the Geneva enforcement regime, and the Nuremburg principles. 
8.3. Obstacles Jo Prosecution Generally. and the Primacy g Politics 
As previously discussed, the existence of diverse legal systems 
should form a routine part of any inquiry into the reasonableness of a 
claim of jurisdiction. (67) An assertion of jurisdiction specifies the 
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limits of legal competence claimed by the asserting state. Thus, 
jurisdiction becomes a fundamental aspect of state sovereignty and 
control. A second factor for consideration is categorization of the 
issues. For example, the four Allied Powers claimed jurisdiction over 
the major Nazi war criminals in 1945, the success of which claim rested 
in large part on Germany's unconditional surrender and subsequent 
occupation. Yet the diversity of their legal systems created many 
problems in the formulation of the three charges in the Nuremburg 
Charter, and the four counts in the Indictment which required high 
levels of negotiation and co-operation. Another jurisdictional 
assertion is also seen 
- 
that of seeking to impose a particular system 
of public order. However, the primacy of law in politics seen at 
Nuremburg has rarely been repeated. This is not encouraging to the 
development of an international penal law of armed conflicts. 
8.3.1. International Norms and State Legislative Discretion 
There is a general respect for the diversity of legal systems and 
notions of jurisdiction so long as international norms are observed. 
The way in which national law is applied to war criminals is generally 
beyond the scope of inquiry, particularly between similar systems of 
public order, so long as the perpetrators of such crimes do not escape 
prosecution and punishment. Nevertheless, the U. S. failed to prosecute 
most of its own Viet Nam war criminals, and no other Power stepped in to 
do so. 
When a subject matter is important to the national interest, as 
was the manner in which the Viet Nam War was fought, a state may press 
its way of doing things so as to shape the event in a manner favorable 
to it. Policy co-ordination is the result, and may require that factors 
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favoring the non-assertion of legal control be taken into account. (68) 
Hence, lt may be argued that the U. S. Government limited war crimes 
claims by refusing to legislate regarding them, and by pressing for an 
edministreton of American courts that was subject to a strict 
constructionist approach to the criterion of "due process", despite the 
many legal theories which urged a more activist judicial role. 
Legislative self-restraint exists whenever a law-making body 
declines to use all its potential competence to assert legal control 
over people, property and events. Executive self-restraint is more 
difficult to assess. Further, the accepted prohibitive norms of 
international low are frequently subordinated to a general mutual 
respect for legal system diversity. Thus, a domestic authority is able 
to authoritatively characterize an event in order to bring any assertion 
of jurisdiction into harmony with the jurisdictional principle invoked. 
The reverse is also true. 
With the advent of a total war era, the traditional state- 
centered system is highly compromised. War as a means of dispute 
resolution has become too dangerous. The U. N. has eroded the boundaries 
of domestic autonomy. Those matters that threaten international peace 
are quickly drawn within the scope of supranational competence. As 
noted by Falk, dominant non-revolutionary states and their domestic 
courts, In particular, thus have a responsibility to establish exemplary 
modes of behavior. (69) All stetes have a legal interest in the 
prosecution of war criminals. Thus, where an effective state consensus 
favors the implementation of a prohibitive rule of international law, 
and existing legislation allows prosecution for breach of that rule, 
substantive legal standards must be applied by the judiciary. 
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8.3.2. The Primacy off, Political Considerations 
The four 1949 Geneva Conventions provide that all persons who 
commit grave breaches, or give orders that they be committed, be sought 
out and prosecuted, whatever their nationality. Yet, it must be queried 
whether states regard this as mandatory. Do they intend to put this 
duty into effect, and to make it thoroughly understood and accepted by 
politicians, the armed forces, and the legal authorities? In 
particular, is provision made to search for the origins of a war crime 
at high levels? Conversely, does the attribution of responsibility for 
atrocities rest with the soldier, thereby effecting a shield for more 
senior policy makers? 
The issue of individual international responsibility for war 
crimes is only half the problem. It may be true that individual police 
or military personnel use excessive force, with no knowledge of 
wrongdoing. There is a hesitation to prosecute such persons, who 
presumably act in the public interest and out of misguided notions of 
loyalty. (70) However, it is wondered whether a hesitation to prosecute 
them might derive from a multitude of sources, not the least of which is 
the potential for governmental embarassment. Policy makers effectively 
may be immune from suit. When the survival of a state is in issue, 
diclinature may be pleaded. 
Verhaegen notes that service-related crimes and offenses are 
frequently followed by internal inquiry procedures which generally keep 
such cases away from the courts capable of trying them. Should an 
injured party wish to prosecute an offender, a right to do so does not 
normally exist in front of a court-martial, the body usually considered 
more competent to deal with breaches of the military. Military 
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tribunals may decline jurisdiction in favor of disciplinary procedures 
if the offenses are not considered to be sufficiently serious to warrant 
the use of state resources. (71) The reasons for such a decision need 
not be given publicly. 
Another difficulty encountered is procedural. Evidence may be 
surpressed, national security may be asserted, and/or jurisdiction may 
be inadequately invoked through an erroneous classification of the 
challenged act. In that criminal justice systems rarely prosecute an 
intent to commit an act, without that act subsequently occurring, the 
offense of "ordering to be committed" might never be entertained. Thus, 
the giving of orders to prepare a crime, without the orders subsequently 
being carried out, would most likely never constitute a prosecuted 
offense. Similarly, the legal classification of an act of the executive 
is rarely questioned. An executive amnesty may be declared, as occurred 
after the Viet Nam War. Procedural and substantive law may come into 
conflict with, and be superceded by, policy considerations underlying 
the maintenance of public order. (72) Thus, it would appear that the 
expansionist approach taken to penal law at Nuremburg is more likely 
attributable to post World War 2 consensus in the face of mass 
destruction and Germany's unconditional surrender than it. is to 
international consensus regarding the need for humanity in warfare 
generally. It was hoped that Nuremburg would be a precedent for future 
state behavior, as it may yet prove to be regarding the conflict in the 
territory of former Yugoslavia. (73) On the other hand, the restrictive 
approach characteristic of modern times is likely to be a function of 
state resistance to increasing U. N. delimitations of sovereign 
authoritative competence. 
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The perceived need to safeguard vital national interests and to 
justify indiscriminate acts further disregards the minimal consensus 
reached in 1949, which consensus struck a balance between differing 
concepts of the requirements of military necessity and the demands of 
humanity in warfare. Subsequently, the Cold War ideological split, and 
the division of the international community into client states by the 
superpowers, undercut the 1949 consensus by encouraging competing 
interpretations regarding the scope and content of the applicable norms. 
(74) The dominance exerted in the 1949 balance was then overcome in 
1974 
-7 by an increased number of new states in a post-Viet Nam War 
atmosphere, many of which had sympathies with the struggle against 
colonial domination, alien occupation, and racist regimes. At that 
time, not only were some wars of self-determination included in Protocol 
1 as international armed conflicts but further, Article 85(5) was 
adopted, which Article specifically construed the legal term "war 
crime". 
With the end of the Cold War, a new pattern is emerging, that of 
one superpower hostile to overly-expansive notions of U. N. delimitations 
of sovereign authoritative competence, and in conflict with the pre- 
eminence of international law over domestic policies. U. S. readiness to 
engage in counterinsurgency is not in question (75), and its law and 
order approach to terrorism is relevant to this point. For this reason, 
it is doubtful whether any exemplary mode of behavior is presented by 
its government or its courts which is capable of recognizing the primacy 
of law in or over politics, and which is ready to apply penal law to 
issues involving state security or national policy sufficient to invoke 
IHL readily in armed struggles, other than along the traditional and 
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outmoded confines of Hague and 1949 Geneva law. Given this apparent 
unwillingness, it is to be questioned whether any rule regarding the 
prosecution of war criminals has emerged such that states are in 
compliance with it. Should the rejection of such rules be the case, it 
is clear that the rationale once underlying them may no longer be 
considered sufficiently relevant for purposes of universal application 
when faced with competing political considerations. 
8.4. Obstacles Jo Prosecuting- Terrorist War Crimes 
An insurgent faction at the beginning of its struggle for power 
invariably utilizes terrorist acts. In an era of total war, both sides 
to an asymmetric armed struggle may be guilty of using any means to 
fight the opposition. During the Viet Nam War, the cumulative effect of 
U. S. counter-guerilla strategies led to accusations of genocide, giving 
the conflict "an entirely new legal magnitude". (76) On the other hand, 
domination of the conflict by the U. S. helped to unify dissimilar Viet 
Namese factions, changing for many the character of the war into one of 
national defense. Were that conflict to occur today, it is to be 
wondered whether it might be characterized as a war of self- 
determination on these grounds alone. 
A major counter-guerilla strategy may become increasingly 
indiscriminate when faced with a discriminating insurgent terror. 
Depending on the extent of the organization on both sides to such a 
conflict, minimal rules of legal and moral restraint may be violated. 
Should these minimal rules not be recognized as applicable, a 
brutalizing impact on the participants is predictable, as all members of 
the society become victims. Group terrorist retaliation may then be 
perceived as evidence of commonly-shared grievances, and preserve the 
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legitimacy of group identity in the face of "alien" domination. Such 
has unfortunately been the case in the former territory of Yugoslavia. 
(77) 
8.4.1. Fundamental Humanitarian Concern 
The targeting by liberation fighters of innocent civilians may 
involve a relatively small number of victims. Nevertheless, a group's 
aims may thus be publicized, or a government's inability to maintain 
public order may be signaled. Conversely, a government prefers to 
suppress information regarding counter-terrorist strategies, or to 
redefine the nature of such strategies into acceptable issue structures 
for purposes of consumption by domestic and international communities. 
Either way, fundamental humanitarian concerns are ignored. 
As previously discussed, it is clear that a law and order 
approach to terrorist acts perpetrated during a liberation struggle 
cannot succeed. (78) Where the armed struggle is confined within 
territorial borders, the violence can only escalate. Should the 
participants in the struggle be in receipt of foreign aid and 
assistance, the weaknesses of both sides may be concealed, with little 
hope of negotiating the conflict's end. International sympathy for a 
liberation struggle may destroy what consensus there may otherwise have 
been regarding the availability of or permission for humanitarian 
intervention. While IHL should, of course, be made applicable from the 
first outbreak of organized hostilities, its use in conflicts such as 
Viet Nam is frequently the subject of debate. Common Article 3 is the 
minimum level of applicability. Should Common Article 2 be deemed 
appropriate, the four 1949 Geneva Conventions are brought into play. 
For those states which have ratified Protocol 1, the protections are 
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raised even higher. Conversely, the participants in a liberation 
struggle may not even see the point in observing humanitarian 
guidelines. 
The targeting of civilians goes to the heart of national 
liberation struggles. Liberation groups which do not qualify for Geneva 
ratification status may also refuse to comply with rules formulated by 
and between colonial states. Rebels are rarely in control of the 
resources required to comply with Geneva provisions, making the 
applicability of much of the treaties a matter of convenience. The 
notion of parity between equals is not relevant. 
Such difficulties however do not excuse the rest of the 
international community from its Common Article 1 duty to "ensure 
respect" for humanitarian law. This would presumably include the search 
for and prosecution of perpetrators of grave breaches or war crimes. 
This duty would also include observance of the rules regarding- 
proportionality, and the non-infliction of unnecessary suffering. 
Observance of these many duties would result in better protection of 
innocent civilians, and a containment of the hostilities. 
Nevertheless, the obstacles to fulfilling the paramount duty of 
ensuring respect for humanitarian law are evident. No longer is it the 
case that industrialized nations attempt to target and destroy 
militarily each other's industrial base. The encouragement of low- 
intensity warfare by industrialized nations seeking new markets thus 
means that civilians in non-industrial nations are increasingly the 
victims of the developed world, generally. Low-intensity warfare is 
further designed to destabilize areas considered to be of strategic 
value. 
. 
The profit motive in the armaments industry which kept the U. S. 
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out of the League of Nations enables third world armed struggles to 
occur and contine. Regional arrangements for collective security 
stretch beyond territorial confines in order to embrace areas of 
strategic interest. Such arrangements thus may foster interference in 
the internal affairs of sister states. 
Such policy considerations outweigh the force of IHL rules, and 
there seems little political logic in altering the modern emphases on 
surrogate warfare in the face of existing societal and economic 
infrastructures. For these reasons, the obstacles to prosecuting war 
crimes and in particular, terrorist war crimes, are many, and frequently 
have nothing to do with law. Fundamental humanitarian concerns, as a 
bare minimum, require world support and diligence, but a willingness to 
make applicable the necessary norms of conduct appears to be lacking. 
States are thus hesitant to prosecute war criminals, whether or 
not legislation exists under which to do so. As for terrorist war 
criminals engaged in a struggle for self-determination, preliminary 
obstacles to the recognition of a war must first be overcome. Should 
that occur, the level of IHL applicability must then be assessed. 
Should this be accomplished, criteria for crimes of war may then be 
defined, after which the elements which constitute such crimes may be 
specified. Procedures of sanction must be devised and invoked to the 
satisfaction of the participants, in order to avoid reprisal actions. 
The legal process thus rests on an entirely different plane - mutuality 
- 
to the process involved in quelling an armed struggle for self- 
determination within confines of a public order exercise. The parity 
between quasi-equals which is required for such legal arrangements 
unfortunately implies a legal relationship with "rebels" which states 
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politically endeavor to avoid. 
8.4.2. The Emergence of § 
. 
Terrorist Norm 
In view of state use of terrorism as an instrument of foreign and 
domestic policy, the obstacles to prosecuting terrorist war crimes are 
clear, particularly should the doctrine of tu quoque be pleaded in 
defense. The degree of tolerance for certain levels of forcible action 
in the face of Article 2(4) of the U. N. Charter further underlines this 
point. Methods of terror-violence are an efficient means to open the 
way to the use of the military. The use of terrorism as preparatory to 
aggression, or as a method of conflict resolution in struggles for self- 
determination, is characteristic of the non-observance in practice of 
I HL. 
Policy considerations compete with law when states decide whether 
to observe the rules, and these policy considerations need to be taken 
into account in any analysis of the development of an emerging norm. As 
previously discussed, political inferences and normative expectations 
may be drawn by foreign policy decision makers from what states do 
rather than from what states ought to do. (79) An increasing gap 
between codified law and state practice would appear to be emerging. 
Thus, where the military is called upon tb control political processes 
or to maintain public order, an indication has been made that there is 
an armed conflict. Hesitation to prosecute members of the armed forces 
for over-zealous performance of their duties indicates that such 
practices are not really serious. Considerations of efficiency further 
support the use of draconian measures during a struggle for national 
liberation. In this way, increasing levels of violence have altered the 
meaning of the many prohibitions against the use of force in 
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international relations, and would imply that terrorism is emerging as 
an international norm of actual wartime behavior. 
State compliance with and enforcement of bi- and multi-lateral 
treaty rules for the arrest, punishment and extradition of terrorist 
offenders have proven inadequate to deter the use of international 
violence. States target themselves for such purposes in IHL, yet actual 
expectations regarding war crimes do not arise from any post-Nuremburg 
consistency in approach. Should IHL rules regarding the prosecution of 
war criminals be viewed restrictively, as mainly applicable by the 
victor during an enemy's disarmament, much of their potential force is 
lost. Should these rules be rejected because of the highly political 
considerations involved in official policy making or in liberation 
struggles, the rationale underlying IHL becomes irrelevant to the total 
war strategies of "just" conflicts. This leads to normative blurring, 
and to the disregard of minimal warfare guidelines. Such a development 
further leads to notions of the permissibility of the use of terrorism 
in particular types of armed conflicts, and promotes support for the 
pre-eminence of policy considerations over legal ones. 
Should this be the case, it is then clear that the customary use 
of terrorist tactics is carving clear exceptions to the prohibition 
against the use or threat of aggressive force in international 
relations. Continued state insistence on not differentiating between 
terrorist war practices, and acts of international terrorism is a major 
factor in the emergence of increasingly higher levels of violence in the 
international community. This in turn works to absolve the policy 
makers, and implies that states may use terrorism unopposed, and without 
inquiry into individual responsibility, or legal guilt. War crimes 
- 
379 
- 
trials do not result for offenses universally recognized as such, except 
rarely, and when they do, the decision to prosecute is highly political. 
This in turn politicizes rather than deters a dangerous development in 
international behavior. 
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9. Conclusion 
The issue of the separability under IHL of terrorist acts during 
liberation struggles has been the prime focus of this research. Were 
terrorist war crimes separated from sporadic acts of international 
terrorism, it is argued that the world community would reach consensus 
more easily regarding a definition of terrorism, and ways in which to 
deter its occurrence., 
Terrorist acts, if perpetrated by states or insurgent forces 
during wars of self-determination, constitute grave breaches or war 
crimes of Geneva provisions. All states are obligated to seek out, and 
prosecute or extradite for trial, the perpetrators of such acts. There 
is no political offense or humanitarian exception to this duty. 
Terrorist acts which are not perpetrated during a liberation struggle 
must fall within the confines of issue-specific anti-terrorist 
codifications, and/or multi- and bi-lateral extradition arrangements. 
These instruments frequently contain a political offense or humanitarian 
exception clause to extradition, making the prosecution of terrorism 
highly dependent on the integrity of legal system diversity. The issues 
involved in the separability of terrorist war crimes perpetrated during 
a liberation group's resort to violence, thus, are briefly summarized in 
this Chapter. 
The IHL legal regime is highly self-regulatory. Nevertheless, 
states are unwilling to invoke IHL, and the non-recognition of the 
separability of terrorist war crimes is the result. A breakdown in 
world consensus regarding enforcement of its provisions thus implies 
that the rationale for its rules is no longer considered relevant to 
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state decision-making. 
9.1. Resort to Violence 
While the principle of self-determination was originally placed 
in colonial contexts it has grown to embrace human rights, economic 
rights, and rights to territory. Such growth is a function in 
particular of the delimitations of legal competence provided for in the 
U. N. Charter system, which delimitations have allowed sufficient 
jurisdictional space in which to redefine notions of nationality. 
The issues involved in the right to self-determination have 
evolved in many respects as a result of resort to violence by liberation 
groups. In particular, terrorism has been a means and method of choice 
in liberation struggles. Further, state Socialism has offered different 
interpretations of substantive international law, in competition with 
Western democratic ideals. War to create new law or system 
transformation quickly has become a tactic of choice when political or 
constitutional processes have stalled, or progressed too slowly to 
redress grievances adequately. 
Many "Peoples" auto-define themselves as entitled to the right to 
self-determination, and everything that that term implies. Should a 
"People" be an approved cause, the group may demand its independence, it 
may struggle for independence, and use force against a governing state 
to achieve autonomy. With every successful war of self-determination, 
the growth of the notion in general international law is strengthened. 
Numerous U. N. Resolutions support the right, support the "justness" of 
the struggle, and support the use of force to achieve the desired ends. 
Given this use of force, wars of self-determination were 
recognized as international in Protocol 1 of 1977, for purposes of the 
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extension of humanitarian law to them. This development recognized the 
need to develop the law of war, to reflect changes in the manner in 
which armed struggles were being fought. Grave breaches of Geneva law 
were now termed war crimes, and the rules clarified with regard to 
military necessity, proportionality, the prohibition against the 
infliction of unnecessary suffering, and the use of terror means and 
methods of warfare. 
Given the development of IHL in 1977 in particular, it is now 
possible to prosecute acts of terrorism perpetrated during an armed 
conflict for self-determination as terrorist war crimes. Many 
liberation struggles are now viewed as international, rather than civil 
wars. Therefore, the full provisions of Geneva law should apply to them 
in full, rather than on the minimal level of Common Article 3. In that 
IHL is so extended, the international rules for behavior during war 
should restrain a threatened government, if only through the office of 
the Protecting Power, where previously there had been little or no such 
restraint. Thus, acts of terrorism which characterize liberation wars 
can now be prosecuted under general international law, in trials which 
should reflect civilized notions of justice. This separability in 
content of violent acts should enable the world community to arrive at a 
consensus regarding random terrorist acts, without undercutting the 
content of the right of "Peoples" to a free existence should they wish 
to press for one through the use of force. 
9.2. Political Considerations 
The problematic issue running throughout this study has been the 
use of force, which is in large part attributable to the U. N. Charter 
system, and to the way in which it has operated until recently. The 
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erosion of the boundaries of domestic jurisdiction contemplated in 
Charter provisions corresponded to a new balance of power which has 
challenged traditional notions of state sovereignty. Yet, the new 
balance of power contained an inherent contradiction: the force of 
capitalism and the force of state Socialism. This meant that, in 
matters of economic and social organization, the world was divided in 
its orientation to a particular set of substantive standards. This in 
turn led to competing interpretations of what effectively is within and 
what is beyond the reach of substantive rules of international law. 
9.2.1. The Presentation of a Legal Claim 
Traditional formal requirements which governed the presentation 
of an international claim presupposed a basic deference to the state as 
the center of authority. Recourse to an international standard is now 
possible. The presentation of an international claim rests most 
securely upon a substantive and a political consensus, however, and the 
successful presentation of a claim for the right to self-determination 
requires such a consensus. Provincial tendencies, expansionist 
ambitions, and opposing views of private property in particular, 
frequently mean that claims of a right to self-determination are met 
with conflicting responses from the world community. 
Self-determination has thus divided the world, as has the use of 
force to achieve it. The notion of self-determination is viewed as an 
outside force which imposes against the will of individual states a 
particular kind of public order. Further, the inviolability of 
territorial integrity and political independence are hard to reconcile 
with rights to an autonomous national existence. 
As a legal issue, the use of force in liberation struggles has 
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re-written many of the rules in international relations. The use of 
force has proved to be a vehicle by which the major world powers could 
pursue their quest for resources, engage in covert aggression, and 
achieve overseas domination. As a political issue, wars of self- 
determination have enabled the major post-1945 world powers to define 
their attitudes to aggression, to human rights, and for purposes of the 
present study, to IHL. After a review of the different attitudes to 
wars of self-determination, consensus is difficult to discern, which in 
turn raises questions about the existence of any consensus regarding the 
constituent rights entitlements which comprise self-determination. 
9.2.2. Consensus with Regard to IHL 
As part of the substantive and political consensus already 
existing in the international community, states have come to a minimal 
agreement in the four Geneva Conventions of 1949. As part of this 
agreement, states have a duty to enact the necessary legislation to 
implement the obligation to seek out and prosecute or extradite for 
trial all persons, whatever their nationality, committing or ordering to 
be committed any of the grave breaches defined in the codifications. 
This system establishes a system of universality of jurisdiction 
regarding war crimes. 
Geneva law, as previously discussed, applies in full. to 
international wars, or minimally to civil wars through the customary 
rules codified in Common Article 3. It provides for state 
responsibility for grave breaches, as did the Hague Conventions of 1907. 
In addition, it provides for individual responsibility, as a result of 
the Nuremburg trials held 1945 
- 
6. It provides for state diligence in 
ensuring respect for all of its provisions, and in their implementation. 
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Armed struggles for self-determination and the development of 
modern weaponry mandated the further development of IHL in 1977. Armed 
struggles for self-determination were viewed as a right by a majority in 
the U. N., and thus served to delimit the confines of matters previously 
considered reserved to states under Article 2(7) of the U. N. Charter in 
that such armed conflicts frequently endangered international peace and 
security. Thus, international substantive and political consensus was 
achieved with regard to claims for an extenson of international law to 
many such wars in 1977, and to the pressure to be put on a threatened 
state to observe the demands of humanitarian law. This consensus 
approach however did not reflect world unanimity. 
9.2.3. The Breakdown of Consensus 
The need to develop and supplement IHL was highlighted in large 
part because of the atrocities perpetrated during the Viet Nam War. The 
U. S. engaged in counter-guerilla strategy, and a lack of applicable 
rules led to an attitude of the permissibility of what was not expressly 
prohibited. The U. S. participated in the 1974 -7 Diplomatic 
Conference, and made many contributions to the process. However, it 
objected strenously to the inclusion of wars of self-determination as 
international wars, and abstained at the vote on Article 1(4) of 
Protocol 1 which codified this inclusion. Israel, a country to which 
Article 1(4) might particularly apply, voted its objection. South 
Africa, another such country, did not participate after the Conference's 
first session. 
The U. S. voiced its concern at the automatic regulation of such 
"civil" wars as if they were international conflicts. Such a regulation 
would unduly interfere in matters of domestic competence, and risk the 
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interference by third states in threatened state domestic affairs. The 
U. S. objected to a recognition of irregular armed forces, terrorists and 
rebels, as combatants for purposes of prisoner of war treatment. 
Further objection was made to an automatic legitimacy of the use of 
force in a "just" cause. Otherwise, the U. S. did not want to hamper its 
own military with new standards of restraint when interpreting the 
demands of military necessity, and selecting what it felt were 
legitimate objects for attack. It did not wish the restraint of the new 
prohibitions against reprisals. Such objections were voiced publicly, 
after classified discussions took place between U. S. military personnel 
and U. S. heads of state. As a result, the U. S. has failed to ratify 
Protocol 1, and refuses to recognize many of its provisions as binding 
upon it. Conversely, the U. S. has agreed to utilize the provisions it 
considers reflect international norms of customary law. 
This breakdown in consensus with regard to the growth and 
development of IHL would appear to be a logical outcome of Cold War 
ideological divisions. The U. S. as a leading proponent of a law and 
order approach to international law thus appears to have fallen prey to 
its own shortcomings in this respect. In particular, U. S. refusal to 
interpret liberation acts of violence through the IHL issue area has 
stymied international co-operation to achieve consensus on policies to 
deal with random acts of international terrorism. This hardline stance 
has thus alienated those states which otherwise might lend their active 
support to such co-operative efforts and which, instead, offer sympathy, 
aid and assistance regarding liberation tactics which the U. S. prefers 
to term terrorism. 
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9.3. Obstacles to Prosecuting Terrorist War Criminals 
Given the lack of substantive and political international 
consensus underlying attitudes to the use of force, it is perhaps not 
surprising that states hesitate individually to extend the scope of 
their jurisdictional competence to pursue and prosecute alleged war 
criminals. This hesitation is particularly clear should criminal 
charges for grave breaches be legally dependent on bases provided in new 
provisions of Protocol 1. 
Conversely, state unwillingness individually to implement and 
apply IHL represents a denial of the protections afforded to individuals 
against the power of states. States identify an offense in order to 
then specify its elements for purposes of proof. Thus, should no, or 
inadequate, provision be made to bring perpetrators of grave breaches to 
trial, the self-regulatory approach provided in IHL fails. Should no 
other state undertake to comply with the duty to prosecute alleged war 
criminals by use of the universality of jurisdiction, it would appear 
that the rationale underlying the applicable rules is no longer 
sufficiently relevant to states faced with competing policy 
considerations which raise the threshold beyond which violent force is 
not tolerated. 
The prosecution and sanction of certain acts deemed criminal in 
IHL is established in self-regulatory state frameworks. The exercise of 
jurisdiction is left to states. Thus, state authoritative 
interpretation regarding responsibility for alleged criminal acts 
resurrects the traditional hierarchy between two juridical categories 
which, strictly speaking, should be viewed as equal: the recognition of 
certain acts as criminal for purposes of international law, and the 
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extension by states of jurisdiction over such acts for purposes of their 
prosecution and punishment. This is the result of attempts simply to 
achieve substantive and political consensus. 
Theoretically, problems arise when a state exercises jurisdiction 
over an alien who may not have harmed that state or its nationals. This 
remains the case even with regard to recent U. N. initiatives to create 
an ad hoc tribunal through which to exercise jurisdiction over persons 
alleged to have committed war crimes in the former territory of 
Yugoslavia, in that trials in absentia will not be permitted. In the 
absence of a permanent international criminal court in which to try war 
criminals readily, domestic courts should appear as agents in the 
international order for such purposes. Nevertheless, the lack of 
consensus regarding the right to use force and the groups which hold 
this right, and the lack of rules to restrain certain Powers in their 
efforts to secure regional and strategic security agreements, simply 
imply that a self-regulatory approach to IHL transforms itself into just 
another facet of sovereignty, as is the case in criminal co-operation 
and extradition arrangements. 
Assuming this point, what then become eminently clear is that any 
resulting mutual respect for diversity in legal systems depends on 
international opinion with regard to the integrity of each one. On this 
basis, the conclusion must follow that substantive and political 
consensus is required before a claim of an international right can be 
asserted successfully. While such consensus would appear to have been 
achieved regarding the Yuglosav war crimes court, it remains the only 
instance of such international consensus since Nuremburg. Thus, given 
the level of self-regulation required by IHL, and the existing balance 
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of power in the international arena, the continued hostility of the U. S. 
to wars of self-determination in general does not bode well for the 
separability of terrorist acts perpetrated in liberation armed 
struggles, and for the prosecution of war criminals in general. 
9.4. Terrorism as a Separable Phenomenon 
It has been repeatedly asserted throughout this study that 
terrorist acts committed during liberation struggles can and should be 
prosecuted under IHL rules. Numerous committee reports on international 
terrorism and U. N. efforts to study the phenomenon have been discussed. 
The issue of inquiry thus regards whether or not the separability of 
terrorist war crimes perpetrated in liberation struggles is feasible. 
As previously indicated, the 1977 extension of IHL to wars of 
self-determination would indicate that terrorism perpetrated during an 
armed conflict is separable in law from random acts of international 
terrorism, similar to the way in which manslaughter is distinguished 
from death caused by dangerous driving. All parties to an armed 
conflict must proceed with restraint for the prohibitions against the 
spread of terror to appear even-handed, as the rules apply to both sides 
of a liberation struggle. Further, the eschewing of terrorist tactics 
in liberation struggles reinforces a liberation authority's self-image 
as a protogovernment for purposes of international consumption. On this 
basis, the new provisions in Protocol 1 were welcomed by the a majority 
in the international community, as the forces of war were thus to be 
constrained. 
As has also been noted, the manner of conducting a war changes 
with new technology. A changed manner of waging war will alter the 
structure of war as a function of societal infrastructure. In 1899 and 
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1907, jurists and governments alike attempted to humanize war law at the 
threshold of two catastrophic world confrontations, and in view of new 
war technologies. In 1949, the four Geneva Conventions sought to fill 
many gaps in prior codifications, in time for the Cold War. In 1977, 
Protocols 1 and 2 filled gaps revealed particularly during the Vietnam 
War. 
As in more traditional times, modern war technology emphasizes 
strategies of stealth and secrecy. These are the tactics of the jungle, 
presumably learned well in Viet Nam. Terrorism depends on these two 
characteristics, and the survival of some states depends on their 
ability to predict and forestall the occurrence of terrorist war 
tactics. The learning of a technique becomes the ability to also use 
it. In a continuing era of total war strategy, designed for'the 
aggrandizement of political power and access to global resources, 
domestic stability is first required, and it is to be expected that 
states will use force to maintain public order, and will control 
political processes through use of the military. Acts of terrorism are 
thus employed against domestic populations, as well on behalf of target 
state populations. 
A politically divided approach to law and politics in the post- 
1945 total war era has thus been a prime factor in the resort to armed' 
violence to achieve self-determination. The re-birth of the "just" war 
flies in the face of concurrent legal prohibitions against the use or 
threat of armed force by states in their international relations. 
However, doctrines of total war advocate the use of any means to counter 
a greater force. What is now clear is that states possessing the 
superior means and resources with which to maintain their survival 
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utilize the terror tactics of liberation groups, coupled with the force 
of law to'deter those groups. Thus, the judiciary is politicized, and 
becomes yet another means of maintaining the status quo in the face of 
international and domestic demands for system transformation. 
For these many reasons, domestic judicial interpreters can be of 
little or no service in the development of international law and, in 
particular, in the development of IHL. Self-regulating states, which 
have accepted the duty to apply IHL's many provisions, fail to do so. 
Too much is at stake in a U. N. system which seeks to exercise control 
over large Powers through a numbers consensus. It would thus appear 
that, while IHL is the appropriate medium through which to simplify 
efforts to deter international acts of random political violence, state 
unwillingness to inquire into the motives underlying these acts, and 
unwillingness to utilize this legal regime, will make any consructive 
movement in this direction highly problematic. 
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